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February 26, 1982 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 81-1255
PLANNED PARENTHOOD AS-

Cert to
[DJ])

SOCIAT=~~KANSAS

CITY~

v.
ASHCROFT~y

Federal/Civil

Gen'l)~

SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr challenges the Missouri statute requiring the

·consent of a parent or approval of the juvenile court before an
unemancipated minor may obtain an abortion.
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW:

Petrs are two corporations operat-

ing abortion clinics in Kansas City and St. Louis and two physi-
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where.

They brought this suit as a facial challenge to several

Missouri statutes enacted together as part of a comprehensive
scheme to regulate, and allegedly discourage, abortions.

After a

trial on the merits, the District Court (Hunter, W.O. Mo.) held
that several of the provisions were unconstitutional but that
others were valid. 1

One of the provisions held unconstitutional

was that requiring parental or judicial consent before a minor
may obtain an abort ion.

~CAS reversed in part and affirmed in part.2

On the issue of

1 The DC decided petrs' challenge to the following provisions:
1) A requirement that abortions be performed only by physicians. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.020. Found constitutional.
2) A requirement that abortions performed after the
twelth week of pregnance be performed in a hospital. Mo.
Rev. Stat. §188.025. Found unconstitutional.
3) A requirement of parental or judicial consent before
minors may obtain an abortion. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028.
Found uncon st i tut ional.
4) Regulation of abortion of fetuses found to be viable.
Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030. Found unconstitutional.
5) Imposition of a detailed informed consent warning procedure. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.039. The court found unconstitutional the requirement of a 48 hours waiting period
between the informed consent warning and the abortion,
the requirement that the informed consent warning also be
given to parents of minors seeking abortions, and several
of the substantive requirements of the warning.
6) A requirement of a pathology report on the aborted
fetus. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.047. Found constitutional.
7) Recordkeeping and reporting reequirements. Mo. Rev.
Stat. §188.052. Found constitutional.
8) Regulatioo of counseling provided at "abortion facilities." Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.063. Found unconstitutional.
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.
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consent for minors' abortions, the court in large part reversed

r--------

the DC decision.

Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028(1) provides:

"No persoo shall knowingly perform an abortioo upon a
pregnant women under eighteen years unless:

------

________. .

(1) The attending physician has secured the informed
written consent of the minor and ooe parent or guardian; or
(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician had received the written informed consent of
the minor; or
(3) The minor has been granted the right to selfconsent to the abortion by court order pursuant to
subsection 2 of this sect ion . . . ; or
(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, and . . • the minor is having the
abortion willingly in compliance with subsection 3 of
this section.
Subsection 2 sets out the procedure to be followed in obtaining
judicial consent for the abortion.

The minor must petition the

juvenile court either for "majority rights for the purpose of
consenting to the abortion," in which case the minor can give
consent herself, or for a judicial determination that the abortion is in the best interests of the minor.

Subsection 3 pro-

vides that a minor cannot be forced to undergo an abortion

2The court of appeals reversed the DC holding of unconstitutionality in regard to two provisions: §188.030 (regulation of
abortion of viable fetuses), and §188.028 (parental or judicial
consent) (reversed in part). It also reversed the DC's holding
that §188.047, requiring pathology reports, was valid. The court
remanded for consideration the DC holding that §188.025, requiring hospitalization after the twelth week, was unconstitutional,
and its holding that §188.052, requiring certain reports, was
valid. On remand, the district court conducted additional
factfinding and once again found the hospitalizatioo requirement
invalid and the reporting requirement valid. The court of appeals affirmed those findings.
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against her consent unless a court orders the abortion as necessary to preserve the woman's life.
The court of appeals noted that a blanket requirement of
parental consent was declared unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428

u.s.

52 (1976).

This Court later deter-

mined that a statute requiring the consent of a parent or of a
court was unconstitutional because it allowed the court to block
the abortion even after it had determined that the minor was sufficiently mature to make her own decision.
433

u.s.

622 (1979)

\

[Bellotti II].

~ellotti

v. Baird,

The DC held §188.028 invalid

because it believed the law would allow the juvenile court to
deny permission for an abortion upon "good cause" even if the
minor were sufficiently mature.

The court of appeals construed

the Missouri statute differently, however.

It held that the law

would allow the juvenile court to deny permission only if it
found that the minor was not sufficiently mature to make her own
choice.

Under that interpretation, the law is valid.

The CA went on to discuss other parts of §188.028.

First,

it held that the requirement of notice to the minor's parents in
all cases was unconstitutional insofar as it required notice to
the parents even if the juvenile court determines that the minor
is mature or that it is in her best interest to have an abortion.
The court found that this question was left open
Matheson, 450

u.s.

in~L.

v.

398 (1981), but believed that the answer was

dictated by the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, joined by
Justice Stewart. 3

The court also held that the law was not

c --- - - - Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages.

~·

,,, ..

- 5 overinclusive or

~derinclusive,

that the use of the term "eman-

cipated" did not render the statute void for vagueness, and that
the statute protects the minor's anonymity and allows for a sufficiently prompt judicial determination.
CONTENTIONS:

Petrs contend that the CAB decision is direct-

ly contrary to Danforth and Bellotti II.

The statute here held

valid contains the same two provisions found fatal to the Massachusetts law in Bellotti II:

it allows a court to deny permis-

sion to a mature minor and it requires parental notification in
every case.

Similar provisions were held invalid by CA7 in Wynn

v. Carey, 5B2 F.2d 1375 (CA7 197B), and by several other courts.
CAB avoids this result by rendering a "tortured construction of
§1BB.02B" to make it consistent with the Bellotti II requirements.
DISCUSSION:

Petrs contentions are somewhat

~usual.

First

of all, petrs ignore the CAB holding striking down the Missouri.
requirement that the juvenile court notify the minor's parents 1n
every case.

Next, they argue that the CAB construction of the

statute to make it conform to the requirements of Danforth and
Bellotti II is incorrect.

Contrary

~o

the CAB interpretation of

3cAB noted that three Justices would have held the parental
notification statute involved in Matheson unconstitutional on its
face and that Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, clearly
indicated thay they would hold invalid a law which required parental notification even if the minor was found to be mature or
the court determined that notification was not in her best interests. 450 u.s., at 420.
In this case, CAB held that the notification requirement was severable and its invalidity did not require the invalidation of the
remainder of §1BB.02B.

J
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the statute, petrs maintain that the law

d~es

not require the

juvenile court to allow a mature minor to give consent herself
and is in that respect invalid.

Thus their argument is not with

statute as interpreted by CAB, but with the harsher interpretation they give to the law themselves.

Unless a state court de-

cides that the CAB interpretation is wrong, it is hard to see
what petrs have to complain about.
Ordinarily, I would recommend denial, but the underlying
issue in this case--the validity of the parental or court consent
provisions--is before the Court in three other petitions involving the Akron, Ohio, abortion ordinance.

Akron v. Akron Center

for Reproductive Health, Nos. Bl-746, Bl-B54 and Bl-1172.

In

Akron, CA6 held that a similar, although not identical, consent
requirement was invalid.

That court made several additional

holdings which conflict with parts of the CAB decision in this
case not challenged by petr.

(The last CAB opinion in this case

was filed on November 30, 19Bl, so there may still be a petition
from the state raising some of the issues presented in Akron.)
The Court has called for a response in Bl-1172, the cross-petn of
the Akron Center for Reproductive Health.

I recommend calling

for a response in this case and considering it along with the
Akron petitions.
I recommend CFR.
There is no response.
February lB, 19B2

•

0

Holzhauer

Opns in petn

·.

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
April 16, 1982 Conference
List 3, Sheet 1
No. 81-1623
ASHCROFT, Atty Gen'l of
Mo., et al.

Cert to CAS

Henley, Harris

(~,

[DJ])

v.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD
ASS'N OF KANSAS CITY

Federal/Civil

Timely

NOTE: This is a cross-petition to Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, No. 81-1255.

Please make

reference to the Preliminary Memorandum in that case.
SUMMARY: Petrs. challenge of the invalidation of Missouri's
statutory requirements that (1) every abortion performed
subsequent to the first 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a
hospital:

Pet..s;

(2) a second physician attend the performance of an
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abortion of a "viable fetus": and (3) a tissue sample be taken of
every abortion and submitted to a qualified pathologist for a
pathology report.

Petrs also contend that the DC erred in

calculating its award of attorney's fees.
FACTS: In June 1979, Missouri enacted a comprehensive
statute dealing with abortion.

Resps--two corporations operating

abortion clinics and two physicians who regularly perform
abortions in the clinics and elsewhere--filed suit in the

W.o.

Mo., challenging as unconstitutional 9 sections of the new law.
However, only the following 3 sections are involved in this
cross-petition.
Section 188.025 provides that "[e]very abortion performed
subsequent to the first 12 weeks of pregnancy shall be performed
in a hospital."

Section 188.030.3 provides that an abortion of a

"viable unborn child"--a fetus at that stage of development when
its life "may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by
natural or artificial life support systems"--"shall be performed
only when there is in attendance a physician other than the
physician performing or inducing the abortion who shall take
control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as
a result of the abortion." 1

This section also requires the

physician performing the abortion to take all reasonable steps to
preserve the life and health of the unborn child, provided that
he can do so without posing an increased risk to the life and

1other subsections of § 188.030 prohibit any abortion of a
"viable unborn child" unless necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother, and also require the performing physician
to use the technique most likely to preserve the life of the
unborn child unless that technique will endanger the mother.

•. <

-

health of the mother.

3 -

Criminal penalties are imposed for

violations of the section.

Finally,

§

188.047 requires that a

"representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion"
be sent to a certified pathologist, who must prepare a "tissue
report" to be filed with the state and the facility in which the
abortion was performed.
The DC (J. Hunter) found the first two of these provisions
unconstitutional, but upheld
report).

§

188.047 (requiring the pathology

Of the 5 other provisions challenged by resps at trial

(they had abandoned their challenge to one provision prior to
trial), the DC upheld two, struck down two in their entirety, and
invalidated portions of the fifth.

Nevertheless, the DC awarded

resps $19,279 in attorney's fees, which was apparently based on
the full amount of time resps' attorneys had spent on the case.
HOLDING BELOW AND CONTENTIONS: The CAS affirmed in part and
reversed in part, holding unconstitutional all 3 provisions at
issue here.
1. Second Trimester Hospitalization Requirement: The DC had
found the requirement that abortions be performed in a hospital
after the first trimester of pregnancy to be unconstitutional for
two reasons.

First, the requirement did not reasonably relate to

protection of maternal health because the "dilation and
evacuation" method of abortion (D&E} could be performed safely
outside a hospital up until the 18th week of pregnancy; and,
since only one Mo. hospital allows use of the D&E method in the
second trimester, the effect of the hospitalization requirement
was to render the D&E method virtually unavailable.

Second,

since no Mo. hospital will admit a woman under 18 without
parental consent, the requirement permitted parents to veto a

- 4 minor's decision to have an abortion, contrary to Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

The CA rejected this

second rationale, saying that "the fact that private entities
(i.e., the hospitals) impose additional requirements without the
State's sanction or insistence cannot affect the statute's
constitutionality."

The CA said that the proper inquiry was

whether the requirement (1) creates a substantial interference
with and imposes a direct burden on the woman's decision to have
an abortion; and (2) if so, is reasonably related to protection
of the woman's health.

Because it found the record inadequate to

decide these questions, it remanded to the DC.
On____....._,_
remand, the DC found
that (1) the D&E procedure was the
_....,
(

safest post-12 week abortion technique currently available, even
when performed outside of a hospital;

(2) only one Mo. hospital

performs second trimester D&E procedures;

(3) the D&E procedure

in a hospital is significantly more expensive than the same
procedure performed in an outpatient facility; and (4) the second
trimester hospitalization requirement results in fewer second
trimester abortions being performed than if hospitalization was
not required.

On the basis of these findings the CA held that

the requirement unconstitutionally
burdened a woman's decision to
r,__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,
seek an abortion because it was not reasonably related to
maternal health.
Petrs contend that this decision conflicts with Roe v. Wade,
410

u.s.

113, 163 (1973), which indicates that the state's

interest in protecting the health of the mother after the first
trimester of pregnancy justifies state regulation "as to the
facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is,
whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other

- 5 -

place of less-than-hospital status."

(The CA found that Roe was

not dispositive because it was decided before the D&E procedure
became widely-used and accepted.)

Moreover, in Akron Center for

Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (CA6 1981),
(

petitions for cert pending, Nos. 80-746, 80-854, & 80-1172 (all
"straight-lined" with the instant case on the April 16 Conference
List) , the court held on virtually identical evidence that a
similar hospitalization requirements was cqrrstitutional.

The

Akron decision relied heavily on Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's
Services v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd
summarily, 451 U.S. 934 (1981) (with 3 Justices stating they would
NPJ), which addressed in particular the impracticality of
retreating from Roe's "bright-line test" to rules under which the
constitutionality of second trimester regulation fluctuate with
every change in statistics concerning the availability of
abortions and the safety of new abortion techniques.

The CAB

should have considered itself bound by this Court's summary
affirmance in Gary-Northwest.
2. Pathology Reports.

The DC upheld the requirement of

pathology reports on the ground that it was rationally related to
the state's interest in regulating standards of medical care.
However, theCA held the requirement unconstitutional because it
increased the cost of abortion by $10-$40 (thereby burdening the
decision to abort): Mo. does not require submission of tissue to
a pathologist following other medical procedures: and there was
no showing that there were unique medical complications
associated with abortion that necessitated a pathology report in
every case.

While in individual cases a report may be useful (to

indicate possible fetal disorders, among other things), there is

-.
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no reason why physicians should not be able to use their own
professional judgment about whether such a report is required, as
they would do in connection with every other surgical procedure.
Petrs contend that the requirement is rationally related to
the state's interest in preserving maternal health, and point out
that the decision below conflicts with Wynn v. Scott, 449 F.
Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978},

~ppeal

dismissed, 439

u.s.

8

(1978}, aff'd, 599 F.2d 193 (CA7 1979}.
3. Requirement That a Second Physician Attend the Abortion
of a Viable Fetus.

The DC struck down this requirement as

overbroad, because it requires a second doctor even when the
fetus has no reasonable chance of survival, such as when D&E is
the only safe procedure for the woman.

The CA agreed, finding

that the requirement significantly increased the costs of
abortion, thereby decreasing its availability, and was not
justified in cases where a D&E procedure was used.
Petrs contend that the decision flies in the face of an
"overwhelming factual record" indicating that D&E should never be
the procedure of choice at a sufficiently late date in the
pregnancy that the fetus would be viable.

The decision also

conflicts with Roe, supra, at 163-164, which says that the
state's compelling interest in potential life justifies a
proscription against abortion after "viability," except when
necessary to preserve the mother's life or health.

Obviously

this interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring the
presence of a second physician to preserve and care for the
potential human life.
4. Attorney's Fees. The CA held that resps were entitled to
the full award of attorney's fees even though they prevailed on

..

- 7 -

~

only some issues.

Petrs contend that this approach conflicts

with decisions in other circuits, which hold that the award
should reflect the extent to which the party prevailed.

E.g.,

Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (CAl 1978); Hughes v.
Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (CA3 1978); Morton v. Charles Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394, 411 (D.Md. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 871
(CA4 1974); Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corp., 503 F.2d 447,
451 (CA7 1974); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, 462 F.2d
1002, 1008 (CA9 1972).

Resps (petrs in No. 81-1255) have filed a "waiver of the
right to respond," in which they actually state their position on
the cross-petition.

They point out that the issues presented in

-

the cross-petition are similar to those pending before the Court
in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of
/

Akron, etc., Nos. 80-746, 80-854, & 80-1172, and maintain that
the record is more qomplete in this case than in Akron.

Thus, if

the Court is inclined to grant plenary review in Akron it should
also grant the cross-petition.
DISCUSSION: All of the issues relating to the
constitutionality of the abortion statute are substantial, and
there is a conflict on two of the issues.

Moreover, as petrs

point out, there seems to be tension between the CAS decision and
the language of Roe v. Wade; and arguably the CA's conclusion
that the hospitalization requirement is unconstitutional was
foreclosed by the summary affirmance in Gary-Northwest, supra. 2

Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

·.
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In all, I recommend that the Court grant the petition,
possibly in conjunction with Akron, No. 81-1172, which likewise
concerns the constitutionality of a second trimester
hospitalization requirement.

Since there is a CA conflict

concerning the calculation of attorney's fees, I recommend that
the Court review this issue along with the other questions.
There is a "waiver of the right to respond" with a statement
of resps' position, and also an amicus brief from the City of St.
Louis urging a grant.

April 8, 1982

Rosenblum

Opns in petn

2The petr in Akron, supra, No. 81-1172, makes a decent
argument that the factual situation in Gary-Northwest was
sufficiently different from that in Akron and this case that the
summary affirmance is not binding. See the Preliminary
Memorandum in 81-1172.
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MEMO TO FILE (?k.t?_:-

Parenth~od

Sl-1255 and Sl-1623 Planned

~~~

v. Ashcroft

(M o)

Planned Parenthood, a clinic (Reproduction Health
Services), and a couple of doctors, sought injunctive and
declaratory relief against the Missouri abortion statute as
revised following Danforth.

It is not easy to identify the

"winner", although t.tl.'is'state prevailed on what appear to be
most of the major issues.

This memo, dictated only to aid

my memory will review - summarily - the opinion of CAS by
Chief Judge Lay.

In doing so, I follow by subject matter

CAS's disposition of the issues.*

'
t er I(H osp1' t a 1 1za
' t 1on
' "' Requ1remen
'
t•
I. Secon d Tr1mes
Section 1SS.025 requires that second and third trimester
abortions be performed in a hospital.
invalidated this requirement.

The DC had

It had noted that the D&E

*At the beginning, CAS summarizes its disposition of the
District Court's opinion, affirming in part and reversing in
part. A-56-57.

~fv~-~

~- ~~~~G
lA..J

~~~

Mo _

hv~~~~~

~~) . ·

~

method was available in Missouri in only one hospital.
Moreover, the DC noted that no hospital would admit a

2.

~

woman~

under lS without parental consent, and therefore parents
were given the power to veto minor women's decisions with

fr-~G-

~

respect to second and third trimester abortions.
Parental Consent for Hospitalization
CAS noted that, unlike the statute in Danforth,

immature minors?).

the new statute does not require parental consent (is this
true even for

In rejecting the DC's

position, CAS noted that the unavailability of hospitals was
not state action, but was the action of "private entities".
Moreover, CAS thought that the DC's position would "force
reevaluation of every health-based second trimester
regulation", and that the state interest was both concern
for the mother's health and viability of the fetus.
Because of inadequate findings by the District

----==---

Court, CAS remanded on the hospitalization requirement.
noted that "the central issue is the
nonhospitalized D&E and hospitalized methods".

In

concluding this portion of its opinion, CAS said:
"In sum, we find that the district court
failed to properly analyze the
hospitalization requir~ent. On remand, it
should ~ deter mJ n ~ f the regulation
create s su s t an £i al interference with and
imposes a direct burden on the woman's
decision eo have an a5ortion. If it does,
the district court should evaluate whether
the hospitalization requirement is justified
by a compelling state interest~ i.e., whether
it is reasonably related to the woman's
health. Missouri bears the burden of
justifying the restriction." A-66

'

,.

II.

Parental or Court Consent for

(J~~-

Minors.~~~

This section makes it a crime to

per!~,~ ~

abortion on a minor (under age lS) unless (i) the ~~
has obtained written consent of the minor and one
guardian; or (ii) the minor is emancipated and the

pare~~

~J~

physic~~~

has informed consent; or (iii) the minor has been granted ~~
the right to self-consent to the abortion by a court order,
obtained by procedure prescribed in the statute; or (iv) the
minor has been granted con~ by court order.

See brief of

respondents cross petitioners, p. 5.
CAS began its discussion of this issue by quoting
the paragraph from my Bellotti II opinion that outlined
requirements with respect to consent.
The DC had invalidated this provision because it
was viewed as allowing a state court unbridled discretion.
Also the statute had not dealt with emancipation properly.
CAS construed §1SS.02S differently.

It ruled that a court

could not deny the minor's petition unless it found that
"the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to
make her own decision and that an abortion was not in her
best interests".

These are my Bellotti II requirements.

CAS buttressed its holding in this respect by reliance on
H.L. v. Matheson.

See AGS-69.

In discussing Matheson CAS noted that it had gone
off on a "standing" issue.

But here the plaintiff was not a

young woman seeking abortion.

Rather, they were

corporations and physicians seeking to provide abortion

..

.

4.
services, and that these plaintiffs had shown that some of
their respective patients included mature minors.
Interestingly, the plaintiffs in this case (the
primary petitioners who lost on major points below} argue
that CAS had no authority to interpret the statute as it
did, contending that the plain language was otherwise.
CAS then noted that this case presented "the case
left open__in Matheson:

whether it is constitutionally

permissible to require mature or 'best interest' minors to
notify their parents prior to a court hearing in which they
seek judicial consent".

A70

Again relying on my Bellotti

II opinion, CAS states that it "advances persuasive reasons

---

for conlcuding that parental notice is unduly burdensome in
cases involving mature or 'best interest' minors."
......,.
u.s., at 642-64S.

443

Planned Parenthood challenged several other
provisions of §1SS.02S.
me - at least at present.
made.

These do not appear substantial to
The usual vagueness argument is

It also is said that the procedure does not assure

anonymity.

-

Despite these arguments, CAS concluded that "the

judicial consel}J; 12.!:9Vision" is constitutional. But CAS
---------- ---=
agreed with Planned Parenthood that "the notice provisions
n:ft"t:a;:a

....... -

found in subsection 1SS.02S.2(2} are impermissible and must~·
be set aside."
In sum, the judicial consent, construed, was
sustained, but - in accord with Bellotti II, the requirement
of parental notification was invalidated.

.

'

5.

III.

"'

Restrictions on Abortion1fter Viability (A73)
CAB first reversed the DCs

holdi~g

these restrictions were void for vagueness.

that all of
I do not think

we granted cert on the vagueness issue.
Second Doctor Requirement

(~:Jt8

~~~~<J

CAB affirmed the DC's decision that this unduly
burdened the woman's right.

~

The state agreed that there was

a financial burden, but argued that under Harris and Maher
that this was a private rather than public matter.

I agree

with CAB that these cases were misconstrued by Missouri.
Thus, there certainly was a state imposed burden that could
be justified only by a showing of compelling state interest.
The interest relied upon by the state was the
importance of making sure, where a second trimester abortion
vt.-~~~
is performed, that_the fetus wil~t survive~_CAB affirmed
the DC in co~uding that the state failed to show that a
second doctor's opinion was necessary.
CAB discussed the D&E procedure, and the conflict
of Dr. Crist's testimony with that of all other doctors.*

*My recollection is that Dr. Crist was a party in the Akron
case. He testified that he used D&E successfully on women
pregnant as much as 2B weeks. His testimony was
contradicted by every other physician, the prevailing view
being that a fetus could not survive D&E abortion. I'd like
to find some way to check up on Dr. Crist. My guess is that
he is a professional witness.

~

~~~

IV.

Informed Consent

~~~JV- ~ ~

Danforth held that a state may
consent" even in the first trimester.
at 64-67.

~-

r~quire

"informed

Danforth, 42S

u.s.,

But Danforth limited this as follows:
~
"The giving of information (to the patient as
to just what would be do~e~as to its
consequences [may be required]. To ascribe
more meaning than this might well confine the
attending physician in an undesired and
uncomfortable straightjacket in the practice
of his profession." At 67.
Section 1SS.039.2(3} goes well beyond Danforth.

It requires that the woman be informed of the "probable
anatomical and psychological characteristics of the unborn
child", and subsection (4} provides that she must be
informed of "the immediate and long range physicial dangers
of abortion and psychological trauma".
The DC held this unduly burdensome, and CAS
affirmed.
In so doing, CAS said that the DC properly
concluded that "the abortion decision is one to be made by a
woman and her physician", and that the state's interest is
adequately served when the woman's decision is made with
"full knowledge of its nature and consequences".
42S
h

u.s.,

Danforth,

at 67.
"-..

J

~ ~ • ~1 -

.

.J._ ... '

A Physician Must Advise f.v ~ ~- ~A

-

-

.1. " .

, ,

I

.6•

Section 1SS.039.1 requries that the "attending
physician" inform the woman of the information specified in
the statute.

Both the DC and CAS sustained this

requirement, despite the argument

-.......... ....

... .

of~~ood

....~--......-

that

.....----......_____.,

I'

'· '

7.

nonphysicians are capable of informing the patient, and that
requiring the physician to do it creates scheduling problems
and increased costs.

My tentative view is that a qualified

person other than a physician could give this information.
I think a state could require the licensing of such persons,

such as practical nurses are licensed.*

~~~
;.,~.

v.

Pathological Reports
Section 1BB.047 requires that sample of the tissue

removed must be submitted to a certified pathologist, who
must file a report with the state divison of health.
CAB invalidated this provision, holding that the
decision whether to obtain pathological reports should be
left to the physician.

CAB noted that Missouri "does not

require submission of tissue to a pathologist following
other medical procedures".

A94

*In the subsection discussing advice by the physician (p.
A91), CAB refers to the 4B hours waiting period prescribed.
It appears to sustain this as valid, although the discussion
at this point in the opinion is very brief.

'

.

s.
In invalidating this requirement, CAS reiterated
that "Missouri law requries that all abortions be peformed
by physicians".

A96*

* * *
CAS's opinion is long and rambling, and not
altogether clear.

I hope we can find some way to prevent

courts from having to make the multiplicity of judgments
such as those addressed by the DC and CAS in this case.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

*CAS's op1n1on is so long I may have missed it, but I find
no full discussion of the requirement that only physicians
may perform first trimester abortions. My guess is that the
Court will hold specially trained persons other than
physicians may be competent to perform first trimester
abortions.

;

..

..
'

'
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MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Nov. 22, 1982

Abortion Cases
I have now read the briefs you were good enough to
select for me, including also the brief by the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.

As I am sure

you have found, the number of issues in these cases is a bit
overwhelming.

I have not tried to sort out which ones we

granted, or whether we took them across the board.
A primary objective of the Court at this time, as
I see it, is to enunciate principles or standards that would
afford clearer guidance to state legislatures and limit the
flow of litigation into the Courts.

The professors' brief

with respect to the major issues, suggests rather positive
standards, and emphasizes the undesirability of •balancing".
These have appeal, but they also probably permit abortions
for adult women during the first trimester quite literally
"at will".

In view of the fees charged (see the Virginia

case), there always will be licensed physicians who will
make enormous profits out of what have been described as
•abortion mills". I am not at all sure the professors' brief
fairly states some of our holdings.

Perhaps the SG goes too

far the other way.
I now summarize, Jim, tentative views on several
of the major issues in these cases:

Informed Consent Requirement
Danforth recognized that this is not an undue
burden per se.

The Akron provision is unduly burdensome

because it imposes extensive requirements as to exactly what
a physician must advise the woman as a predicate to her
•informed• consent.
As to the consent requirement with respect to
minors who are neither mature not emancipated, I joined
Matheson in holding that parental consent of at least one
parent is a valid requirement except where the minor is
mature or emancipated or an independent decision-maker finds
that a non-consented abortion is in the best interests of
the minor.

In Akron, apparently Ohio law would require the

juvenile court to notify the parents.

Under my opinions in

Bellotti II and Matheson, this would be invalid.

24 Hours

Dela~(Akron)/48

Hours(Missouri)

Although I do not recall (without checking) a
court decision on this issue, I doubt that an arbitrary
delay - even with an emergency provision - would meet our
standards.

This normally can be left to the physician,

provided there is some assurance that the physician will
adequately inform the woman.

With respect to immature

minors, there should be time to assure informed consent.

We

have never considered the extent of a doctor's
responsibility in determining whether a minor is mature.

I

suppose a state validly could require with respect to minors

'·

..

3.

of tender age {under 15) that an independent decision maker
determine maturity and best interest issues.

Such a

requirement inevitably would produce some delay.

Second Trimester Abortions
My recollection is that Roe drew no bright line,
referring only to approximate stages in the development of a
fetus.

In Akron, respondents argue that •early second

trimester abortions are safely performed (even in]
outpatient clinics, and CA6 apparently would invalidate any
•arbitrary line between trimesters•.
The American College seems to agree, relying on
the argument that •medical knowledge (since Doe] has
progressed dramatically•, particularly in the use of D&E
procedures.

Yet, the evidence in the Missouri case

persuaded CAB {and possibly the DC also) that D&E procedure
invariably destroys the fetus.

Thus, in view of the

compelling state interest once viability exists a state
lawfully could insist that the decision as to viability be
made by a physician.
As the College brief relies on •current medical
knowledge•, it would appear that it agrees a qualified
physician is the only person likely to possess such
knowledge, and therefore the viability decision cannot be
delegated to a less qualified person.

4.

Free Standing Clinics
A major issue, in view of the extensive use of
clincis and the apparent unavailability of hospitals willing
to do abortions, is what sort of facilities - if any - would
be lawful.
I am favorably inclined toward the views in the
amicus brief of the College.

See pages 23, 24.

I

particularly like footnote 65 on p. 24 that describes the
College's standards for "free standing surgical facilities"
as requiring them to •maintain the same surgical,
anesthetic, personal (maybe this is personnel) standards as
recommended for hospitals."

Clearly, I would think, clincis

should be regulated and approved by state law, and
periodically inspected.
It is not clear whether the College would require
this type of clinic for first trimester abortions.

The

record - or perhaps one of the briefs - has the full text of
the College's standard as to abortions.

Take a look, and

identify (or xerox) anything helpful.

* * *
Jim, I have dictated the foregoing summary of
tentative views.

When we go into Conference on three cases,

involving three different sets of regulations, it will be
helpful to have a somewhat similar summary from you,
identifying the issue and the case.

Where we differ, we can

reconcile these prior to Conference.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

,.,,.

job 11/29/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Abortion Cases

Mo. and Akron apparently require JCAH-licensed "hospitals."
---r
<.......
_ __

No

one has indicated in the briefs what standards the JCAH imposes, and
the JCAH's requirements are unavailable to me.
h.

-

You may want to ask

'.

the clinics in the Mo. and Akron cases whether they ever tried to
comply with the law and whether their clinics were denied
certification.

I have heard from someone that once saw the JCAH regulations
that they impose very minimal requirements.

If that is the case,

the Court should know exactly what "burden" they impose before they
strike them down as unconstitutional.
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§ 32.1-123

CODE OF VIRGINIA
ARTICLE

§ 32.1-125.1

1.

Hospital and Nursing Home Licensure and Inspection.
§ 32.1-123. Definitions.- As used in this article unless a different meaning
or onstruction is clearly required by the context or otherwise:
1. "Hos.eJtal"means any facility in which the primary function is the provision
of diagnos1s,o f treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or
nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known
by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, samtariums and
general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and maternity hospitals;
2. "Nursinp- home" means any facirtty or any identifiable component of any
facility in which the primary function is the provision, on a continuing basis, of
nursing services and health-related services for the treatment and inpatient care
of two or more nonrelated individuals, including facilities known by varying
nomenclature or designation such as convalescent homes, skilled care facilities,
intermediate care facilities, extended care facilities and infirmaries.
3. "Nonre/ated" means not related by blood or marriage, ascending or
descending or first degree full or half collateral. (Code 1950, § 32-298; 1964, c.
54; 1973, c. 477; 1979, c. 711.)

§ 32.1-124. Exemptions. - The provisions of §§ 32.1-123 through 32.1-136
shall not be applicable to: (1) a dispensary or first-aid facility maintained by any
commercial or industrial plant, educational institution or convent; (2) an ·
institution licensed by the State Mental Health and Mental Retardation Board;
(3) an institution or portion thereof licensed by the State Board of Welfare; (4)
a hospital or nursing home owned or operated by an agency of the
Commonwealth or of the United States government; and (5) an office of one or
more physicians or surgeons unless such office is used principally for
performing surgery. (Code 1950, § 32-298; 1964,_c. 54; 1973, c. 477; 1979, c. 711.)
§ 32.1-125. Establishment or operation of hospitals and nursing homes
prohibited without license; licenses not transferable. -A. No person shall
own, establish, conduct, maintain, manage or operate in this Commonwealth any
hospital or nursing home unless ~uch hospital or nursing home is licensed as
provided in this article.'
B. No license issued hereunder shall be assignable or transferable. (Code 1950,
§ 32-299; 1979, c. 711.)
§ 32.1-125.1. Inspection of hospitals by State agencies generally.- As used
in this section:
A. "Hospital" means a hospital as defined in§ 32.1-123 or 37.1-1 of the Code.
B. "Inspection" means all surveys, inspections, investigations and other
procedures necessary for a state agency or a division or unit thereof to perform
m order to carry out various obligations imposed on such agency by applicable
State and federal laws and regulations.
State agencies shall make or cause to be made only such inspections of
hospitals as are necessary to carry out the various obligations imposed on each
agency by applicable State and federal laws and regulations. Any on-site
inspection by a State agency or a division or unit thereof that substantially
complies with the inspection requirements of any other State agency or any
other division or unit of the inspecting agency charged with making similar
inspections shall be accepted as an equivalent inspection in lieu of an on-site
inspection by said agency or by a division or unit of the inspecting agency. A
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lfp/ss 12/17/S2
Sl-1255 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft (Missouri)
Conference 12/16/S2
CJ absent due to illness.
This memorandum summarizes the votes on the issues
before us.
Issue No. 1 - Abstention.
Affirm:

S-0.

Issue No. 2 - Parental Notification and Consent
Divided vote - 4-4.
Voting to reverse:

WJB, TM, HAB and JPS

Voting to affirm:

BRW, LFP, WHR, SO'C

Note: CAS construed the Missouri statute to require an independent decision-maker, expressly relying on my
opinion in Bellotti II.

* * *
Sl-1623 Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood
Issue No. 1 - Hospitalization in JCAH Hospitals
Affirmed 5-3
A vote to affirm in this case sustains CAS holding
of invalidity.
Voting to affirm:
Voting to reverse:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP and JPS.
BRW, WHR and SO'C

2.

Issue No. 2 -Pathologist's Report
CAS held this requirement invalid.
Reversed:

6-2 (several tentative).

Voting to reverse: WJB (tentative), BRW, TM (tentative), LFP (tentative), WHR, and SO'C.
ment.

Voting to affirm:
HAB and JPS

i.e., invalidate the require-

Note: I would not be surprised to see WJB and TM
change their votes on this issue. I also was tentative.
Issue No. 3 - Second Physician's Opinion - Invalidated by
CAS
Reversed 5-3.
Voting to reverse (to sustain the requirement)
BRW, LFP, WHR, JPS and SO'C.
Voting to affirm:

WJB; TM and HAB.

Note:
HAB feels strongly about this issue. He
thinks that sustaining the second physician requirement is
"flatly contrary to Bolton". But Bolton involved only first
trimesters. Here the requirement exists only when the fetus
is viable and the state's interest is at its strongest.

* * *
Issue No. 4 - Attorney's Fee
All vote to Hold for my opinion in Hensley.

lfp/ss 02/01/83
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Jim and Mark

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 1, 1983

81-1255 and 81-1623 Ashcroft
I have reviewed Ashcroft, and return my edited
copy to Jim herewith.
As you predicted, this is somewhat easier to deal
with than Akron.

Yet, apart from the hospitalization issue,

none of our positions is entirely easy to defend.
Only with respect to the "second physician" issue
have I suggested consideration of a significant changes in
your draft.

I started out to do a rider, and went on to put

on paper my thoughts as to the best arguments supporting
validity.

Feel free to edit or rewrite or blend in with

your draft.
I have some trouble with the first few pages of
the draft, Jim, as we are dealing with four issues and although there is repetition in restating these, there may be
room for some clarification.

Read these over with this con-

cern in mind.
If you should be able to put this in a second
draft that satisfies both of you before I leave after lunch
on Thursday, I will take it with me for our long weekend.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

lfp/ss 02/02/83
._t;;

)

c

MEMORANDUM

..

TO:

DATE:

Feb. 2, 1983

Powell, Jr. ,:·.,. .:·

FROM:

Ashcroft
•t:"

Unless we have used it in the section dealing with
the "second physician", I would like to add the following
from~,

at

p~ .~;; l63: ~,,~

..

"With respect to the state s important and
J.egitimate interest in potential life, the
'compelling' ~oint is at viability. This is
so because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb."
may well be that

ss

'.

!{
CJ

lfp/ss 02/28/83
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 28, 2983

81-1255 Ashcroft
Thank vou for qivinq me the opportunity to review
the first printed draft on Sunday.
I have done some editing of language, and raised a
minor question or two in the marqin.
Attached hereto is a stylistic revision for page
12.

The rather long sentence

b~ginninq:

"We thi.nk this

minor burden • • • ," is a bit awkward.
Take a look at page 15.

The sentences in the text

ao not seem to flow as smoothly as most of the opinion.
Perhaps the third sentence (before exercising • • • ) should
precede the second sentence ("The Court • • • ").

I don't

feel strongly about this.
In one of my opinions, either Matheson or possiblv
Bellotti II, I indicated that a minor should have access to
an "independent decision-maker" who need not be a judqe.
What would you and Mark think of adding a note saying, in
effect, that since Missouri has provided for a judicial
decision-maker, we need not consider whether a qualified and
independent non-judicial decision-maker would be appropriate, citing what was said in one of my opinions?
On Saturday when you and Mark raised the denial of
equal protection issue, I mentioned my recollection that Roe

I-~''"'

..

~

'

.;
't'

.

>

.

'

2.

described the abortion procedures (decision?) as "unique".
Would it not be desirable to include a reference to this in
Akron?

I think the emphasis on the "stressful" nature of

the decision, with both amotional and physical consequences,
contributes to the uniqueness.

Moreover, in view of the

long history of state regulation, exclusively of
abortions,and the stronq views held

by

various religions, it

would be irrational indeed to conclude that abortions could
not be classified differently from other surgical procedures.

They have been viewed as unique since the founding

of the republic - and before.

r... F.P., Jr.
ss
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CHAMBERS OF

March 4, 1983

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 81-1255) Planned Parenthood of Kansas City v. Ashcroft
No. 81-1623) Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood of Kansas City
Dear Lewis:
cases.

In due course, I shall be writing a parti ~ dissp~t .. in these
This may take a while.
~ /l4.•+ <... L)f ~

9

Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.iUFtntt <!Jo-n:rt o-f tlft ~tb .itah.-a.Jringhnt. ~. <If. 2ll.;i~~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 5, 1983
Re:

No. 81-1255) Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft
No. 81-1623) Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.

Sincerelyy

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

.§nvumt cqcurl cf flrt ~1trit~ ~tafts
~fri:ngtcn,

:!9. cq.

2{!~)1,~

CHAMBERS OF"

May 6, 1983

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

81-1255)

Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas
City, et al. v. John Ashcroft, et al.

)

81-1623)

John Ashcroft, et al. v. Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City, et al.

Dear Sandra:
Please add my name to your opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

~upum~

<!):ouri: of t4~ ~niub' .:%tattg
'JI'¥lfittghtn. ~. <!):. 2llgt'!~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 7, 1983

Re:

81-1255 and 81-1623 - Planned

Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft
Dear Lewis:
Although I expect to join Parts I thru IV of
your op1n1on, I do not agree with the analysis in
Part V and therefore shall await further writing.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

•'

~uvrtmt <!l4t1td

d tqt .,nittb ,jbttt%

'~lhtHftittgton, ~.

<ll·

211,;;,.~

CHAMBER S OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 7, 1983

No. 81-1255
No. 81-1623

Planned Parenthood Association of
Kansas City v. Ashcroft
Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City

Dear Lewis,
In due course, I will circulate something
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

J;u.prttttt <Q:qurt qf tlft ~tb J;ta.tts
jihtsftin:gton. ~. <!J. 20gt'l$
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 7, 1983
Re:

Nos. 81-1255 & 81-1623 Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft

Dear Lewis:
I will await Sandra's writing in this case.

Sincerely, /

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.§u:pumt <!fcurl cf tqt ~tlt .§tlttta

'maafringhm. ~. <!f. 2.0,?)}~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

May 25, 1983

Re:

Nos. 81-1255 and 81-1623 - Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City, Missouri v.
Ashcroft and Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City, Missouri

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your opinion.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

.:§upumt (!Jqurl qf tltt ~nihl .:§taftg
~ag.ftin:ghm. ~.

QI.

20,?~$

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE JOHN . PAUL STEVENS

June 1, 1983

Re:

81-1255 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft
81-1623 - Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your opinion.
Respectfully,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

..

,,

.i'u.p:rtuU Clf®ri of tlt't 'J'ttittb .itattg

JTa.sfrington. ~. Clf.

20~~~

/'

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 1, 1983

Re:

No. 81-1255, Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Mo. v.
Ashcroft, AG of Mo.
81-1623, Ashcroft, AG of Mo. v. Planned Parenthood
of Kansas City, Mo.

Dear Lewis:
I join.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss 06/03/83
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

June 3, 1983

Ashcroft
After a rereading of the opinions below on the
"second

physician"

preargument),

and

issue
again

{that

I

had

not

reading HAB' s

reread

dissent,

do not

draf~
t
/'

- is

As a means of focusing my own thinking

{and

believe proposed Rider A - as you and I have
quite fair.

I

since

so you can check it), I dictate this memo.
The

DC

invalidated

the

physician

second

requirement as overbroad, devoting only a paragraph to it
{A 26).

Its findings included:

"D&E may be the procedure

of choice, even after viability,
are

positive

contraindications

prostaglandins

installation";

in cases in which there

to

the

"no

use

of

chance

saline or
of

fetus

survival" when D&E is used; and, the concluding sentence:
"the attendance of a second physician during an abortion
procedure

which

holds

no

possibility

of

fetal

survival

does not further [the state's] interest."
The finding relied on by HAB is that D&E "may be
the

procedure

of

choice

even

after

viability",

but

.-.

I '1

..

'.

2.

apparently

only

in

cases

in

which

the

woman's

health

requires this because it might be endangered by the "use
of

saline

or

prostaglandins

installation".

We

would

agree, if the woman's life is endangered by methods other
than D&E.

Thus, the question seems to be whether there is

substantial evidence that during the third trimester D&E
may be required in the interest of the mother's health?
A footnote cites, without quoting, the testimony
of

"Doctors

Robert

Schmidt

for

opinion

correctly

concluding

Crist

for

defendants".

that

considerations

"in

It

states

the

some

cases

will preclude

plaintiffs
seems

the

might result in a live birth

to

DC' s

and

me

Richard

that

holding

HAB's

(p.

maternal

6),

health

use of procedures

that

• [the second doctor in

such circumstances] "is superfluous".
CA 8 quoted Dr.
may

be

there

the
were

methods.

Crist as

testifying that "D&E

best medical procedure at
"contraindications"

(A 80)

to

28 weeks"
the

use

of

because
other

CA8 does state that "Missouri points to

testimony by other physicians that do not or would not use
D&E at
that

this

stage,

and therefore the evidence

indicates

"the question is one in which medical opinions may

differ".

3.

If

I

am

reading

the

foregoing

correctly,

it

seems to me that our rider A needs substantial revision.
Sadly,

I

don't

think we can hang HAB directly with Dr.

Crist's testimony, as he does not mention him at all.

He

simply latches on to the findings of the two courts below,
and relies on the "two court" rule.
You are far more familiar with all of this, Jim,
than

I

Unless

am.

something

important,

I

am

mistaken

or

have

overlooked

it seems to me we must refocus our

response on this aspect of the two physician issue.
concedes that medical opinions differ.
the ultimate finding of fact below.
do

two

things:

(i}

show,

as

you

At best,

CA8

this is

This entitles us to
have

devastatingly

(subject to a comment below} that on the plaintiff's side
the only "differing view"

is that of Dr. Crist, whereas

the other view is that few if any physicians ever use a
D&E

during

third

contradictory
contrary

trimester;

evidence,

to Dr.

Crist's

protecting a viable fetus

with
views,

and
the
the

given

( i i}
great

weigh

state's

f

this
of

interest

it
in

justifies the second physician

requirement even though there may be the rare case where a
doctor

may

think

honestly that D&E

mother's health.

~~.e~.

.
l

~ '•'t

'

is

required

for

~~ ~~e~l ~

~

the

4.

My one qualification about Dr. Crist's testimony
is

the

possible

ambiguity

in

his

long

answer

the

question

in the middle of the page

(A 130) .

however,

that

testimony

(at

least

correct.

The

final

that

reprinted

your
in

reading
the

of

this

appendix)

is

I

to

believe,

question and answer on p. 131 was as follows:

Q.
And do you believe that as a general
principle
• where there is an abortion there
should never be a live fetus?
A.

That is correct."
We should discuss this.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

.,.

·.

'\1·,1. _,
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82-1255 Ashcroft

Dear Henry:
....

'

,,

I would appreciate your advice as to how to frame
the position of the Court and the Justices in the above
case.
In terms of the judgment, I have a ~ourt on every
issue. On the hospitalizatlon issue, the dissenters are
Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor. On the remaining
three issues in Ashcroft, only the Chief has joined me. I
have a judgment concurred in by White, Rehnquist and
O'Connor

'I.

.

,f;

.,~,

•. \i

~--·"

It seems a bit a.wkward for me to be saying,

in those three sections that "the Court holds" or that
"we" make some decision. I understand that HAB, in his dissent in Ashcroft refers to my opinion as "Justice Powell's
opinion". ,,
I am now making some changes in this case, but
all of the opinions may be ready by our Conference next
Thursday.

··I.

JO,l

Sincerely,
'

~·

~~

{

}, li/ ,);

Mr.

..
'"
,,,

,•

......1,•,1'

·'

To : ,The Chief Justice

Justice Brennan
Justice Wh:l t'e
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquis t
Justice Stevens
,;l'om: Justice 0 'Connor

2d

Ot<~tf

Circulated :

.

SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED
Nos. 81-1255

AND

Rac1rculated-.---STATES
. --L-U~

81-1623

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC.,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
81-1255
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MISSOURI, ET AL.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MISSOURI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
81-1623
v.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC.,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June 15, 1983]

JuSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JusTICE WHITE and Jus- ,
TICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part in the judgment and

dissenting in part.
For reasons stated in my dissent in No. 81-746, Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health and in No. 81-1172,
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron, I believe
that the second-trimester hospitalization requirement imposed by § 188.025 does not impose an undue burden on the
limited right to undergo an abortion. Assuming arguendo
that the requirement was an undue burden, it would nevertheless "reasonably relate[] to the preservation and protec-

81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION
2

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

tion of maternal health." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 , 163
(1973). I therefore dissent from the Court's judgment that
the requirement is unconstitutional.
I agree that second-physician requirement contained in
§ 188.030d is constitutional because the State possesses a
compelling interest in protecting and preserving fetal life,
but I believe that this state interest is extant throughout
pregnancy. I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.
I agree that pathology-report requirement imposed by
§ 188.047 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Because I
do not believe that the validity of this requirement is contingent in any way on the trimester of pregnancy in which it is
imposed, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Assuming arguendo that the State cannot impose a parental veto on the decision of a minor to undergo an abortion, I
agree that the parental consent provision contained in
§ 188.028.2 is constitutional. However, I believe that the
provision is valid because it imposes no undue burden on any
right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion. I concur in the judgment of the Court on this issue.
I also concur in the Court's decision to vacate and remand
on the issue of attorney's fees in light of Hensley v.
Eckerhart,- U.S.- (1983).

1

..Bu,rtmt <qourt ltf tltt ~tb .i'tatts
"lt\\frington. ~. <!}. 21lbi~~
CHAMeERS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F. F>OWELL , JR .

June 14, 19S3

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: Cases held for City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive
Health Center, Inc., No. Sl-746: Planned Parenthood Assn. of
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. Sl-1255: and
Simopoulos v. Virginia, No. Sl-1S5.
No. Sl-17S2, City of Virginia v. Nyberg
In 1973 the municipal hospital commission of Virginia,
Minnesota, enacted a resolution proscribing the use of municipal hospital facilities for all abortions except those
necessary to save the life of the mother. Appellees, physicians and staff members at the municipal hospital, brought
suit. The DC ordered appellant to make the facilities
available for use by physicians who wished to perform abortions. 361 F. Supp. 932 (Minn. 1973). CAS affirmed, 495
F.2d 1342 (1974), and we dismissed an appeal and denied
cert. 419 u.s. S91 (1974).
In 19SO appellant filed a motion for relief of judgment
under Rule 60(b), arguing that the prior holding had been
undermined by our decisions in Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464
(1977): Poelker v. Doe, 432 u.s. 519 (1977): Harris v.
McRae, 44S u.s. 297-rl9SO): and Williams v. Zbaraz, 44S u.s.
35S (19SO). The DC denied relief, and CAS affirmed.
First, this is not a proper appeal. No statute was
invalidated, and a resolution of a hospital commission would
not appear to be a "statute" under Sl254. I therefore will
vote to dismiss the appeal.
On the merits, I think CAS's decision is correct. CAS
distinguished Poelker as holding only that a municipality
need not fund or provide abortion services that otherwise
are unavailable. Here the city is not being required to
fund abortions, hire doctors who perform abortions, or otherwise subsidize abortion services: the injunction only precludes it from preventing physicians from performing paid
abortions. I see no conflict requiring our attention.
Moreover, this is not a good case to consider this type of

2.

issue. The case was decided in the early 1970's, and arises
now as a motion for relief from judgment.
My vote is to dismiss and deny.
There are two motions by a lawyer named Alan Ernest,
one to file an amicus brief on behalf of the Legal Defense
Fund for Unborn Children, the other to represent children
unborn and born alive. I will vote to deny these motions.
The proposed amicus brief is wholly unhelpful and scurrilous.

L.F.P., JR.
LFP/vde

.hprtmt a+ottrt of tltt ~tb' .italte
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

June 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: Cases held for City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive
Health Center, Inc., No. 81-746: Planned Parenthood Assn. of
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. 81-1255: · and
Simopbulos v. Virginia, No. 81-185.
No. 82-151, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
710 Pension Fund v. Janowski
This case actually was a hold for Hensley v. Eckerhart,
No. 81-1244, but was listed as also a hold for Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, No. 81-1255 (in which there was an attorney's fee issue).
Petr is a pension fund. In 1976 the Fund was amended
in light of ERISA. Resps are two participants in the Fund
who brought a class action alleging that certain of the
amendments deprived them of vested benefits. The DC disapproved most of the amendments. It then awarded $142,000 in
attorney's fees to plaintiffs, an amount based on a multiplier of 2 (i.e., double the base amount of hours times
rates) •
CA7 affirmed in part and reversed in part. On the
issue of attorney's fees, CA7 stated that courts consider
several factors in deciding whether to award fees under
ERISA: the degree of bad faith, the ability of the parties
to pay fees, whether an award will deter other potential
violators of the law, the amount of the benefit, and the
relative merits of the parties' positions. CA7 noted that
"[u]nfortunately, the district court did not justify its
decision to award attorney's fees in terms of these specific
guidelines." (App. 16a.)
CA7 nonetheless found "sufficient analysis" to permit
affirmance, concluding "that this award is justified because
the litigation benefited a substantial group of Fund participants and that the award is necessary to enable aggrieved
parties to invoke the power of the court when pre-ERISA
benefits are in danger." (Id., at 18a.) As to the amount
of the award, the court observed: "Because the award was

..

2.

based on several factors, only one of which was whether
Janowski was the prevailing party, nothing in our decision
requires recomputation of the amount awarded." (Id.)
Judge Fairchild dissented on the fees issue: "I am
also of the opinion that the allowance of attorneys' fees
should be reduced. The implied accrual formula ••• appears
to be the most significant victory of the class members before the district court, and we are reversing that part of
the decision.• (Id., at 20a.)
Initially, there is an additional issue raised in the
petition. Petrs allege that resps failed to allege injuryin-fact and therefore lack standing. Resps reply that the
statute expressly provides a right to sue to those who are
covered by an unqualified p lan. No conflict is alleged, and
I believe resps are correct .
(I also would note that we
already have denied cert in Janowski v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 710 Pension Fund, No. 82-37, in
which resps here sought review of the merits of CA7's decision.) There is no reason to review this issue.
As to the attorney's fees issue, if this were a suit
under Sl988 or another statute providing for fee awards to
"prevailing parties," it would be a clear GVR in light of
Hensley. A question arises as to whether the Hensley analysis applies in an award of fees under S502(g) of ERISA,
which states that "[i]n any action under this subchapter by
a participant ••• the court in its discretion may allow a
reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party." In my view, Hensley is apposite even though ERISA is
not a "prevailing party" fee statute.
The DC took its guidance from "prevailing party" cases,
and indeed stated:
"It is the prevailing party, not the wholly
successful party, which is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, in our opinion ••••
Unless some claims were made recklessly or in
bad faith, we do not believe that the attorney's fees for the prevailing plaintiffs
should be based on the number of motions or
issues on which they were successful. Otherwise, the fixing of reasonable fees would be
reduced to a tabulation of minutiae rather
than compensation for the general results
achieved." (App. 4la.)
This makes clear that the issue in Hensley is also raised
here. In view of Judge Fairchild's dissent pointing out

3.

that the plaintiffs had been reversed on the most important
issue, I think the amount of fees should be reassessed in
light of Hensley.
I will vote to GVR in light of Hensley.

~-*~

L .F .P., JR.
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The second of these cases comes to us on

g~

the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

It in-

volves four provisions of a Missouri statute that comprehensively regulates the performance of abortions.
The first of these is a hospital requirement substantially similar to that in Akron.

For the reasons stated

in that case,J'we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
that the Missouri requirement is invalid.
A second provision requires minors to secure parental or judicial consent before obtaining an abortion.
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of this requirement.

We agree and affirm its judgment.
A third provision requires a partholgy report for

each abortion performed.
this requirement.

The Court of Appeals invalidated

~a-~f..-.~

We Gis~ ~a" ana ' reverse the judgment.

Finally, a fourth provision requires the presence
of a second physician;fauring abortions performed after the
fetus has become viable.

The role of the second physician

is to preserve the life of the fetus - where this may be
possible.

---

2.

f/sftcllcFT

The ,ourt of Appeals

Revertfiele~s

invalidated this

p~

<J!

--?

As was made clear in Roe, /a fter viability of the

fetus,/ the state has a compelling interest in preserving its
life.

We think the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating

the second-physician requirement ;fand we reverse its judgment.

* * *
The views of the Justices, however, have diverged
considerably

(/)A~ the

issues in this case.

Parts III, IV, and V of my opinion were joined
only by the Chief Justice.
Justice Blackmun has filed an opinion concurring
with respect to the hospital
the other three issues.

requirement ~but

dissenting on

His opinion is joined by Justices

Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
Justice O'Connor has filed an opinion dissenting
from the judgment on the hospitalization
ring in the judgment on the other three
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist.

issue ~but concur-

issues.~ She

is

'

---

Page proof of syllabus as
approved.
Lineup included.
Lineup still to be
~dded. Please send
lineup to me
when~ . .

Anoth~l copy of page proof of
shy abus as approved to

NOTE

being do
s ow-The syll; _
L·
.
pared b~
~eup, WhiCh has now
Umted: ~A rl,n added.

I

SUPRE~

:\dclitional changes
m syllabus.

f'b :1-

HENRY

will be released, as is
the opinion is issued.
;ourt but has been pretee of the reader. See
337.

NITED STATES

C. LIND

Reporter of D ecisions.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD A:s::;vv.~.ATION OF KANSAS
CITY, MISSOURI, INC., ET AL. v. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 81-1255.

---

Argued November 30, 1982-Decided June 15, 1983 *

Missouri statutes require abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy to be performed in a hospital(§ 188.025); require a pathology report for each abortion performed (§ 188.047); require the presence of a second physician
during abortions performed after viability(§ 188.030.3); and require minors to secure parental consent or consent from the juvenile court for an
abortion (§ 188.028). In an action challenging the constitutionality of
these provisions, the District Court invalidated all provisions except
§ 188.047. The Court of Appeals reversed as to §§ 188.028 and 188.047
but affirmed as to §§ 188.030.3 and 188.025.
Held: Section 188.025 is unconstitutional, but §§ 188.047, 188.030.3, and
188.028 are constitutional.
655 F. 2d 848, affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded; 664 F. 2d 687, affirmed.
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II, and VI, concluding that the second-trimester hospitalization requirement of§ 188.025 "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion." City of Akron v. Akron Center of Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at--. Pp. 4--5.
JUSTICE POWELL, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, concluded in Parts III,
IV, and V that:
*Together with No. 81-1623, Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri,
et al. v. Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc .,
et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT
Syllabus

1. The second-physician requirement of § 188.030.3 is constitutional as
reasonably furthering the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives
of viable fetuses. Pp. 5-9.
2. The pathology-report requirement of§ 188.047 is constitutional. On
its face and in effect, such requirement is reasonably related to generally
accepted medical standards and furthers important health-related state
concerns. In light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination can have, the small additional cost of such an examination does not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. Pp. 9-14.
3. Section 188.028 is constitutional. A State's interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either
parental or judicial. And as interpreted by the Court of Appeals to mean
that the juvenile court cannot deny a minor's application for consent to an
abortion "for good cause" unless the court first finds that the minor was not
mature enough to make her own decision, § 188.028 provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with established legal standards. See City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at--. Pp.
14-17.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concluded that:
1. The second-physician requirement of§ 188.030.3 is constitutional because the State has a compelling interest, extant throughout pregnancy, in
protecting and preserving fetal life. P. 2.
2. The pathology-report requirement of § 188.047 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion, and it~ validity is not contingent on the trimester of pregnancy in
which it is imposed. P. 2.
3. Assuming, arguendo, that the State cannot impose a parental veto on
a minor's decision to undergo an abortion, the parental consent provision of
§ 188.028.2 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on any
right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion. P. 2.
POWELL, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and VI, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an
opinion with respect to Parts III, IV, and V, in which BURGER, C. J.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part, in which WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.

81-1255#

Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, MO. v.
Ashcroft {Jim)
LFP for the Court
1st draft 3/4/83
2nd draft 6/7/83
3rd draft 6/10/83
Joined by CJ
Copy to Mr. Lind 6/2/83
HAB concurring in part and dissenting in part
1st draft 5/17/83
2nd draft 5/19/83
3rd draft 5/23/83
4th draft 6/10/83
Joined by WJB, TM, JPS
SOC concurring in part and dissenting in part
1st draft 5/5/83
2nd draft 6/13/83
Joined by BRW, WHR

But this is a recent change of policy by the ACOG and was not
uncontroversial.

See 4 Record 799-800.

While the change was in

part a judgment made after a cost-benefit analysis, it was also
meant to encourage routine identification of fetal parts before the
woman leaves the abortion facility: "Current clinical tenets
recommend that the uterine contents be submitted for a pathologist'
review; however, this approach does not place enough emphasis on the
necessity for proper examination of the tissue at the time of the
abortion procedur

itself."

Rubin, Fatal Ectopic Pregnancy After

Attempted Legally Induced Abortion 4 (April 2, 1979)

(presented

annual EIS conference, U.S. Department
Welfare, Public Health Service, Center

Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978).

And "[t]he risk of ectopic pregnancy has been
with increasing age, higher-order gravidity, black
~
races, and low socio-economic groups." Rubin, Fatal Ectopic
Pregnancy After Attempted Legally Induced Abortion (April 2,
1979) (paper presented at annual EIS conference, u.s. Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Center
~
for Disease Control) • An abortion followed by a pathology report
f1
may be the one valua e opportunity a poor woman has to discover
serious health problems, and she and the State both certainly
have a strong and immediate interest in assuring that the
abortion is performed properly. Without abortion procedures that
conform to generally accepted medical standards, legalized
abortion may not offer the poor many of the benefits that the Roe
right was meant to fo~ter.
~
~The dissent suggests that §188.047 is infirm because it
does not require microscopic examination, but that misses the
point of the regulation, which is that someone other than the
~
~ performing clinic~wil ~ ~~~e an independent medical judgmen~~
~k1
the tissue. See ri. 3, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a
~
pathologist)
·
¥ l~ok t Lt gLOssly .••• The
Footnote continued on next page.
d

1;:~~~~

/1J /1s the testimony in the Distr' t Courtm~~a~~~e~s~c·J~eQar, medical opinion
J/1.- /k.o {remai~ from unanimous on th-;i:s~~~~;;::L See 3 Record 623, 4

'-11
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Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847.

In this

case, for example, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely experienced
abortion practitioner, testified that he requires a pathologist
examination after each of the 60,000 abortions performed under his
direction at the New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health.
He considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's
report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or
for that matter from any other surgical procedure which involved the

~

erence 1s I wouldn't just be saying that, I would be putting
down an official diagnosis and putting my name on it, which woul
make me professionally liable for the accuracy of that
inter retation."
M_o_r_eoye.t:.,J it is reasonable for the State to
ssume that an independent pathologist is much more likely to
perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor.
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 {1981) {"To
the pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and
microscopically for the primary purpose of establishing a , --diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy."} {emphasis added) . - In any
case, in changing its policy, the ACOG found that the policies of
clinics varied as to the need for microscopic examinations:
No consensus exists regarding routine microscopic
examination of aspirated tissue in every case. The
committee surveyed a representative sampling of
institutions around the country. Information was
received from experienced clinicians in 29 institutions
in all regions of the country concerning their policies
on the examination of presumed products of conception.
Nearly two-fifths {38 percent) of the respondents made
microscopic examination of the tissue discretionary,
while slightly more than half {55 percent) stated that
a microscopic examination was performed in all cases.
ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1
{June 27-28, 1980). Thus, the dissent appears be critical of the
State for not taking away all discretion of the clinic in sending
tissue to a pathologist when it takes away some.

\

6.

removal of tissue from the human body."

App. 143-144.

App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr.

5 Record 798-799 (testimony

Keitges)~

See also

of Dr. Schmidt).
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's health
and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's
examination, we cannot say that the Constitution requires that
I~·~

State subordinate its interest in health to minimize ';t:;cost

abortions.t ~Even

in the early weeks of pregnancy,

"[c~ertain

regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise
of her right to decide to have an abortion may be permissible where
justified by important state health objectives."
ante, at 11.

See Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 80-81.

City of Akron,
In light of the

substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination can have, we
think the

small~~eAa~

cost of a tissue examination does not

significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision.

The

estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed.

483 F. Supp., at 700,

14/By disregarding the considered judgment of the Missouri
legislature, the dissenting opinion seems to suggest that because
some voices in the medical profession do not agree with the
State's judgment that a pathologist's examination is necessary in
all cases, the State's requirement is unconstitutional. Post, at
2-3. But this Court has never suggested that a State's abortion
regulations must conform in every detail to the recommendations
of the ACOG or the National Abortion Federation. The medical
profession is not the only guardian of the citizens' health. A
State is obligated to protect its citizens against unethical
practices, and for courts making difficult constitutional
decisions in this area, a legislature's factfindings and reports
can be a persuasive and helpful supplement to the medical
community's views with respect to the need for and reasonableness
of abortion regulations.

7.

n. 48.

In Danforth, this Court unanimously' upheld Missouri's

recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest in
protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and
judgment," 428 U.S., at 81.

IS

We view the requirement for a pathology

report as comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this
point.

RIDER A

JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissenting opinion would hold invalid the statute
on the mere possibility that Missouri courts might not find any
exception for emergency situations.

Post, at 8-9.

MARSHALL stated in Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,

U.S.

But as JUSTICE
(1983),

"[w]e will not strain to reach a constitutional question by
speculating that the [state] courts might in the future interpret" a
statute is a questionable manner.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-347 (1936)

Id., at __ (citing Ashwander v.
(Brandeis, J., concurring).

II

I

JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissenting opinion would hold §188.030.3

unconstitutionally overbroad because a fetus cannot survive a D&E
abortion after viability.

Post, at 6-7.

It assumes that D&E is the

"method of choice for some women who need post-viability abortions."
6.

The sole record support for this assumption appears to

be the testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician called by
See 2 Record 427, 438.

This method

G~£taiHly

may be

the choice for those who select Dr. Crist as their physician.

He

indicated that, "as a general principle," "[t]here should not be a
live fetus," id., at 435, and "that the abortion patient has a right
not only to be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but
also has a right to a dead fetus," id., at 431--even
could survive a D&E abortion, id., at 433.

-/...e-~tf

though~ one

None of the other

witnesses at trial, those called both by the plaintiffs and
defendants,

indicated~

use of D&E late in a pregnancy after

viability.

See 1 Record 21 (limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks);

2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar)

(D&E up to 17 weeks;

would never perform D&E after 26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost
"inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest
up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20
weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to
childbirth at 24 weeks); 8 Record 33, 78-81 (Dr. Willard Cates)
weeks latest D&E performed).

There

~~physicians

(16
with

1\

Dr. Crist's expressed total disinterest in preserving fetal life,

2.

and who perform third-trimester abortions with no regard to the
State's compelling interest in preserving fetal life when this is
possible without endangering the health of the mother.

Yet, the

dissent's overbreadth argument, based primarily on Dr. Crist's
views, is without other support in the record.
As all third-trimester abortions are subject to the
requirements of §188.030.2, D&E should not be used when the fetus is
viable; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and
when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to the
woman's life or health.

The dissent points to nothing in the

~f-~~~

reco::_dt however,

~-4-ntiiaate

ehet D&E will ever be the method that

poses the least risk to the woman in situations where there are
compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after
viability.

It appears therefore that the premise of the dissent's

factual assumption that D&E is the method of choice in the third
trimester has no basis in the record.

Nor does the dissent identify

medical literature that supports this assumption.

Cf. American

College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin
No. 56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979)

(mortality rate

for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation abortions up to
20 weeks); App. 79-80.

The dissenters thus point to no support for

their assumption that "maternal health considerations will preclude
the use of procedures that might result in a live birth" after
viability.

Post, at 6.

RIDER B

In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of
such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall
be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by
arrangement outside of the hospital."
20.030(3) (A)7 (1977).

13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-

With respect to abortions, whether performed

in hospitals or in some other facility, §188.047 requires the
pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue report with the State
Division of Health •••• "

Seen. 2, supra.

The pathologist also is

required to "provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility
or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced."

Thus,

Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well
as almost all other surgeries performed in hospitals, must be
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological examination
by the performing doctor.

The narrow question before us is whether

the State also may require the tissue removed following an abortion
performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to be submitted to a
pathologist.

We believe that it can.

On its face and in effect, §188.047 is reasonably related to
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important
health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 12.

As the

Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly
"useful and even necessary in some cases," because "abnormalities in
the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal disorders."

655

2.

F.2d, at 870. U) As rule, it is good medical practice to submit all
11
tissue to the examination of a pathologist. Z This is particularly
important following abortion, because questions remain as to the
long-range complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent
pregnancies.

See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates,

Jr.)~

Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent
Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980).

Recorded pathology

101A

pathological examination is designed to assist in the
detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or
other precancerous growths, and a variety of other problems that
can be discovered only through a pathological examination. The
general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear.
See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed.
1982)~ National Abortion Federation (NAF), National Abortion
Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards
obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing)~
Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae
in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF
standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting
"minimum standards").

I/ ~ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's
trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee"
should examine "all tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic
operations." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services
13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG standards also state as a
general rule that, for all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed.
1982). The dissent, however, relies on the recent modification
of these standards as they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides
an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a
pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue
permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change in policy was
controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800. ACOG
found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it
recognized--on the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a microscopic examination is performed
in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice,
Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980).

3.

reports, in concert with abortion complication reports, provide a
statistical basis for studying those complications.

Cf. Planned

Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976).
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion is
as qualified as a pathologist to make the
argument

~~~...;.~~...
4.-qno.~s

examination~

This

the fa ct that Missouri requires a pathologist--not

J

the performing physician--to examine . tissue after almost every type
of surgery.

Although this requirement is in a provision relating to

surgical procedures in hospitals, many of the same procedures
included within the Missouri statute customarily are performed also
in outpatient clinics.

No reason has been suggested why the

prudence required in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in
such a clinic.
I

I

Indeed, there may be good reason to impose stricter
.I

~

;;.1

-

standard" on clinics performing abortions than on hospitals.t

' ' A-A-..J-a I

12.

As

(i
~~~
J.Z. iThe professional views that the ~ laintiffs find to
('~,,.,~
.
support their position do not disclose whether consider a tion was
given to the fact that there has been
measure of serious abuse
in some abortion clinics. It is lclear 1 that a State reasonably
.
could conclude that a pathology ~ equirement is more net essary in ,
~
,
ti.e.M:: clinics than in gener 41 hospi tals ;:-part-icularly with ; - - - - .
/~ .~ · r~~ t~ abortions. There is ,~ant evidence tha t abortion
~ ~ has been a surgical procedure associated with a ~~incidence of
1~
questionable practices. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622,
641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to
"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics)~ Planned Parenthood
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976)
(Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-Times of Chicago, in a series
of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices
in abortion clinics, including the failure to obtain proper
pathology reports. ~ See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago SunTimes 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978).
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective"
the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the
additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests
that we disregard the interests of the "woman on welfare or the
unemployed teenager. •• Post, at 4. But these women may be ~
most likely to seek the least expensive clinic available. ~·~ CJ
Footnote continued on next page.

1"''11.

I

I

4.

the testimony in the District Court indicates, medical opinion is
not unanimous on this question.
798-800, 845-847; n.

II

J,

Missouri's requirement.

supra.

See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750,
But there is substantial support for

In this case, for example, Dr. Bernard

Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner, testified
that he requires a pathologist examination after each of the 60,000
abortions performed under his direction at the New York Center for
Reproductive and Sexual Health.

He considers it "absolutely

necessary to obtain a pathologist's report on each and every
specimen of tissue removed for abortion or for that matter from any
other surgical procedure which involved the removal of tissue from
the human body."

App. 143-144.

See also App. 146-147 (testimony of

Dr. Keitges}; 5 Record 798-799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt}. l

13

In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's health

l

"[t]he risk of ectopic pregnancy has been associated with
increasing age, higher-order gravidity, black races, and low
socio-economic groups." Rubin, Fatal Ectopic Pregnancy After
Attempted Legally Induced Abortion (April 2, 1979} (paper
presented at annual EIS conference, U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Center for Disease
Control}.
s the standards of medical practice in such clinics
may not be the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a
pathologist's examination of tissue is particularly important.

~The dissent suggests that §188.047 is infirm because it
does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that
misses the point of the regulation, which is that someone other
than the performing clinic should make an independent medical
judgment on the tissue. See n !~j , supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr.
Pierre Keitges, a pathologist}. It is reasonable for the State
to assume that an independent pathologist is ~ more likely to
perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor.
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981} ("To
the pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and
microscopically for the primary purpose of establishing a
diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy."} (emphasis added}.
13

~

5.

and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's
examination, we cannot say that the Constitution requires that a
State subordinate its interest in health to minimize to this extent
the cost of

abor ~ven

in the early weeks of pregnancy,

"[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the
woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an abortion may be
permissible where justified by important state health objectives."
City of Akron, ante, at 11.

See Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 80-81.

In

light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination
can have, we think the cost of a tissue examination does not
significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision.

The

estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed.
n. 48.

In Danforth, this Court

unani~ously

483 F. Supp., at 700,
upheld Missouri's

recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest in
protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and

---

~th
cons.ide-red judgment of the Missour ·
legislature, lEhe dissenting opinion seems to suggest that
cause
some voices in the medical profession do not agree with
e
State's judgment that a pathologist's examination i
ecessary in
all cases, the State's requirement is unconstit 'onal. Post, at
2-3. But this Court has never suggested th
a State's abortion
regulations must conform in every deta'
o the recommendations
of the ACOG or the National Aborti
ederation. The medical
rofession is not the only gua
an of the citizens' health. A
tate is obligated to pro
its citizens against unethical
practices, and for c
s making difficult constitutional
decisions in thi
rea, a legislature's factfindings and reports
can be a p~ asive and helpful supplement to the medical
communi
s views with respect to the need for and reasonableness
of
rtion regulations.

~

kUk~~ . w~~~
H-tt>

~ ~~/9-C{J~ ~NA-P (..cA./~
~ Y-o ~ nfli.<A· ~ . /-llfJ ~
~''a,~,·~~~

6.

judgment," 428 U.S., at 81.

IS

We view the reqriirement for a pathology

report as comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this

~ ~-

...

~·

•'
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Ashcroft Alternative Language Rider AA

ASHALT SALLY-POW
There is agreement that no fetus can survive a D&E.

Thus,

as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this
procedure after viability is subject to the requirements
of §188.030.2.

See id., at 865, and n. 28.

The courts

below, in conclusory language, found that D&E is the
"method of choice for some women who need post-viability
abortions".

Post, at 6.

No scholarly writing supporting

this view is cited by those courts or by the dissent.
Reliance apparently is placed solely on the testimony of
Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas.
t.-1.4

if nothing else, is remarkable.

His testimony,

~c.~

He is a member of the

/\.

National Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion
providers and people interested in the pro-choice

2.

movement".

Record, 415-416.

He supported the use of D&E

on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester.

In

some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure
than other methods.

See 2 Record 427-428.

His

disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his
agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only
to be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but
also has a right to a dead fetus".

Id., at 431.

He also

agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to
protect the fetus, if it can be saved", id., and finally
that "as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a
live fetus", Id., at 435.

Moreover, contrary to every

other view, he thought a fetus could survive a D&E
abortion, id., at 433-434.

None of the other physicians

who testified at the trial, those called both by the

3.

plaintiffs and defendants, considered
after viability was indicated •

-··..

that~

use of D&E

7.

The courts below found, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting

opinion agrees, post, at 6-7, that

1

~,} = d ,
f'

I

u:.:

865.

Accordingly, for

here is no

~e€ie~

justifica-

, §188.030.3 is overbroad.
I

bility is subject to the requirements of §188.030.2. See id., at
1 9;- ~ ~~~499-G
865, and n. 28. L!Hus, ~ is ne~ ~ be USQdA when the fetus is viable; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and
when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to the
woman's life or health.

~

Cf. id., at 865 (seme physicians testified
--

1\

they would not use D&E in third trimester); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56,
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979)

(mortality rate for D&E

less than or similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20
weeks); App. 79-80.
The sole record support for the lO\ier

~u-rts'

findings "'that D&

is the "method of choice for some women who need post-viability
abortions," post, at 6, appears to be the testimony of Dr. Robert
Crist, a physician called by plaintiffs and a member of the National
Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and people interested in the pro-choice movement,"
Crist ceneieered---4 t gees

Record 415-416.

mee~e~.J.- pr~~~~ ~ on

Dr.

a 28-week

""'

pregnancy and in some circumstances considered it a better procedure
than other methods.

See 2 Record 427-428.

But he also was of the

2.

philosophy "that the abortion patient has a tight not only to be
of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right t
dead fetus,•

id., at 431, that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention

a

o~

trying to protect the fetus, if it can be saved," id., and that,

'as

a general principle," "[t]here should not be a live fetus," id.,

t

435--even though _he thought a fetus could survive a D&E abortion,
id., at 433-434.

None of the other witnesses at trial, those cal ed

both by the plaintiffs and defendants,

~r

viability.

J See

1 Record 21

indicated~

(lim~ing

use of D&E

use of D&E to- under 18

weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar)

(D&E up to 17

weeks; would never perform D&E after 26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost
"inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest
up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20
weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to
childbirth at 24 weeks); 8 Record 33, 78-81 (Dr. Willard Cates)

As

weeks latest D&E performed).

(16

----------

all thfrd=trl mester abortions are

the requirements of both §188.030.1 and
be used in Missouri when the fetus is

§l8~tl.2, D&E

vja~e;

when other

are more likely to preserve its life; when alternative prodo not pose a greater risk to the woman's life or health;
and when the abortion is not necessary to preserve the life or
-M-1,.1 ~
0
health of the woman. Thus, to shGw that §188.030.3 is overbr}\ad,

v

enough to show that D&E ~imes· the method of choice , ~

~ecause Dr. Crist appar
ntly perfor ed all his abortions in Kansas / 2 Record 334, 368, 42 ,
~
~
~lr"L
7
'
hich does not
a statute similar
§188.030.1 and §188.030.2

~

hat no fetus-. wi1.-l survive a o-&:s-a.oort-:ion.

hav~

~

because he did not make clear that the D&E abortions he had pe -

.
_.{.11'/;

~"hA-(:.

~

. ·:

_ If
t--L.. Jt

.. , '

_ / . ..J--

'vt~ ~1-Ut;~

L<l.,

~~f~+~~;.
~~ .

f1-

3.

emergency s1tuations, there 1

viable

evidence that D&E will ever be the method that poses the
least risk to the woman in those rare situations where there are
compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after viabi iMoreover, even if there are such instances, it is not at all

~--~~-y.

§188.030.3.~The

clear that they would justify invalidating
Court also relied on the testimony of Dr.
~

Schmidt~ ~t Afis

Distr ct
testim

ccJ1'ia._w

is enlightening on the relevance of aftY finding that a D&E aborti
w1'llb e necessar

.
1n

~~~.
:

.

Is there any reason that you can give us for the attendance of a second physician for an abortion on a viable
fetus by method of D&E.

Q.

A.

No.

Q.

There is no possibility of survival, is there?

A.

No.

Q.

Certainly.

Mr. Susman, can I add to that just a moment?

A. To get that in focus, to me this is not a practical
point. I simply do not believe that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an elected method of abortion.
Because, again, we are talking about well along in second
t:_rimes : er, not early trimest;..er. (' ~~4<* •2 ·~•t)
Doctor, there has been prior testimony of D&E being
performed at those stages when contraindication exists for
the other alternatives.

Q.

A. Well, okay. There very well may be, but I personally
cannot conceive
a significant practical po i nt. - It
may e 1mportant legally, u from a med1ca stan point,
that doesn't bother me. (~.,.;~-~e.d )
,___

Recor 9- S36-~1.

/.1.~
G~n-~eorr~radtctory

1\

-~---

-

evidence, the State's

protecting a viable fetus justifies the second-physic'
requirement even though there may be the rare case where a doctor
may think honestly that D&E is required for the mother's health.
Legislation

n~e-~not ~mm~~very
~

I

'

'! (~

conceivable contingency.

RIDER B

In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of
such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall
be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by
arrangement outside of the hospital."
20.030(3) (A)7 (1977).

13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-

With respect to abortions, whether performed

in hospitals or in some other

facilit~§l88.047 requires the

~~

pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue report with the State
Division of Health ...• "

Seen. 2, supra.

The pathologist also is

required to "provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility
or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced."

Thus,

Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well

as ~

all other

surger ~

performed in hospitals, must be

submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological examination
by the performing doctor.
the

Stat~a~~·~~

The narrow question before us is whether

require the tissue removed following an abortion

performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to be submitted to a
pathologist.

We believe that it can.

On its face and in effect, §188.047 is reasonably related to
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important
health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 12.

As the

Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly
"useful and even necessary in some cases," because "abnormalities in
the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal disorders."

.....

655

2.

10

F • 2d ' a t 87o. t.

As rule, it is good medical practice to submit all
11
tissue to the examination of a pathologist.t This is particularly

"

important following abortion, because questions remain as to the
long-range complications Gf
pregnancies.

aeortioft~

and their effect on subsequent

See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.);

Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent
Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980).

Recorded pathology

10

t A pathological examination is designed to assist in the
detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or
other precancerous growths, and a variety of other problems that
can be discovered only through a pathological examination. The
general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear.
See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
• (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed.
1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National Abortion
Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards
obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing);
Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae
in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF
standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting
"minimum standards").

lit ACOG's

standards at the time of the District Court's
trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee"
should examine "all tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic
operations." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services
13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG standards also state as a
general rule that, for all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed.
1982). The dissent, however, relies on the recent modification
of these standards as they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides
an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a
pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue
permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change in policy was
controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800. ACOG
found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it
recognized--on the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a microscopic examination is performed
in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice,
Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980).

3.

e a

reports, in
statistical
Parenthood

01

Plaint if
as qualified
argument disr

:;t--

not the perfoJ

~ry

type of surge1

_

~ ...

vv.J.::il.On

relating to surg1cal procedures in hospitals, many of the same
procedures included within the Missouri statute customarily are
performed also in outpatient clinics.

No reason has been suggested

why the prudence required in a hospital should not be equally
appropriate in such a clinic.

Indeed, there may be good reason to

impose stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing
abortions than on hospitals.i

'1.As

the testimony in the District

)~~J

/J..

/

laintiffs find t-64
whether consideration

e~QQ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-a~~~~~~~ee~~~~~~~eo~

wi-tb a~ d..e.r.We :i-nQ..id"DCQ....O~\:IQs.ti-o.;}a-bl:e pr-aeticQ&;,. See
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979} (Bellotti II}
(minors may resort to "incompetent or unethical" abortion
clinics}; Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 u.s.
52, 91, n. 2 (1976} (Stewart, J., concurring}. The Sun-Times of
Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread
questionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including
the failure to obtain proper pathology reports. See "The
Abortion Pro~
i t ers," Chicago Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint
1978}.

~

In sugges ing that we make from a "comfortable perspective"
the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the
additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests
that we disregard the interests of the "woman on welfare or the
Footnote continued on next page.

4.

Court indicates, medical opinion is not unanimous on this question.
See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847; n. 2, supra.
But there is substantial support for Missouri's requirement.

In

this case, for example, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely experienced
abortion practitioner, testified that he requires a pathologist
examination after each of the 60,000 abortions performed under his
direction at the New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health.
He considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's
report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or
for that matter from any other surgical procedure which involved the
removal of tissue from the human body."

App. 143-144.

See also

App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr. Keitges); 5 Record 798-799 (testimony
of Dr. Schmidt)

.1 13

In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's health
and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's
examination, we cannot say that the Constitution requires that a

unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But these women may be those
most likely to seek the least expensive clinic available. As the
standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be the
highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's
examination of tissue is particularly important.
13

~k..~~~

:!The dissent suggests that §188. 04 7 is ~infirm because it I
does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that _ ~
misses the point of the regulatiop~ w~ is tbatj someone other ~
than the performing clinic 9A9Yld~ ake an indepen ent medical
~~
judgment on the tissue. See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr.
u-Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is reasonable for the State
to assume that an independent pathologist is more likely to
perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor.
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To
the pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and
microscopically for the primary purpose of establishing a
--diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy.") (emphasis added).

'.

5.

State subordinate its interest in health to minimize to this extent
the cost of abortions.

Even in the early weeks of pregnancy,

"[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the
woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an abortion may be
permissible where justified by important state health objectives."
City of Akron, ante, at 11.

See Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 80-81.

In

light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination
can have, we think the cost of a tissue examination does not
significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision.

The

estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed.
n. 48.

483 F. Supp., at 700,

In Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's

recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest in
protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and

•4

judgment," 428 U.S., at 81.

We view the requirement for a pathology

report as comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this
issue.

February 1, 1983
ASHl GINA-POW
Rider A page 9
In

Roe

the

Court

recognized

as

compelling

interest of a state in the life of a viable fetus:
state

in

human

promoting

life

proscribe,

its

may,

if

abortion

interest
it

chooses,

except

where

appropriate medical judgment,
1 i fe or health of
Missouri's

the

potentiality of

regulate,
it

" ... the

is

and

even

necessary,

in

for the preservation of the

the mother."

statutes

in

the

undertake

Roe at 16 5.
this

Several of

regulation.

--~

Post

viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary
to

preserve

the

life or

Rev. Stat. §188.030.1.
procedures

fatal

to

procedures

pose

a

mother.
is

See~'

§188.030.3

the health

the mother.

the

viable
risk

§188.030.2.
requires

fetus
to

unless
the

invalidated this

alternative

health

of

the

The statute at issue here
the

attendance of

physician at the abortion of a viable fetus.
Appeals

Mo.

The state also forbids the use of

greater

that

of

requirement,

a

second

The Court of

agreeing with

the

(respondents here on this issue)

urge

District Court.
The plaintiffs
affirmance,

advancing

a

number

of arguments.

They say

/

2.

that this second-physician requirement is an aberration of
the

traditional

doctor-patient

r ela t ionsh ip,

impractical, unnecessary, burdensome and costly.

and

is

No other

Missouri statute requires two physicians in attendance for
any other medical or

surgical procedure,

birth or delivery of

a

including child

premature infant.

These are not

insubstantial arguments, and we view the issue as a close
one.
Our

cases

state's

interest

compelling.
the

repeatedly

type

It

of

in

the

therefore

regulations

have

held,

potential
has
it

however,

life

of

substantial

may

adopt

is

discretion

in

respect

abortions that are permissible after viability.
v.

Do 1 e ,

4 3 2 U. S •

4 38 ,

U.S. 113, 165 (1973).

4 4 5-4 4 6

( 19 7 7) ;

the

fetus

with

a

that

to

See Beale

Roe v . Wade ,

410

The fetus is uniquely vulnerable at

this stage, and as recognized in Roe the abortion decision
no longer is solely one to be made between the mother and
her physician.

Roe 410

u.s.

at 166.

Section 188.030.3 provides that the second physician
"shall take control of and provide immediate medical care
for a child born as a result of the abortion".

Moreover,

the statute requires that ths physician "be in attendance"
during

the

abortion

and

"take

all

reasonable

steps

in

3.

keeping

with

good

medical

practice

to

preserve

the

life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that
it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health
of the woman".
clear

from

judgment
interested

Section 188.030.3.

these

there

that
in

provisions
are

performing

that
some

abortions

Seen. 4 supra.
Missouri
physicians
when

has

It is
made

a

primarily

desired

by

the

woman, and that there may be tension between this interest
and the state interest in protecting the potential life of
an unborn child.

*

* It is a matter of common knowledge that over the past
decade numerous physicians have specialized in abortion
practice, and clines solely devoted to this practice have
been opened in cities across our country. As evidenced by
the description of the type of clinic before the Court in
Bellotti I (citation), some of these clinics fairly may be
described as "abortion mills" in which a woman's demand
often is honored with little or no counseling.
Moreover,
many such clinics lack facilities adequate to deal with
the problems and risks attended upon abortions when there
may be close questions as to viability. (Jim:
If you and
Mark think this is a proper and useful no~we should add
a cross-reference to the footnote in S imopoulos on the
Boston-type clinic).

4.

All
witnesses
(with

one

of

the

called

expert
by

the

exception)**,

testimony
plaintiffs
agreed

trial,

and

that

dilation and evaucation procedure
is usually fatal to the fetus.

at

the

the

both

by

defendants

use

of

the

(D & E) after viability

The presence of a second

physician could be a safeguard against the unproper use of
this procedure.

**
The one exception was the testimony of Dr. Robert
Crist.
Although
his
testimony
is
not
entirely
unambigious, it can be read as approving the use of the D
& E procedure at times close to if not after viability.
He also expressed the belief that honoring the wishes of
the woman may be more important than protecting the
potential life of a unborn child.
(Jim:
The AG of
Missouri suggests this - see p. 41. We should, of course,
check exactly what Dr. Crist said and my guess is this
will require some revision of what I have just dictated,
if not its omission).

5.

Perhaps the most persuasive argument relied on by the
plaintiffs is that the presence of a second physician is
not required for any other medical or surgical procedure,
including

childbirth or delivery of

a

premature

infant.

The answer given by the state to this argument, in effect,
is

that

abortion

are

unique.

In

other

situations

the

patient's primary interst is in preserving his or her own
health.
where

Exception to this, of course, are childbirth and

an

infant must

be delivered prematurely.

Yet,

in

these situations, the mother and physician are essentially
of

one

mind.

delivery,

the

Having

carried

mother

ardently

safely and healthy.

of

fetus

desires

to

the

that

it

time
be

of

born

She also naturally hopes to survive

herself in good health.
conflict

the

interests

Thus,

there rarely if ever is a

between the

principal actors.

The

situation is different with respect to the woman who on
her own initiative seeks an abortion.

This is a surgical

procedure she may desire for no health reason and solely
to avoid childbirth

To be sure,

if told that the fetus

is or may be viable,

this may determine many mothers who

otherwise would like to have an abortion.
deter

all

mothers

and

the

state's

But it does not

assumption

that

some

physicians will accord primacy to the wishes of the woman

6.

cannot be viewed as unreasonable.

After all,

the states

interest is compelling and this necessarily supports the
right of
choice

a

state

following

to

impose some burdens on the woman's

v iabi 1 i ty

of

the

fetus.

We

therefore

believe the second physician requirement "has both logical
and biological

justifications,"

id.

at 163,

reasonable relationship to the state interest.
the Court of Appeals on this issue.

r'

and bears a
We reverse

,..
RIDER A

7.

The courts below found, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting

opinion agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used because
no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure.
655 F.2d, at 865.

483 F. Supp., at 694;

Accordingly, for them, §188.030.3 is overbroad.

There is agreement that a fetus generally cannot survive a D&E abortion.

But as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this proce-

dure after viability is subject to the requirements of §188.030.2.
See id., at 865, and n. 28.

Nevertheless, the courts below, in

conclusory language, found that D&E is the "method of choice for
some women who need post-viability abortions."

Post, at 6.

No

scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by those courts or
by the dissent.

Reliance apparently is placed solely on the testi-

mony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas.
if nothing else, is remarkable in its candor.

His testimony,

He is a member of the

National Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers
and people interested in the pro-choice movement."
416.

2 Record 415-

He supported the use of D&E on 28-week pregnancies, well into

the third trimester.

In some circumstances, he considered it a bet-

ter procedure than other methods.

See 2 Record 427-428.

His disin-

terest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his agreement "that
the abortion patient has a right not only to be rid of the growth,
called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a dead fetus."
Id., at 431.

He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of

trying to protect the fetus, if it can be saved," id., and finally

•

I

2

0

that "as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a live fetus,"
id., at 435.

Moreover, contrary to every other view, he thought a

fetus could survive a D&E abortion.

Id., at 433-434.

None of the

other physicians who testified at the trial, those called both by
the plaintiffs and defendants, considered
viability was indicated.

that~

use of D&E after

See 1 Record 21 (limiting use of D&E to

under 18 weeks): 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar)

(D&E

up to 17 weeks: would never perform D&E after 26 weeks): 4 Record
787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viability): 7 Record 52
(D&E safest up to 18 weeks): id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E
past 20 weeks): id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to childbirth at 24 weeks): 8 Record 33, 78-81 (Dr. Willard
Cates)

(16 weeks latest D&E performed).

Apparently Dr. Crist prac-

ticed only in Kansas, 2 Record 334, 368, 428, a state having no
statutes comparable to §188.030.1 and §188.030.2.

It is not clear

whether he was operating under or familiar with the limitations imposed by Missouri law.

Nor did he explain the circumstances when

there were "contraindications" against the use of any of the procedures that could preserve viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited to emergency situations.

Indeed, there is no record

evidence that D&E ever will be the method that poses the least risk
to the woman in those rare situations where there are compelling
medical reasons for performing an abortion after viability.

If

there were such instances, they hardly would justify invalidating
§188.030.3.

~ ~.

,,

3.
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in a footnote, the District
Court cited--with no elaboration--or. Schmidt.

His testimony, re-

fleeting no agreement with Dr. Crist, is enlightening.
Is there any reason that you can give us for the attendance of a second physician for an abortion on a viable
fetus by method of D&E.

Q.

A.

No.

Q.

There is no possibility of survival, is there?

A.

No.

Q.

Certainly.

Mr. Susman, can I add to that just a moment?

A. To get that in focus, to me this is not a practical
point. I simply do not believe that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an elected method of abortion.
Because, again, we are talking about well along in second
trimester, not early trimester.
Doctor, there has been prior testimony of D&E being
performed at those stages when contraindication exists for
the other alternatives.

Q.

A. Well, okay. There very well may be, but I personally
cannot conceive that as a significant practical point. It
may be important legally, but from a medical standpoint,
that doesn't bother me.

d.:o~

4 Record 836-837 (emphasis added).
~

Given that Dr. Crist's

sohisma ~

testimony is wholly unsupported, the State's compelling interest

in protecting a viable fetus justifies the second-physician requirement even though there may be the rare case when a physician may
think honestly that D&E is required for the mother's health.

Legis-

lation need not accommodate every conceivable contingency.

~.:·

..

..

RIDER C

The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an
open one, and adhere to the views that they expressed in Bellotti
II.

Post, at 10-11.

But those views have never been adopted by a

majority of this Court, while a majority have expressed quite
differing views.
Bellotti II, 443

'·'

See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981}:

u.s.

622 (plurality opinion}.

RIDER B

In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of
such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall
be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by
arrangement outside of the hospital."
20.030{3){A)7 {1977).

13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-

With respect to abortions, whether performed

in hospitals or in some other facility, §188.047 requires the
pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue report with the State
Division of Health ..•• "

Seen. 2, supra.

The pathologist also is

required to "provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility
or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced."

Thus,

Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well
as from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological examination
by the performing doctor.

The narrow question before us is whether

the State lawfully also may require the tissue removed following an
abortion performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to be
submitted to a pathologist.

We believe that it can.

On its face and in effect, §188.047 is reasonably related to
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important
health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 12.

As the

Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly
"useful and even necessary in some cases," because "abnormalities in
the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal disorders."

'}

~

655

2.

ao
F • 2d ' a t 870. 1

As a rule, it is good medical practice to submit all

tissue to the examination of a pathologist.!

II

This is particularly

important following abortion, because questions remain as to the
long-range complications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies.
See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates,

Jr.)~

Levin, et al.,

Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243
J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980).
!0

Recorded pathology reports, in concert

~ pathological examination is designed to assist in the
detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or
other precancerous growths, and a variety of other problems that
can be discovered only through a pathological examination. The
general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear.
See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed.
1982) ~ National Abortion Federation (NAF), National Abortion
Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards
obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing)~
Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae
in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF
standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting
"minimum standards").
11 7ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's
trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee"
should examine "all tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic
operations." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services
13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG standards also state as a
general rule that, for . all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed.
1982). The dissent, however, relies on the recent modification
of these standards as they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides
an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a
pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue
permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change in policy was
controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800. ACOG
found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it
recognized--on the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a microscopic examination is performed
in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice,
Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980).

3.

with abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for
studying those complications.

Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo.

v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976).
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion is
as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination.

This

argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a pathologist-not the performing physician--to examine tissue after almost every
type of surgery.

Although this requirement is in a provision

relating to surgical procedures in hospitals, many of the same
procedures included within the Missouri statute customarily are
performed also in outpatient clinics.

No reason has been suggested

why the prudence required in a hospital should not be equally
appropriate in such a clinic.

Indeed, there may be good reason to

impose stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing
abortions than on

hospitals.1 1 ~As the testimony in the District

12.

)The professional views that the plaintiffs find to
support their position do not disclose whether consideration was
given to the fact that not all abortion clinics, particularly
inadequately regulated clinics, conform to ethical or generally
accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622,
641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to
"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976)
(Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-Times of Chicago, in a series
of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices
in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to obtain
proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore,
that a State reasonably could conclude that a pathology
requirement is necessary in abortion clinics as well as in
general hospitals.
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective"
the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the
additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests
that we disregard the interests of the "woman on welfare or the
unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But these women may be those
Footnote continued on next page.

4.
Court indicates, medical opinion is not unanimous on this question.
See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847; n. 2, supra.
But there is substantial support for Missouri's requirement.

In

this case, for example, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely experienced
abortion practitioner, testified that he requires a pathologist
examination after each of the 60,000 abortions performed under his
direction at the New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health.
He considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's
report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or
for that matter from any other surgical procedure which involved the
removal of tissue from the human body."

App. 143-144.

See also

App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr. Keitges); 5 Record 798-799 (testimony
of Dr. Schmidt) .1

13

In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's health
and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's
examination, we cannot say that the Constitution requires that a

most likely to seek the least expensive clinic available. As the
standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be the
highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's
examination of tissue is particularly important.
~

~The dissent appears to suggest that §188.047 is
constitutionally infirm because it does not require microscopic
examination, post, at 4, but that misses the point of the
regulation. The need is for someone other than the performing
clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue.
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a
pathologist) • It is reasonable for the State to assume that an
independent pathologist is more likely to perform a microscopic
examination than the performing doctor. See H. Cove, Surgical
Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the pathologist,
abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of
intrauterine pregnancy.") (emphasis added).

5.

State subordinate its interest in health to · minimize to this extent
the cost of abortions.

Even in the early weeks of pregnancy,

"[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the
woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an abortion may be
permissible where justified by important state health objectives."
City of Akron, ante, at 11.

See Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 80-81.

In

light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination
can have, we think the cost of a tissue examination does not
significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision.

The

estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed.
n. 48.

483 F. Supp., at 700,

In Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's

recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest in
protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and
judgment," 428

u.s.,

.~

at 81.

We view the requirement for a pathology

report as comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this
issue.

f

lfp/ss 05/30/83

Ashcroft Footnote B

ASHFNB SALLY-POW
The dissenting opinion relies on medical opinion
that does not agree with the state's judgment that
examination by a pathologist is necessary following almost
all surgical procedures.

Medical opinion, however, is far

from being unanimous on this question.

Moreover, the

professional views expressed do not disclose whether
consideration was given to the fact that there has been a
measure of serious abuse in some abortion clinics.
, supra.

See n.

In this case, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely

experienced abortion practitioner, testified that he
requires a pathologist examination after each of the
60,000 abortions performed under his directionat the New
York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health.

He

2

0

considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a
pathologist's report on each and every specimen of tissue
removed for abortion or for that matter from any other
surgical procedure which involved the removal of tissue
from the human body".

App. 143-144.

See also App. 146-

147 (testimony of Dr. Keitges): 5 Record 798-799

(testimony of Schmidt).

In weighing the balance between

protection of a woman's health and the comparatively small
additional cost of a pathologist's examination, we cannot
say that the Constitution requires that a state
subordinate its interest in health to minimize the cost of
abortions.

The evidence in this case indicates charges

for first-trimester abortions range from ______ to ______ ,
whereas the additional cost for the health protective
tissue examination ranges from ______ to

------

..

I

.~

(
/1 \ '

lfp/ss 05/30/83

Ashcroft - Footnote A

ASHFNA SALLY-POW
The dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun would
hold that the Missouri requirement for a pathology
examination is a burden on the woman's right of
constitutional proportions.

It argues that the physician

performing the abortion is as qualified as a pathologist
to make the examination.

The dissent, in advancing this

argument, ignores the fact that Missouri requires a
pathologist - not the performing physician - to examine
tissue after almost every type of surgery.

Although the

this requirement is in a provision relating to surgical
procedures in hospitals, many of the same procedures
included within the Missouri statute customarily are
performed also in outpatient clinics.

No reason has been

2.

suggested

why the prudence required in a hospital should

not be equally appropriate in such a clinic.
Inddd, a state reasonably could conclude that
this health precaution is more necessary in outpatient
clinics than in general hospitals - particularly with
respect to abortions.

There is abundant evidence that

abortion has been a surgical procedure associated with a
high incidence of questionable practices.

See Bellotti

II, 443 U.S., at 641, n. 21 (minors may resort to
"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics); Danforth,
428 U.S., at 91, n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring).

The Sun-

Times of Chicago, in a series of special reports,
disclosed widespread questionable practices, in abortion
clinics, including the failure to obtain proper pathology
reports.

See "The Abortion Profiteers", Chicago Sun-Times

.'

,,'

.

3.

{Special Reprint 1978).

The additional cost of a

pathology examination, modest compared to other medical
charges {see, e.g., Simopoulos v. Commonwealth,
______ ), is justified by the state's interest in
protecting the health of the mother.

f ..•

at

lfp/ss 05/30/83

Ashcroft - Footnote A

ASHFNA SALLY-POW
The dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun would
hold that the Missouri requirement for a pathology
examination is a burden on the woman's right of
constitutional proportions.

It argues that the physician

performing the abortion is as qualified as a pathologist
to make the examination.

The dissent, in advancing this

argument, ignores the fact that Missouri requires a
pathologist - not the performing physician - to examine
tissue after almost every type of surgery.

Although the

this requirement is in a provision relating to surgical
procedures in hospitals, many of the same procedures
included within the Missouri statute customarily are
performed also in outpatient clinics.

No reason has been

I

I

'.

•

2.

suggested

why the prudence required in a hospital should

not be equally appropriate in such a clinic •
..uuJ._

l

Indae, a state reasonably could conclude that

"

this health precaution is more necessary in outpatient
clinics than in general hospitals - particularly with
respect to abortions.

There is abundant evidence that

abortion has been a surgical procedure associated with a
high incidence of questionable practices.
II, 443

u.s.,

See Bellotti

at 641, n. 21 {minors may resort to

"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics); Danforth,
428 U.S., at 91, n. 2 {Stewart, J., concurring).

The Sun-

Times of Chicago, in a series of special reports,
disclosed widespread questionable practices, in abortion
clinics, including the failure to obtain proper pathology
reports.

See "The Abortion Profiteers", Chicago Sun-Times

3.

(Special Reprint 1978).

The additional cost of a

pathology examination, modest compared to other medical
charges (see, e.g., Simopoulos v. Commonwealth,
______ ), is justified by the state's interest in
protecting the health of the mother.

at

lfp/ss 05/28/83

Rider A, p. 8 {Ashcroft}

ASH8 SALLY-POW
"[a]ll tissue surgically
removed, with the exception of such tissue as tonsils,
adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall be examined by
a pathologist, either on the premises or by arrangement
outside of the hospital".
20.030{3} {A}7 {1977}.

13 Mo. Admin. Code

With respect to

requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue
report with the State Division of Health,
supra.

"

See, n. 2,

The pathologist also is required to "provide a

copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in
which the abortion was performed or induced".
The

l~-~u

~

questio~- is whether the foregoing ~\o~'\

~

1requirement J i unconstitutionally

<.i)
burdenk a woman's abortion

.

'I

2.

'd ,

decision.

We hold that

~ d~not.

H

i~eac=
i~quired

in

its filing is
required only for abortions ) this routine act would hardly
assume unconstitutional proportions.

Even in the early

weeks of pregnancy "[c]ertain requirements that have no
significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to
decide to have an abortion may be permissible where
\\

justified by important state health objectives.

City of

I\

Akron, ante, at 11.

See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo.

v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976).

We think it clear

that the additional requirement that the pathologist's
report be filed can have "no significant impact" on the
woman's right.

Or, putting it differently, the abortion

decision is not unconstitutionally burdened.

!I

•,

lfp/ss 06/02/83

Rider A, p.

{Ashcroft)

ASHA SALLY-POW
Note to Jim:
Although I would deemphasize and remove from the
text the change of opinion by ACOG, we should recognize preferably in a note - that the dissent relies on the
recent modification of its standards, providing that a
pathological examination is a permissive rather than a
mandatory safeguard.

The ACOG found that no "consensus

exists regarding routine microscopic examination of
aspirated tissue in every case", though it recognized- on
the

basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions that in a

majority of them a microscopic examinatio;t s performed in
all cases.

{citation)
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Ashcroft Alternative Language Rider A

ASHALT SALLY-POW
There is agreement that no fetus can survive a D&E.

Thus,

as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this
procedure after viability is subject to the requirements
of §188.030.2.

See id., at 865, and n. 28.

The courts

below, in conclusory language, found that D&E is the
"method of choice for some women who need post-viability
abortions".

Post, at 6.

No scholarly writing supporting

this view is cited by those courts or by the dissent.
Reliance apparently is placed solely on the testimony of
Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas.
if nothing else, is remarkable.

His testimony,

He is a member of the

National Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion
providers and people interested in the pro-choice

2.

movement".

Record, 415-416.

He supported the use of D&E

on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester.

In

some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure
than other methods.

See 2 Record 427-428.

His

disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his
agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only
to be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but
also has a right to a dead fetus".

Id., at 431.

He also

agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to
protect the fetus, if it can be saved", id., and finally
that "as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a
live fetus", Id., at 435.

Moreover, contrary to every

other view, he thought a fetus could survive a D&E
abortion, id., at 433-434.

None of the other physicians

who testified at the trial, those called both by the

/.
. . ,.

~

3.

plaintiffs and defendants, considered

that~

use of D&E

after viability was indicated.

/

.
'
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Rider No. 2 (Ashcroft)

ASH2 SALLY-POW
Apparently Dr. Crist practiced only in Kansas, 2 Record
334, 368, 428, a state having no statutes comparable to
§188.030.1 and §188.030.2.

It is not clear whether he was

familiar with Missouri law.

Nor did he explain the

circumstances when there were "contraindications" against
the use of any of the procedures that could preserve
viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited
to emergency situations.

Indeed, there is no record

evidence that D&E ever will be the methods that poses the
least risk to the woman in those rare situations where
there are compelling medical reasons for performing an
abortion after viability.

If there were such instances,

they hardly would justify invalidating §188.030.3.

/

t .... ·.

,,

2.

In addition to citing Dr. Crist in a footnote,
the district court cited - with no elaboration - Dr.
Schmidt.

His testimony, reflecting no agreement with Dr.

Crist, is enlightening.
(here copy Q and A from p. 3 of Jim's note)
4 Record 836-837.

Given that Dr. Crist's schismatic

testimony is wholly unsupported, the state's compelling
interest in protecting a viable fetus justifies the
second-physician requirement even though there may be the
rare case when a physician may think honestly that D&E is
required for the mother's health.

Legislation need not

accommodate every conceivable contingency.

RIDER C

The

dissenters~the
1\

issue here is an open one, and

adhere to the views that they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at
~
~ A'C~·~.,4--~ a.-L·fctk:J4
10-11 • ..!Pfiose views wera cJQaH.y not tag sziewe e£ a majority of this
.1\

"

::::tt:£_;=~:;::A~:=::;n ~
~~~~. 5~ (~k- /i«14~ZE~

~)

,I·'

RIDER B

JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting
a fetus cannot survive a D&E

uncon titutionally overbroad becau
viability.

Tse

;~l~~ u~o~

~~~~~~~~~~~t$A;~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~that

D&E

post-viability
by plaintiffs.
~ p~~~~~~._

~

i~eRt~H ofA protec ~

See

~~~In

testified that he never "es eny
~

the fetus after an abortion, that an

abortion patient has a right not only to be rid of her pregnancy but

IJIIL,

to a IIdead fetus,'" and that as a general principle, in the case of ·
-.L..J-~-.- ~4...11 l»t..L L. • .d..tJ. ~ ..._,
abortion, there should never be a live fetus. Id., at 431-435. ~~zr
None of the other witnesses at trial,
plaintiffs and Lho!l'e

call~&-

~

~

those

~~·~

called~ by

ey t:he defendants, indicated

the

~

use of

D&E late in a pregnancy after viability~ uReer ~ eirc~mst:enc~~. ~
See 1 Record 21 (limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks): 2 Record
381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar)

(D&E up to 17 weeks: would

never perform D&E at 26 weeks): 4 Record 787 (almost "inconceivable"
to use D&E after viability): 7 Record 52 (D&E safest up to 18
weeks): id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20 weeks): id.,
at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to childbirth at 24
weeks): 8 Record 33, 78-8

Dr. Willard Cates)

(16 weeks latest D&E

dissenters are willing to build their

Missouri law.

I

~

e dubious finding that D&E is the
clear!

erroneous to
3 is overbro

abor~e ~ect

to the

requirements of §188.030.2, D&E etrnAot be used when the fetus is
viable; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and
when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to the
woman's life or health.

~ Jrhe dissent points to nothing in the

record to indicate that D&E will ever be the method that poses the
>-~
least risk to the woman in !!2!1:. situation ioA--whie ~ there are
compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after
viability.

J

"\ the dissent does

~

acknowledge the

euQA

that may arise and force the performing physician

9r

~as,

ehe er acitri premise of the dissent's

~l y-

S"l:lspeet factual

~ assumption that D&E is the method of choice in the third trimester
~/

r;;;
~

a~

i• ~~&eft

~~-- ~~~

has no basis in the record.

l medical literature give &Re
'\

l1c.J

f"

support,..
J\

4~QRters

fe ~

Nor does the

u_.,_

their assumption.
A

Cf. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979)
(mortality rate for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation
abortions up to 20 weeks); App. 79-80.
no support for

he dissenters thus point to

~ ssumption that "maternal health considerations

will preclude the use of procedures that might result in a live
birth" after viability.

Post, at 6.

lfp/ss 06/02/83

Rider~Ashcroft)
A

ASHCROFTX SALLY-POW

LfrThere may well be few physicians with Dr. Crist's
expressed total disinterest in preserving fetal life, and
who perform third-trimester abortions with no regard to the
state's compelling interest in preservingfetal life when
this is possible without endangering the health of the
mother. Yet, the fact that there are such physicians
illustrates the reasonableness of the state's requirement of
the presence of a second physician after viability.

The

dissent's overbreadth argument, based on primarily on Dr.
Crist's views, is without other support in the record.

lfp/ss 05/30/83

Ashcroft Footnote B

ASHFNB SALLY-POW
The dissenting opinion relies on medical opinion
that does not agree with the state's judgment that
examination by a pathologist is necessary following almost
all surgical procedures.

Medical opinion, however, is far

from being unanimous on this question.

Moreover, the

professional views expressed do not disclose whether
consideration was given to the fact that there has been a
measure of serious abuse in some abortion clinics.
, supra.

See n.

In this case, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely

experienced abortion practitioner, testified that he
requires a pathologist examination after each of the
60,000 abortions performed under his directionat the New
York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health.

'

..
·~

He

2

0

considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a
pathologist's report on each and every specimen of tissue
removed for abortion or for that matter from any other
surgical procedure which involved the removal of tissue
from the human body".

App. 143-144.

See also App. 146-

147 (testimony of Dr. Keitges); 5 Record 798-799

(testimony of Schmidt) .

In weighing the balance between

protection of a woman's health and the comparatively small
additional cost of a pathologist's examination, we cannot
say that the Constitution requires that a state
k U-::v ~k.tJ
subordinate its interest in health to minimize the cost of
/\

abortions.

The evidence in this case indicates charges

for first-trimester abortions range from ______ to ______ ,
whereas the additional cost for the health protective
tissue examination ranges from

.. ,

to

----
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In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of
such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall
be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by
arrangement outside of the hospital."
20.030(3) (A)7 (1977).

13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-

With respect to abortions, whether performed

in hospitals or in some other facility, §188.047 requires the
pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue report with the State
Division of Health •... "

Seen. 2, supra.

The pathologist also is

required to "provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility
or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced."

Thus,

Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well
as almost all other surgeries performed in hospitals, must be
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological examination
by the performing doctor.

The narrow question before us is whether

the State (maYralsol require the tissue removed following an abortion
performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to be submitted to a
.
. Maa. ;t:s
pathologist. We b el1eve
t h at 1t
can.
On its face and in effect, §188.047 is reasonably related to
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important
health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 12.

As the

Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly
"useful and even necessary in some cases," because "abnormalities in
the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal disorders."
F.2d, at 87o.l

10

655

As rule, it is good medical practice to submit alJL

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

·.

2.

pathologist~-The

tissue to the examination of a

standards of the

merican College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists {ACOG) at the
t.vt-U....~

time of the District Court's trial stated i-n

""

r~eJ!c:f ~ to ·

"staff

activit[ies that] are recommended in some form for all obstetricgynecologic services":
The purpose of a tissue or operative review committee
is to make certain that the highest possible surgical
standards are maintained by the hospital staff members.
This is accomplished by a continuing review of all the
surgical procedures performed in the hospital,~n t~e
h~spit~.
For this purpose, pathologic examination should
be performed on all tissue removed at obstetricgynecologic operations.

J ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 {4th ed.
1974).

The current ACOG standards state for all surgical services

performed on an ambulatory basis: "Tissue removed should be
submitted to a pathologist for an examination."

ACOG, Standards for

Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 {5th ed. 1982) {emphasis adde~
This is particularly important following abortion, because questions
~aA,I-1:>
~a~t

the long-range complications of abortions and their effect on

su,b sequent pregnancies , T n .

See App. 72-73 {testimony of Dr.

lOlA pathological examination is designed to assist in the
detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or
other re
o s rowths, and a variety of other problems that
can
be-atscovere through a ~athological examination. The
A
pathological examination ~ is clear. See American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists {ACOG), Standards for
Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 {5th ed. 1982); National
Abortion Federation {NAF) , National Abortion Federation Standards
6 {1981) {compliance with standards obligatory for NAF member
facilities to remain in good standing); Planned Parenthood of ]~
Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for
Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of First Trimester
·
Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10; Brief of the American Public
Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 811172, at 29, n. 6.

{,.....- JvM OG
~

d

(/}

5'~

1

•n

I'"V~~

")

3.

Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion
with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980).
Recorded pathology reports, in concert with abortion complication
reports, provide a statistical basis for studying those
complications.
428

Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.

u.s. 52, 81 (1976).

\.
7

Danfor~,

Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing th~ abortion is

i ,,

as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination. ~ ( Such
arguments must have been persuasive to the ACOG and National
Abortion Federation, for they recently have created for abortion an
f

1 "exception to the practice" of submitting aspirated tissue to a

pathologist for examination.

See ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed.)

. 1.I~

J(~This argument ignores the fact that Missouri requires a
pathologist--not the performing physician--to examine tissue
after almost every type of surgery. Although this requirement is
in a provision relating to surgical procedures in hospitals, many
of the same procedures included within the Missouri statute
customarily are performed also in outpatient clinics. No reason
has been suggested why the prudence required in a hospital should
not be equally appropriate in such a clinic. Indeed, there may
be good reason to impose stricter standards on clinics performing
abortions than on hospitals. See n. 3, infra.
ILJ The professional views that the plaintiffs find to
support their position do not disclose whether consideration was
given to the fact that there ha~ b~en a measure of serious abuse
in some abortion clinics. ~t ~ t is clear that a State
reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is more
necessary in outpatient clinics than in general hospitals-particularly with respect to abortions. There is abundant
evidence that abortion has been a surgical procedure associated
with a high incidence of questionable practices. See Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 u.s. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (minors may re~ort to
"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976)
(Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-Times of Chicago, in a series
of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices
in abortion clinics, including the failure to obtain proper
pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago SunFootnote continued on next page.

'.
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FIRST DRAFT: Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft,
Nos. 81-1255, 81-1623
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
These cases present several issues relating to state
regulation

of

whether

have

to

the
an

woman's

fundamental

abortion:

(i}

right

whether

to

the

decide

State of

Missouri may require that every abortion subsequent to the
first

twelve

hospital~

sample

be

weeks

of

pregnancy

be

performed

in

a

(ii} whether the State may require that a tissue
taken

of

every

abortion

and

submitted

qualified pathologist for an examination and

to

report~

a

(iii}

whether the State mav require the attendance of a second
at

physician b. i
Jt

the

... ·~ j - - . -~ - ~ IJ \.-\
~·-

abortion of a viable ~~

and

(iv ) whether the State's

""

parental consent statute is consistent with this Court's
prior decisions. 1

vV r /A
1 The
~
rv
•
)Yf
on
award of

r IYV"

, /'v)l

\t'p'

1

-~

a~tf'-

~«.

'1,

s

..L<- ,...,

fl,

~.

petition also raises
issue whethe~n
attorneys' fees, made pur uant to 42 u.s.c.
§1988, should be proportioned to ref ect accurately the
extent to which plaintiffs prevailed. Beoause t':his hJ.gue
i~al t-a the OllQ prQiteRtee il'i HeRsley u
Eckerhart,
Footnote eeRHRue G....on Rex ~ page -.(

2.

I

On

~

.

June

$"

abort1on.

A

29,

the

1979,

Governor

of

State

e·he

~

..

The next day, pla1nt1ffs--Planned Parenthood of

"
Kansas

City,

Missouri,

Inc.,

two doctors

that

perform

(~··~s')-and an abortion clinic--filed a complaint in

abortions,

.1\

the District Court for
challenging,

as

the Western District of Missouri

unconstitutional,

several

sections

of

~~

The

taose- A s ta tutes.
§188.025,

providing

~
~must
1\

be

sections

that

abortions

performed

pathology

relevant

here

after

twelve-weeks

a.,.
2
in l\.hospital f ;

report

requiring

a

§188.030,

req~~~~~as~~·~~

after

include

every

§188.047,

abortion; 3

~~b-f-w2~~
4
after

viability;

and

1\

}

2 Mo.

Rev. Stat. §188.025 provides: "Every abortion
performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy shall be performed in a hospital."
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.047 states:

A representative sample of tissue removed at the time
of abortion shall be submitted to a board
eligible or certified pathologist, who shall
file a copy of the tissue report with the state
division of health, and who shall provide a copy
of the report to the abortion facility or
hospital in which the abortion was performed or
induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record.
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.3 provides:

Footnote continued on next page.

3.

§188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial
consent. 5

An abortion of a viable unborn child shall
performed or induced only where there is in
attendance a physician other than the physician
performing or adducing the abortion who shall
take constrol of and provide immediate medical
care for a child born as a result of the
abortion.
During
the
performance
of
the
abortion,
the physician performing
it,
and
subsequent
to
the
abortion,
the
physician
required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with
good medical practice, consistent with the
procedure used, to perserve the life and health
of the viable unborn child; provided that it
does not pose an increased risk to the life or
health of the woman.
5Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028 reads:
1.
No person shall knowingly perform an
abortion upon a pregnant woman under the age of
eighteen years unless:

(1) The attending physician has secured the
informed writ ten consent of the minor and one
parent or guardian; or
(2)
The minor
is emancipated and the
attending physician has received the informed
written consent of the minor; or
(3) The minor has been granted the right to
self-consent to the abortion by court order
pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and
the
attending
physician
has
received
the
informed written consent of the minor; or
(4) The minor has been granted consent to
the abortion by court order, and the court has
given its informed written consent in accordance
with subsection 2 of this section, and the minor
is having the abortion willingly, in compliance
with subsection 3 of this section.
2. The right of a minor to self-consent to
an abortion under subdivision (3) of subsection
1 of this section or court consent under
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section
may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
(1) The minor or next friend shall make an
application to the juvenile court which shall
Footnote continued on next page.

be

assist the minor or next friend in preparing the
petition and notices required pursuant to this
section.
The minor or the next friend of the
minor shall thereafter file a petition setting
forth the initials of the minor; the age of the
minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian,
or,
if
the minor's
parents
are
deceased and no guardian has been appointed, any
other person standing in loco parentis of the
minor; that the minor has been fully informed of
the risks and consequences of the abortion; that
the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient
intellectual
capacity
to
consent
to
the
abortion; that, if the court does not grant the
minor majority rights for the purpose of consent
to the abortion, the court should find that the
abortion is in the best interest of the minor
and give judicial consent to the abortion; that
the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have
private counsel, that the court should appoint
counsel.
The petition shall be signed by the
minor or the next friend;

(3)
A hearing
on the merits of
the
petition, to be held on the record, shall be
held as soon as possible, within five days of
the filing of the petition . . . . At the hearing,
the court shall hear evidence relating to the
emotional development, maturity, intellect and
understanding of the minor; the nature, possible
consequences, and alternatives to the abortion;
and any other evidence that the court may find
useful in determining whether the minor should
be granted majority rights for the purpose of
consenting to the abortion or whether
the
abortion is in the best interests of the minor;

(4) In the decree, the court shall for good
cause:
for
or

(a) Grant the petition for majority rights
the purpose of consenting to the abortion;

(b) Find the abortion to be in the best
interests of the minor and give judicial consent
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for
so finding; or
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth
grounds on which the petition is denied;
Footnote continued on next page.

the

~
1\ DlS t.
r1c t
hospitalization

requirement;

minors' consent provision; and §188.030, the provision

..£:)<~1- ~

~upheld §188.047, the pathology requirement. 6

of Appeals
Court's

for

The Court

the Eighth Circuit reversed the District

judgment

with

respect

to

§188.028,

upholding the requirement that a minor secure

parent~
! o ~~

~~-JJ 1- ~~.4·'
=-!!

judicial

consent

to

an

a~ortion, A

and . •rJitb

r;es;pect - to

bu-~~-~~~~~
I{ §188.047,
i'fl _.e-Ue.g.t- i.nualidati~
the
requirement.
the
case

pathology

The District Court's judgment with regard to

second-physician
was

T'¥

remanded

requirement

for

further

was

affirmed,

proceedings

and

and

the

findings

3.
If a minor des ires an abortion, then
she
shall
be or ally
informed of and,
if
possible, sign the written consent required by
section 188.039 in the same manner as an adult
person.
No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion
may be performed against the will of a minor
pursuant
to
a
court
order
described
in
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section
that the abortion is necessary to per serve the
life of the minor.
6 see 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701.
The District Court
awarded attorneys' fees for every hour claimed by the
plaintiff's attorneys.

6.

relating

to

requirement.
the
the

the

second-trimester

655 F.2d 848,

872-873

District Court reaffirmed

r

(1981).

On remand,

~elus~on

second-trimester hospitalization

was unconstitutional.
judgment.

that

requirement

The Court of Appeals affirmed this

664 F.2d 687, 691.

We
resolve

its,(

hospitalization

granted
the

u.s.

certiorari,

conflict

in

the

Courts

(1982),

of

Appeals

on

to
the

hospitalization requirement 7 and because the other issues
presented
should

are

be

i~t

settled .. by

questions

tMs

Cocrrt.

of
We

federal
now

law

affirm

that
the

judgment of the Court of Appeals invalidating the Missouri
hospitalization
consent

requirement

requirement,

unconstitutional

the

but

and

upholding

reverse

pathology

the

report

the

parental

judgment

holding

and

second-

the

.s
physician requirement.8

A
7 See Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v.
City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (CA6 1981), rev'd in part &
aff'd in part, ___ U.S. ___ (1983).
Many states require
hospitalization for second-trimester abortions. See Brief
for Americans United for Life as Amicus Curiae 4 n. 1
(listing ~ 23 states) •
8 The judgment as to the attorneys' fees issue is
vacated and remanded in light of our decision in Hensley
v. Eckerhart,
u.s.
(1983).

7.

II
The Court today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for

u.s.

Reproductive Health, Inc.,

(1983), has stated

fully the principles that govern judicial review of state
statutes

regulating

discussion

need

abortion

not

be

procedures,

repeated

principles in mind, we turn to the

here.

~

and
With

that
these

statutes at issue

here.
A

In City of Akron, we held invalid a hospitalization
requirement for second-trimester abortions.

The ordinance

there

abortions

general

required

doctors

hospitals or

Commission

on

to

perform

facilities

Accreditation

such

in

accredited by the Joint

of

Hospitals

American Osteopathic Association.

u.s.,

or

by

at

the
The

~

.
A~(.L
requirements

.
t h at a f ac1'1'1 ty must meet lR
Ala•otF f

~~1-<J .t..c
to

constitute

a

hospita~

id.,

at

==='~,.{ similar

to

~ ~ , ~-.~~- · q LV~~
those required ~ ~Aneed

d~
s

~~

,t)4-

~ Hd--

~~1

..

~~""

"hos~i

9 Missour i
not define the term
tal" in
11
J,.r
statutory pro is ions regulating abort ions,. aRe WQ oan
/.(
~~ ~nk¥-~~~~ that ·
has its common meaning of a general,
~~
acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.015(2)
~;(defining "abortion facility" as a "clinic, a physician's
~ 1
Footnote continued on next page.
:--

8.

aey

dif~

in- -1§.1:1 e---t ,.10

de :f i rn. t 1. o tTS • 10

What

is

important for our purposes is that both 1 aws require all
second-trimester

abortions

to

be

performed

in

general,

require

extended

acute-care facilities.

~J2li:D2sl~T~ '~
the s'tatute here does
analysis,

because

it

imposes

not

burdens

similar

found to interfere with the woman's rig h t

to

those

to decide to

ASH GINA-POW n abortion in City of Ak ro n and is 1 ikewise not
RIDER A page 8
81-1255 and 81-1623 - Ashcroft v. Missouri

/

In short, Section 188.025 imposes on a woman's abortion
decision requirements we found to

~e

in

Cit~

of

'\
Akron.

For the reasons stated in that case at some length,

we agree with the Court of Appeals that this statute is
invalid.

Note to Jim:

The only purpose of the foregoing is to save a

few lines, and to avoid using language that possibly may be
viewed as different.

~~
9.
1-o~~

~~ ~- J'~-~
~~~-~~~~
Appeals that §188.025 cannot be upheld. ~ ~

cJHf

~t-6,

B

Missouri clearly views the life of a viable fetus as
important and the protection of that life as a compelling
interest.

The State proscribes post-viability abortions

except when necessary to preserve the health or lives of
pregnant women.

See Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.1.

It also

precludes the use of procedures fatal to the viable fetus

1

unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk to the
health of the mother.

See id., §188.030.2.

It is clear that the cost of a second physician in
attendance at the abortion of a viable fetus would be a
direct burden upon the availability and delivery of such
abortion

services.

After

viability,

however,

1

the

compelling interest of the State in potential human life
is paramount,

authorizing

the

proscription of

not necessary to maternal life and health.

abortions

Because it has

the power to preclude, it necessarily has much discretion
in regulating the effectuation of abortions that it does
allow.

See Beal v. Doe, 432

v. Wade, 410

u.s.

u.s.

113, 165 (1973).

438, 445-446 (1977): Roe

1

10.

Plaintiffs
requirement

argue

that

is an aberration of

this

second-physician

the traditional doctor-

patient relationship, and is impractical, unnecessary, and
burdensome.
doctors

No

other

in attendance

Missouri
for

statute

requires

two

any other medical or surgical

procedure, including for childbirth or for the delivery of
a premature infant.

Requiring two doctors to be present

strains medical resources and places an enormous financial
burden directly upon

the woman seeking to terminate the

pregnancy. 11

11Plaintiffs also argue that the statutory provision
is overbroad, because no viable fetus can survive a D&E
procedure.
The District Court found D&E to be the
"procedure of choice"
after viability and that D&E
"carries no chance of fetal survival."
483 F. Supp., at
694. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the District
Court's finding of fact as to the chances of fetal
survival is not clearly erroneous and that "[t]here is no
error in the district court's factual conclusion that for
some patients and physicians, D&E is the method of choice
even after viability is possible." 655 . F.2d, at 865. We
disagree, however, with both courts' legal conclusion that
the second-physician requirement is overbroad. The Court
of Appeals did not reach the issue whether a State could
require a second physician when there is some possiblity
the fetus may survive, see id., at 866 & n.30, but
nonetheless held §188.030.3 unconstitutional.
As the
Court of Appeals noted, however, the choice of D&E after
viability is subject to the requirements of §188.030.2.
See id., at 865 & n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be used when
the fetus is viable and other methods are more likely to
preserve its life but not pose a greater risk to the
woman's life or health.
Moreover, the experts in the
District Court disagreed whether D&E should ever be used
after viability.
See 655 F.2d, at 865 & n. 29.
It is
arguable that the coincidence of situations in which there
are both compelling medical reasons for an abortion after
viability and the risk-based choice is D&E may be rare.
In this case, however, the District Court's failure to
Footnote continued on next page.

11.

Plaintiffs'

objections,

however,

fail

to

take

into

account the state's compelling interest in the life of the
unborn

and

his

uniquely

vulnerable

mother's immediate needs.

status

given

his

The abortion decision at this

stage in the pregnancy is no longer "primarily" a medical
decision between the mother and her physician, and "'the
usual

remedies,

judicial

and

intra-professional,'"

Roe,

410 U.S., at 166, that are available to protect the woman
are not adequate,
protect

the

applies

to

in Missouri's

viable
the

fetus.

fetus

By

reasonable
definition,

capable of

judgment,
this

independent

to

statute

life.

The

State is entitled to preserve and nurture that potential
life and, when successful, actual life.
We
assume

believe
that

generally,
but

with

mother.

the

with
the

that

it

is reasonable

concern

of

the

for

the State to

abortionist

is

not,

the health and well-being of the fetus,
health

and

desires

of

his

patient,

the

The second doctor will provide immediate medical

make any findings that would permit us to judge the
frequency of post-viability abortions by the D&E procedure
renders plaintiffs' overbreadth challenge unpersuasive.

12.

care for

the child when born,

the doctor performing
inflicted upon

the

and his presence may help

the abortion to reduce the trauma

fetus.

Moreover,

that are almost certainly fatal

certain

procedures

to the fetus may not be

necessary to protect the health or 1 i fe of the woman . 12
In

those

mandated,

situations
it

is

where

necessary,

fatal
if

procedures
Missouri's

are

not

compelling

interest in the life of the fetus is to have any meaning,
that

the

State

have

someone

present

to

scrutinize

the

choice of the procedures used.
We

recognize

that a preservable human life may not

often be possible as a result of an abortion, but we also
know that abortions should not often be performed after
v iabi l'i ty,

and

then only for

serious medical

reasons . 1 3

12 At a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that
viability is possible, the fetus is sufficiently large
that it must be dismembered, and the skull must be
crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft,
655 F.2d, at 865 & n. 29.
13 There is no clearly expressed exception on the
face of the statute for the performance of an abortion of
a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance.
It is possible that emergency circumstances might well
warrant the same. The last clause of §188.030.3 qualifies
at least the last part of the provision with the phrase
"provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the
life or health of the woman." It may be that this clause
would not require a second doctor where it was simply not
possible.
See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407 n.l4
Footnote continued on next page.

13.

The State legitimately, however, may choose to be prepared
for those rare instances of live birth.

We believe the

second-doctor requirement "has both logical and biological
justifications,"
relationship

id.,

to

at

163,

and

compelling

the

bears

a

State

very

close

interest

protecting the lives of viable unborn children.

in

1

Thus, in

requiring a second physician to be in attendance at the
abortion of a viable fetus, Missouri has acted precisely
within

the

principles

set

forth

in Roe and

reaffirmed

today in City of Akron.

1

c
The most vulnerable State regulations are those that
apply to adult women during the first

trimester~

provision on its face, by imposing a
"""-

/
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ASH13 SALLY-POW
Section 188 047
. .
.
, requiring a pathology report
abortion, is such
view of the state

a regulation.

The question is whether in

interest, the requirement

woman's abortion decision.

after every

unduly burdens a

We think ~ I't d

Sa

oes not.

1

14.

state, Missouri requires "[a]ll tissue surgically removed,
with the exception of such tissue as tonsils,
hernial

sacs,

and

prepuces,

pathologist,

either

outside

hospital."

the

Although Missouri

on

the

shall

be

premises

See

13

or

CSR

apparently does

adenoids,

examined
by

a

arrangement

50-20.030

not

by

(1977).

require pathology

reports in all procedures, or in all surgical operations
outside

of

a

hospital,

"not

all

distinction

abortion and other procedures is forbidden."
Baird

(Bellotti

I),

428

u.s.

132,

149

between

Bellotti v.

(1976).

Section

~~

(/1,_..1

§188.047, on its face and in effect, reasonably enco~ r ~

~~s~~d

1\

rna ternal

1/tL- ~~

health . 14

~H osocr i

1\

14 The District Court noted that several medical
experts testified that pathology should be done in every
case of abortion.
See 483 F. Supp., at 700 n. 49.
Moreover, the standards for abortion services of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
state that for all abortions:
Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to
the patient's release from the facility.
If
villi or fetal parts are not identified with
certainty, the tissue specimen must be sent for
further pathologic examination, and the patient
must be alerted to the possibility of an ectopic
pregnancy.
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th
ed.
1982).
The standards of the National Abortion
Federation,
whose
members
include
the
institutional
plaintiffs in this case, itself provides:
All tissue must be examined grossly at the time
of the abortion procedure by a physician or
Footnote continued on next page.

15.

argues that the requirement of a pathological examination
1/1~w4±±

~ ~~ -ti:2 ~
a~±p

~wre

the

detection

of

fatal

ectopic

pregnancies, uterine perforations, hydatritaforme moles or
other

precancerous

problems

that

can

growths,
only

and
be

a

variety

discovered
may be

pathological examination.!\

is

of

through

the one

~
~

range

complications

of

a

justified in

affects the reproductive capabilities of patients.
are still some questions t;o be

other

There

~ {-<J
.a~~

abortions

and

a.eot~-t

their

~

the longeffect

on

11-~ ~LI-~
subsequent pregnancies. ~ recorded pathology reports, in
\

1\

concert with abortion complication reports, should provide
a

statistical

basis

on

which

to

study

those

trained assistant and the results recorded in
the chart.
In the absence of visible fetal
parts or placenta upon gross examination,
obtained tissue may be examined under a low
power microscope for the detection of villi. If
this examination is inconclusive, the tissue
should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology
laboratory for microscopic examination.
National Abortion Federation, National Abortion Federation
Standards 22 (1981).
See Brief of the Amercican Public
Health Association as Amicus Curiae 29 n. 6 in Nos. 81185, 81-746 & 81-1172 (supporting the National Abortion
Federation standards for nonhospital abortion facilities
as constituting "minimum standards").

16.

complications. 15
Plaintiffs
tissue

contend

examination

is

that

the

additional

unduly

cost

of

that

burdensome;

a

the

requirement of an examination by a pathological cannot be
justified under traditional medical cost/benefit analysis;
that

such

an

examination

unnecessary

and

duplicative

of

serves
the

no

gross

in

rational

does

not

case

is

purpose;

examination

physician makes in every case.
§188.047

every

the

simply
and

is

performing

Indeed, plaintiffs note,

specify whether

the

pathologist must

make a microscopic examination 16 and does not impose any
time

limits

within

which

the

examination

must

be

conducted, thereby obviating somewhat the reasons for the
examination.

We need not, however,

balance the costs and

benefits to determine whether §188.047 is constitutional.
We agree with the District Court that "the Court has not
been

shown

that

the

increase

in

cost

per

abortion

15 section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report
be sent to the State's division of health.
16 state regulations, however, state: ' "All reports
shall contain the findings of a gross examination.
If
fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an
accompanying microscopic tissue report must also be filed
with the Division of Health." 13 CSR 50-151.030.

17.

procedure resulting from the required tissue examination
will

constitute

abortion."

an

undue

burden on

483 F. Supp., at 699-700.

a

woman

seeking an

The estimated cost

of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services
is

$19.40

per

abortion

clearly
somet ·

are

performed. 17

useful:

pathology

Pathologists

may

discover

in a close case that is out of the ordinary and

not be not iced by the per forming doctor
pathology
requirements

requirement,

upheld

in

Missouri v. Danforth,

like

Planned

428

u.s.

52

the

recordt eeping

Parenthood
(1976),

of

Central

"can be useful

to the State's interest in protecting the health of

its

female citizens, and may be a resource that is relevant to
decisions involving medical experience and judgment," id.,
at 81. 18

J~~J

As

an

empi r~

-j u9~me"ftt,

"we see no legally

~a-

testimony in the District Court that the
additional cos of pathology would range from $10.00, for
a gross exami at ion, to $40.00, in cases where multiple
microscopic
xaminations of the tissue were necessary.
See 483 F. S pp., at 700 n. 48.
18 The
noted
that
"[t]he
added
requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception
for public health officers, and for retention for seven
years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and
persuade us in our determination of the constitutional
limits."
428
u.s., at 81.
Missouri
provides
for
identical safeguards.
See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§188.055.2,
188.060.

18.

~~4~~~

~:;a< ~T-t::r( ~

icant impact or consequence on the abortion decision
or

n the physician-patient relationship."
requirement may have some

See

id.,

at

impact on

's limited resources, but we are not persuaded th

D

It

is

~
~r

that

the State's

special

concern

for

~~~~~4A•~
~

"

will not support a State-granted parental veto over

a minor's abortion decision.
74-75. 2 0

See Danforth,

428

u.s.,

at

Nor may the State itself retain the arbitrary

right of veto over a mature minor's abortion.

A majority

of the Justices of this Court, however, has indicated ~nat ~

19 As
in Danforth,
we emphasize
that,
although
§188.047 is not constitutionally offensive in itse~l~~
"perhaps approach[es] impermissible limits."
U.S., at
52.
Small burdens in cost, even
promote maternal
health, may not be "abused or
rdone," id.
Obviously,
even a few additional sm
requirements, even when they
individually promote
od medical practices, eventually
will burden the
rtion decision to the point that women
will be d
red from having an otherwise medicallY.
desira
abortion.
20 This
Court
in
Danforth
held
unconstitutional
Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried
minors under the age of 18. See 428 u.s., at 72, 75.
In
response to our decision, Missouri enacted the section
challenged here.
This new statute became effective
shortly before our decision in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979).

19.

~ i t ---wottld
minors

~~

approv ~

a

narrowly

drafted

statute

allowing

judicially determined to be mature to make their

own abortion decisions, while requiring immature minors to
obtain a consent-substitute,

such as parental permission

or judicial authorization predicated upon a determination
of

the minor's best interests. 21

See Bellotti v. Baird

443

647-648

(Bellotti

II),

U.S.

622,

643-644,

(1979)

21 The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) , also require that the alternative to parental
consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue
"will
be
completed
with
anonymity
and
sufficient
expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an
abortion to be obtained."
Id., at 644.
Confidentiality
is assured by the statutoryrequirement that allows the
minor to use her initials on the petition. See Mo. Stat.
§188.028.2(1). As to expedition of appeals, §188.028.2(6)
provides in relevant part:
The notice of intent to appeal shall be
given within twenty-four hours from the date of
issuance of the order.
The record on appeal
shall be completed and the appeal shall be
perfected within five days from the filing of
not ice to appeal.
Because time may be of the
essence
regarding
the
performance
of
the
abortion, the supreme court of this state shall,
by court rule, provide for expedited appellate
review of cases appealed under this section.
We believe the section provides the framework for a
constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial
proceedings. Immediately after the effective date of this
statutory
enactment,
the
District
Court
enjoined
enforcement: No unemancipated pregnant minor has been
required to comply with this statutory section before an
abortion is performed. Thus, to this point in time, there
has been no need for the state Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning appellate review.
There is no reason to
believe that Missouri will not expedite any appeal
consistent with the mandate in our prior opinionsf an
e
e 1eve
1s ourt of the
judgment
of
the
Court
concerning
the
constitutionality of this section, the Supreme Court of
Missouri shall proceed with diligence to enact relevant

20.

(plurality

opinion

(WHITE, J.,
parental
arguments

for

dissenting}

consent

four

Justices} :

at

656-6 57

(expressing approval of absolute

requirement}. 22

against,

id. ,

these

rules

The

reasons

have

been

for,

and

thoroughly

explored in prior opinions, and we need not discuss them
again in detail.
The

issue

construction. 23

here

is

one

purely

The Missouri statute,

of

statutory

in relevant part,

provides:
(4} In the decree, the court shall for good
cause:

~

22
cf. H.L.
: : :eson, 450 u.s. 398, 407 & n.l4,
411 (1981) (uphol ing a parental notification requirement
but not extending holding to mature or emancipated minors
or
to
immature
minors
showing
such
notification
detrimental to their best interests).
The lower courts
found
that
§188.028's
notice
requirement
was
unconstitutional.
See 655 F.2d, at 873: 483 F. Supp., at
679. Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this
Court for review, § 188.028 contains no requirement for
parental notification.
23The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated"
women under the age of 18 both from the requirement of
parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a
judicial proceeding.
The word "emancipated" in this
context is not void for vagueness. Although the question
whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the peculiar
facts and circumstances of each individual case, the
Missouri courts have declared general legal rules to guide
that determination, and the term is one of general usage
and understanding in the Missouri common law.
See Black
v. Cole, 626 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67
C.J.S. Parent and Child §88, at 811 (1950 ed.}}: In re the
Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976)
(same}: Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo. App.
1958} .
It should also be noted that, before a person may
be successfully prosecuted for a violation of §188.028,
the State must show that defendant "knowingly" violated
the section.

21.

(a) Grant the petition for majority rights
the purpose of consenting to the abortion;

for
or

(b) Find the abortion to be in the best
interests of the minor and give judicial consent
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for
so finding; or
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth
grounds on which the petition is denied[.]

On its face,
do (a),
a

§188.028.2(4)

(b), or (c).

denial

of

the

the

authorizes juvenile courts to

The Court of Appeals concluded that

petition

permitted

in

subsection

(c)

"would initially require the court to find that the minor
was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her
own decision and
interests."

that

655 F.2d,

an abortion was
at 858.

her

best

Plaintiffs contend

that

fairly

statute so as

possible,

in

4~

this interpretation is unreasonable.
Where

not

We ti+sagree.
1\

courts

should

construe

a

to avoid a danger of unconsti tut ionali ty.

The Court of Appeals was cognizant of the fact that if the
statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor
for~

"good cause," it would violate the principles set

forth in Danforth and Bellotti II.
The court,

however,

See 655 F.2d, at 858.

reached the logical conclusion that

"findings and the ultimate denial of the petition must be

22.

supported by a
exercising
evidence

showing of

any option,
on

"the

'good cause.'"

the

juvenile court

emotional

rationally

petition,

found

Before

must

receive

development,

intellect and understanding of the minor."
Appeals

Ibid.

maturity,

The Court of

that a court could not deny a

"for good cause," unless it first found--after

having received the required evidence--that the minor was
not mature enough to make her own decision. 24
after Bellotti I I,

Clearly,

there would be no legally sufficient

reason to deny a petition if evidence demonstrated that a
minor was
Thus,

we

sufficiently mature to make her own decision.
believe

the

Court

of

Appeals

correctly

24 Missouri argues t at, under state law, "for good
cause" is "'a cause orr ason sufficient in law.'" State
v. Davis, 469 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1971) (quoting Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 978 (1976)).
The
Missouri courts f
t, however, in a variety of
contexts, that the commonly used legal phrase "for good
cause" "is not susceptible of precise definition," Vaughn
v. Ripley, 416 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. App. 1967), and that
"'good cause' depends upon the circumstances of the
individual case," Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407
(Mo. 1963). A finding of its existence "lies largely in
the discretion of the ••• court to which the decision is
committed," ibid., and the phrase "connotes a remedial
purpose in a matter addressed primarily to the conscience
of the court," Corzine v. Scott, 505 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo.
App. 1974). This discretion, however, no doubt is limited
to choices that are "a cause or reason sufficient in law."
We are unwilling to assume that the discretion given to
the Missouri courts by t~~lQg~at~~ includes the
privilege of ignoring this Court's \GOilstrtJctio~ o f- the

y

Otlf'P"""'

l"''f

~

fund mnental r

ir
C.~srn.:.-t.A~-4-Utf~"'H.,.._,...__

23.

interpreted
avoids

the

the

statute,

infirmities of

and

as

interpreted,

§188.028

the state statute reviewed in

Bellotti I I. 25
III
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it
invalidated

Missouri's

requirement

and

provision,

is

second-trimester

upheld

the

State's

affirmed.

The

judgment

hospitalization

parental

consent

invalidating

the

requirement of a

pathology report for all abortions and

the

that

requirement

a

second

physician

abortion of any viable fetus

is reversed.

judgment upholding

of

the

We vacate the
for

all

remand

for

proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart, ___

u.s.

hours

expended

an award

attend

by plaintiffs'

attorneys'
attorneys

fees

and

25 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the clear
ambiguity of §188.028.2(4), as evidenced by the differing
interpretations placed upon it by reasonable judicial
minds,
perhaps
the
appropriate
course
of
judicial
restraint is abstention.
This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398,
407 (1981): Bellotti I, 428 u.s., at 146-147. Plaintiffs
did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the
court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification
procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state
statutory construction to the state supreme court, see 655
F.2d, at 861 n. ?.0, which procedure "greatly simplifie[d]"
our analysis in Bellotti I, 428 u.s., at 151. Moreover,
where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair
construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving construction, there is no need
for the federal courts to abstain.

24.

It

is

so ordered.

SECOND DRAFT: Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft,
Nos. 81-1255, 81-1623

~ JUSTICE

POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:

------~:7
cf! on June

29,

.:r: Governor

the

1979,

of Missouri

into law comprehensive regulations of abortions.
day,

plaintiffs--Planned

Parenthood

of

signed

The next

Kansas

City,

,.

..~.

Missouri, Inc., two doctors that perform abortions, and an

(the 1 plaintiff~;--filed

abortion clinic
District

Court

for

the

Western

a complaint in the

District

of

Missouri
·,

challenging, as unconstitutional, several sections of the
new

statutes.

Named

General

of

Jackson

County,

capacity

Missouri

and

as

defendants

and

the

Missouri,

as

were

prosecuting

who

representative

was
of

the

Attorney

attorney

sued

both

the

class

in

of
that

of

all

prosecuting attorneys of the various counties in Missouri.
See 483 F.
relevant
19 8 2) ,

here

679,

683

include

Mo.

providing

* pregnancy

A.

Supp.

must

be

that

(WD Mo.
Rev.

Stat.

abortions

performed

in

1980).

a

The sections

§188.025

after

(Supp.

twelve-weeks

hospital; 1

§188.047,

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

2.

requiring
§188.030,

a

pathology

requiring

the

report
presence

after
of

every
a

second

abortion; 2
physician

after viability; 3 and §188.028, requiring minors to secure
parental or judicial consent. 4

1 Mo.

Rev. Stat. §188.025 provides: "Every abortion
performed
subsequent
to
the
first
twelve weeks
of
pregnancy shall be performed in a hospital."

2 Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.047 states:
A representative sample of tissue removed at the time
of abortion shall be submitted to a board
eligible or certified pathologist, who shall
file a copy of the tissue report with the state
division of health, and who shall provide a copy
of the report to the abortion facility or
hospital in which the abortion was performed or
induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record.
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.3 provides:
An abortion of a viable unborn child shall
performed or induced only where there is in
attendance a physician other than the physician
performing or adducing the abortion who shall
take constrol of and provide immediate medical
care for a child born as a result of the
abortion.
During
the
performance
of
the
abortion,
the physician performing
it,
and
subsequent
to
the
abort ion,
the
physic ian
required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with
good medical
practice,
consistent with
the
procedure used, to perserve the life and health
of the viable unborn child; provided that it
does not pose an increased risk to the life or
health of the woman.
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028 reads:
1.
No person shall knowingly perform an
abortion upon a pregnant woman under the age of
eighteen years unless:
(1) The attending physician has secured the
informed written consent of the minor and one
parent or guardian; or
( 2)

attending

The minor
is emancipated and
the
physician has received the informed
Footnote continued on next page.

be

3.

f

After

a

full

trial,

at

which

a

number

of

expert

written consent of the minor; or
(3) The minor has been granted the right to
self-consent to the abortion by court order
pursuant to subsection 2 of this sect ion, and
the
attending
physician
has
received
the
informed written consent of the minor; or
(4) The minor has been granted consent to
the abortion by court order, and the court has
given its informed written consent in accordance
with subsection 2 of this section, and the minor
is having the abortion willingly, in compliance
with subsection 3 of this section.
2. The right of a minor to self-consent to
an abortion under subdivision (3) of subsection
1 of this section or court consent under
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section
may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
(1) The minor or next friend shall make an
application to the juvenile court which shall
assist the minor or next friend in preparing the
petition and notices required pursuant to this
section.
The minor or the next friend of the
minor shall thereafter file a petition setting
forth the initials of the minor; the age of the
minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian,
or,
if
the minor's
parents
are
deceased and no guardian has been appointed, any
other person standing in loco parentis of the
minor; that the minor has been fully informed of
the risks and consequences of the abortion; that
the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient
intellectual
capacity
to
consent
to
the
abortion; that, if the court does not grant the
minor majority rights for the purpose of consent
to the abortion, the court should find that the
abortion is in the best interest of the minor
and give judicial consent to the abortion; that
the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have
private counsel, that the court should appoint
counsel.
The petition shall be signed by the
minor or the next friend;

(3)
A hearing
on
the merits of
the
petition, to be held on the record, shall be
held as soon as possible, within five days of
the filing of the petition . . . . At the hearing,
the court shall hear evidence relating to the
emotional development, maturity, intellect and
Footnote continued on next page.

4.

witnesses testified,
of

these

sections,

requirement. 5
reversed
§188. 028,

the District Court

the

invalidated each

except ~

pathology

the

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
District

Court's

judgment

with

respect

to

thereby upholding the requirement that a minor

secure parental or

judicial consent to an abortion.

It

understanding of the minor; the nature, possible
consequences, and alternatives to the abortion;
and any other evidence that the court may find
useful in determining whether the minor should
be granted majority rights for the purpose of
consenting to the abortion or whether
the
abortion is in the best interests of the minor;

(4) In the decree, the court shall for good
cause:
for
or

(a) Grant the petition for majority rights
the purpose of consenting to the abortion;

(b) Find the abortion to be in the best
interests of the minor and give judicial consent
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for
so finding; or
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth
grounds on which the petition is denied;

the

3.
If a minor des ires an abort ion, then
she
shall
be orally
informed of and,
if
possible, sign the written consent required by
section 188.039 in the same manner as an adult
person.
No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion
may be performed against the will of a minor
pursuant
to
a
court
order
described
in
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section
that the abortion is necessary to perserve the
life of the minor.
5 See 4 8 3 F • S u pp. 6 7 9 , 6 9 9 -7 0 1.
Thes District Court
also awarded attorneys' fees for ~ houG claimed by the
A
plaintiff's attorneys.
~

5.

also

held

that

the

District

Court

erred

§188.047, the pathology requirement.

~~o

judgment with
was

affirmed,

and

in

sustaining

The District Court's

the second-physician requirement

the

case

was

remanded

for

further

proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester
hospitalization
(1981).

On

holding

that

requirement.

remand,

the

resolve

granted
the

848,

Court

affirmed

its

of Appeals

664 F.2d 687, 691.

certiorari,

conflict

872-873

hospitalization

The Court

unconstitutional.

affirmed this judgment.
We

District

F.2d

second-trimester

the

requirement was

655

in

the

(1982),

u.s.
Courts

of

Appeals

on

to
the

hospitalization requirement 6 and because the other issues
presented

are

settled.

We

Appeals

invalidating

requirement

questions
now

and

affirm

of
the
the

upholding

federal

law

judgment
Missouri
the

of

that
the

should

be

Court

of

hospitalization
parental

consent

6see Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v.
City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (CA6 1981), rev'd in part &
aff'd in part, ___ u.s. ___ (1983).
Many states require
hospitalization for second-trimester abortions. See Brief
for Americans United for Life as Amicus Curiae 4 n. 1
(listing 23 states).

6•

requirement,

but

unconstitutional

reverse

the

the

pathology

.judgment

report

and

holding

the

second-

physician requirements. 7

The Court today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for

u.s.

Reproductive Health, Inc.,

(1983), has stated

fully the principles that govern judicial review of state
statutes

regulating
need

not

abortion
be

procedures,

repeated

and

here.

With

principles in mind, we turn to the statutes at

these

issue.~

In City of Akron, we held invalid a hospitalization
requirement for second-trimester abortions.
there
general

required

~

hospitals or

Commission

on

perform

facilities

Accreditation

such

The ordinance
abortions

in

accredited by the Joint

of

Hospitals

American Osteopathic Association.

u.s.,

or
at

by

the
The

7The petition also raises the issue whether an
award of attorneys' fees, made pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1988, should be proportioned to reflect accurately the
extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.
See n. 5, supra.
The judgment as to this issue is vacated and remanded in
light of our decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart,
U.S.
( 19 8 3) .

7.

~~~
requirements

A
~

heep~a± ~~ ~ ee similar to those required by Akron. 8

"

We therefore need not discuss

i\

t~~~mQRts

~ ~~..e.~k:-~~~1\ What is ....iJD~a'fl-t ~ u L. pYrpo..s~

is

in detail. 9

that

both

laws

require all second-trimester abortions to be performed in
general, acute-care facilities.
In

short,

§188.025

~~-

imposes ~

on

a

woman's

abortion

~~~-~-~~~d1J4 ~

decisionj req~etRQRt':s.-

Wo9

~od to "Be uRodul¥- burcQReome in-

~~~~~
.-t. ~.tt:(•••t.J-~- ,... ~ v WM.-~ Jf I e:; L.t · 5 ·A.. 'i/,f'/ 6> ~ .(1 t:f'7 3) ,
8 Missour i does not define the term "hospital" in
its
statutory
prov1s1ons
regulating
abortions.
We
therefore must assume, as did the courts below, see 483 F.
Supp., at 686 n. 10; 664 F.2d, at 689-690 & nn. 3, 5 & 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acutecare facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.015(2) (defining
"abortion facility" as a "clinic, a physician's office, or
any other place or facility in which abortions are
performed other than a hospital").
Section 197.020, part
of Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
Hospital means a place devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for the
diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more
abnormal physical conditions; or a place devoted
primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical
care for
three or more nonrelated individuals.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. §197.200 (defining "ambulatory surgical
center" to include facilities "with an organized medical
staff of physicians" and "with continuous physician
services and registered professional nursing services
whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 CSR 5030.010 (1) (A)
(1976)
(same).
The regulations for the
Department of Social Services, 13 CSR 50-20.010 to -20.030
(1977),
establishes
standards
for
the construction,
physical facilities, and administration of hospitals--not
unlike those set by the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals. See City of Akron,
U.S., at
9 The parties have drawn no factual distinction
between the State's requirements of a "hospital" and the
City's requirements in City of Akron.

8.

~k<Gn. ~e~sons stat~injtil?;/L:!::!;:;- _._

o.f

/;A IQJL?' £,.,.,
.....,.~.R.Q~t:::::=~~

agree

with

A

the

Court

410

u.s.

of

Appeals

that

113

(1973),

the

this

is invalid.

In

Roe

v.

Wade,

Court

recognized as compelling the interest of a State in the
life

of

a

viable

interest

in

chooses,

regulate,

where

is necessary,

it

the

fetus:

" [T] he

potentiality
and

even

State

of

in

human

promoting

1 i fe

proscribe,

may,

abortion

in appropriate medical

its

if

it

except

judgment,

for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
Id., at 164-165.

Several of Missouri's statutes undertake

this regulation.

Post-viability abortions are proscribed

except when necessary to preserve the life or the health
of the mother.

See Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.1.

The State

also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater
risk to the health of the mother.

;,.._
The

statute

attendance of
viable

fetus.

at
a

H-e-~

issue I\ fte-r-e ,
second

The

See id., §188.030.2.

§188.030.3,

physician

lr

at

the

requires

the

abortion of

courts below both agreed

a

that

9.

this requirement is invalid.
The plaintiffs, respondents here on this issue, urge
affirmance,

advancing

a

number

of

They

arguments.

say

J--k{
~s

that
the

second-physician requirement is an aberration of

traditional

impractical,
other

including
These

unnecessary,

Missouri

attendance

doctor-patient

for

statute

burdensome,

and

two

requires

is

costly.

No

in

physicians

insubstantial

premature

arguments,

and we

infant.
view the
1

issue as a close one.
Our
State's

cases

the

repeatedly

interest

compelling.

It

regulations

1

any other medical or surgical procedure,

childbirth or delivery of a

are not

and

relationship,

in

the

have

held,

potential

therefore has

however,
of

is

substantial discretion

in

respect

a

the

fetus

it may adopt with

life

that

to

abortions

that are permissible after viability.

See Beal v.

432 U.S. 438, 445-446 (1977); Roe, 410

u.s.,

Dole,

at 165.

1

The

~

fetusl\ uniquely vulnerable at t .his
in Roe,

stage~as

recognized

~
the abortionA no longer is [SOle\ yJ one to be

between the mother and her physician.

made ~

See id., at 166.

Section 188.030.3 provides that the second physician

1

' 10.

"shall take control of and provide immediate medical care
for a child born as a result of the abortion."

Moreover,

the statute requires that the physician "be in attendance"
during

the

keeping

abortion

with

good

and

"take

medical

all

practice

reasonable
to

steps

preserve

in
the

1

life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that
it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health
of the woman."
provisions
are

some

See n. 3, supra.

It is clear from these

that Missouri has made a
physicians

primarily

judgment that there

interested

in

performing

1

abortions when desired by the woman, and that there may be
tension between this
protecting

the

interest and the state interest in

potential

life

of

an

unborn child.

For

example, the District Court found, and the record supports
its finding,
{D&E)
483

that the dilatation-and-evacuation procedure

of abortion "carries no chance of fetal survival."
F.

Supp.,

at

694. 10

The

presence

of

a

second

lOAt a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that
viability is possible, the fetus is sufficiently large
that it must be dismembered, and the skull must be
crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft,
655 F.2d, at 865 & n. 29.

1

' 11.

physician could be a safeguard against the improper use of
this procedure.
Perhaps

the

most

persuasive

argument

relied

on by

1

plaintiffs is that the presence of a second physician is
not required for any other medical or surgical procedure,
including

childbirth or delivery of

a

premature

infant.

The answer given by the State to this argument, in effect,
is

that

abortions are unique.

patient's
hetfith.

primary

interest

In other situations,

is

in

preserving

her

the

1

own

Exceptions to this, of course, are childbirth and

where an

infant must be delivered prematurely.

Yet,

H..~
these situations, the mother ardently desires that

in

d-/d
~

be

~

born

safely

and

survive herself
ever

is

a

II

She

heal thy.

in

conflict

also

good

health.

of

interests

naturally

Thus,

there

between

the

hopes

to

rarely

if

1

principal

actors.
The situation is different with respect to the woman
who on her own initiative seeks an abortion.

This is a

surgical procedure she may desire for no health reason and
solely to avoid childbirth.
fetus

is

or

may

be

viable,

To be sure, if told that the
many mothers who otherwise

1

would like to have an abortion may determine not to do so.
But

~

~

does not alter the decision of all mothers and the

State's

assumption

primacy to

that

the wishes of
After

unreasonable.

some

physicians

will

the woman cannot be

all,

the

State's

1

accord

viewd

interest

as
is

compelling and this necessarily supports the right of a
State

to

impose

some

burdens

on

the

woman's

choice

1

certain procedures

1

of

in£ i ic teel-"""t!f>OR -tfie--

f~us.

Moreover,

that are almost certainly fatal to the fetus may not be
necessary to protect the health or 1 i fe of the woman or
may have

to

be

abandoned when complications

that a preservable human

not often be
1

llsee gener ly ACOG Technical Bulletin No.
56,
supra n. 11,
(live-birth rate as high as 7% for
intrauterine nstillation of uterotonic agents); Grimes &
Cates, The
r ief for H ertonic Saline, 15 Contemporary
Ob/Gyn 2 , 38 (1980); Stroh & Hinman, Reported Live Births
Follo
Induced Abortion:
Two and One-Half Years'
Ex
1ence 1n U state New Yor ,
Am. J. 0 stet.
G ecol. 83 (1976) (26 following saline induced-abortions;
Footnote continued on next page.
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---·-

t~b~rtions

should

not

and then only for

serious

· second-doctor requirement "has both logical and biological
justifications,"

id.,

at

163,

and

bears

a

1

reasonable

relationship to the State interest in protecting the lives
of

viable

unborn

children.

We

reverse

the

Court

of

Appeals on this issue.
1

The most vulnerable State regulations are those that
apply to adult women during the first trimester.
188.047,

requiring

9 following
abortion):

a

pathology

hysterotomy:

1

report

following

Section

after

every

oxtyocin-induced
~

12There is no clearly expressed excepti n on the
face of the statute for the performance of an a ortion of
a viable fetus without the second physician in a tendance.
I

.

.

.

.

w ~ e.

The last clause of §188.030.3 qualif ~
at least the last part of the provision with t e phra~ e
"provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the
life or health of the woman." It-ma¥ ~ t~a-t th is clause
w
·
·
·
ot
pe o M b 1 e .
See H . L • v . Matheson , 4 50 U . S . 3 9 8 , 4 0 7 n . 14
(1981) (rejecting argument that statute might apply to
ind · viduals with emergency health care needs).
n an
ase, we need not 1nva 1
e a
o erw1se constitution
laws simply because they ~, if applied --~--~~~
· CCJl!ll§ tan_c~rais ~;zutiona
~

~
h~~

~.e...-

/.J--1-~~ ~
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abortion,

~

i i,L... sri e~.,r

is such a regulation.

decision.
In

the

o.f

requirement

The question is whether

burdens

a

woman's

abortion

1

We think it does not.
its

regulation of

hospital

services

within

the

~
state, Missouri requires "[a]ll tissue surgically removed,

,..

with the exception of
hernial

sacs,

and

prepuces,

pathologist,

either

outside

the

hospital."

(1977}.

Although

pathology reports
operations
between

outside

abortion

such tissue as tonsils,

on

the

be

premises

See

Missouri

shall

13

apparently

examined

or

CSR

and

a

hospital,

other

by

by

a

1

arrangement

50-20.030(3}(A}.7
does

in all procedures, or
of

adenoids,

"not

procedures

not

require

in all surgical
all distinction
is

1

forbidden."

Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I}, 428 U.S. 132, 149 (1976}.
Section §188.047, on its face and in effect, is reasonably
related

to

generally

accepted

medical

standards

and

maternal health. 13

13The District Court noted that several medical
experts testified that pathology should be done in every
case of abortion.
See 483 F. Supp., at 700 n. 49.
Moreover, the standards for abortion services of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG}
state that for all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory outpatient basis:
Footnote continued on next page.

2
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As

the

Court

of

Appeals

examinations are "clearly"

recognized,

pathology

"useful and even necessary in

some cases," because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn
of serious, possibly fatal disorders."
The

State

because
performed

it

may
is

be
the

outside

justified
one
of

in

singling

surgical
hospitals

reproductive capabilities of

655 F.2d, at 870.
out

procedure
that

patients.

abortions
frequently

affects

There

are

the
still

Tissue
removed
should
be
subsmitted
to
a
pathologist for an examination.
In the
situation of elective termination of pregnancy,
the
attending
physician
should
record
a
description of
the gross products.
Unless
definite
embryonic
or
fetal
parts can be
identified,
the
products
of
elective
interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to
a
pathologist
for
gross
and
microscopic
examination.
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th
ed. 1982) (emphasis added). The standards of the National
Abortion
Federation,
whose
members
include
the
institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides:

{

All tissue must be examined grossly at the time
of the abortion procedure by a physician or
trained assistant and the results recorded in
the chart.
In the absence of visible fetal
parts
or
placenta
upon
gross
examination,
obtained tissue may be examined under a low
power microscope for the detection of villi.
If
this examination is inconclusive, the tissue
should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology
?
laboratory for microscopic examination. (~~~

National Abortion Federation, National Abortion Federation
Standards 22 (1981).
See Brief of the American Public
Health Association as Amicus Curiae 29 n. 6 in Nos. 81185, 81-746 & 81-1172 (supporting the National Abortion
Federation standards for nonhospi tal abortion facilities
as constituting "minimum standards").

2

' 16.

some

unanswered

questions

about

the

long-range

complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent
pregnancies.
Cates).

See

App.

72-73

(testimony

of

Dr.

2

Willard

It is thought that recorded pathology reports, in

concert with abortion complication reports, should provide
a

statistical

basis

on

which

to

study

those

complications. 14
Plaintiffs
tissue

2

contend

examination

is

that

the

~l y

additional

cost

burdensome;

of

that

a

the

requirement of an examination by a pathological cannot be
justified under traditional medical cost/benefit analysis;
that

such

an

examination

unnecessary

and

duplicative

of

.....

the

physic ian makes
§188.047

does

serves

no

gross

in

rational
examination

in every case.

not

every

case

is

purpose;
the

simply
and

2

is

performing

Indeed, plaintiffs note,

specify whether

the

pathologist must

make a microscopic examination 15 and does not impose any

14 section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report
be sent to the State's division of health.
l5state regulations, however, state: "All reports
shall contain the findings of a gross examination.
If
fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an
accompanying microscopic tissue report must also be filed
with the Division of Health." 13 CSR 50-151.030(1).

2
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time

limits

within

which

the

examination

must

be

conducted, thereby obviating somewhat the reasons for the

examination~We

need not, however,

balance the costs and

benefits to determine whether §188.047 is constitutional.
We agree with the District Court that "the Court has not
been

shown

that

the

increase

in

cost

per

abortion

procedure resulting

from the required tissue examination

will

undue

constitute

abortion."

an

burden on

a

483 F. Supp., at 699-700.

woman

seeking

an

The estimated cost

of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services
is

$19.40

per

abortion

2

performed. 16

The

2

pathology

requirement, like the Missouri record-keeping requirements
upheld

in

Danforth,
State's

Planned
428

u.s.

interest

citizens,

and

Parenthood
52

(1976),

in protecting

may

be

a

of

Central

"can

be

Missouri

useful

the health of

resource

that

is

to

v.
the

its female
relevant

to

decisions involving medical experience and judgment," id.,

16 See 483 F. Supp., at 700 n. 48.
There was also
testimony in the District Court that the additional cost
of pathology would range from $10.00,
for a gross
examination,
to
$40.00,
in
cases
where
multiple
microscopic examinations of the tissue were necessary.
See ibid.

2

the abort·
patient relationship."

· · n or on the physician-

See id., at 81.

Accordingly, we

2

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It

is settled that the State's special concern for

the parent-child

relationship will not

support a State-

granted parental veto over a minor's abortion decision.
See Danforth,

428

u.s.,

at 74-75. 18

2

Nor may the State

itself retain the arbitrary right of veto over a mature
minor's
Court,

abortion.
however,

A majority

~
~ indicated

drafted statute allowing minors

of

the

Justices

approval

of

a

of

this

narrowly

judicially determined to

1 7The Danforth Court also noted that "[t] he added
requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception
for public health officers, and for retention for seven
years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and
persuade us in our determination of the constitutional
limits." 428 U.S., at 81. Missouri extends the identical
safeguards found reassuring in Danforth to the pathology
reports at issue here.
See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§188.055.2,
188.060.
18 Th is
Court
in
Danforth
held
unconstitutional
Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried
minors under the age of 18. See 428 U.S., at 72, 75.
In
response to our decision, Missouri enacted the section
challenged here.
This new statute became effective
shortly before our decision in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s.
622 (1979).

2

...
.(
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be

mature

to

make

their

own

abortion

decisions,

while

requiring immature minors to obtain a consent-substitute,
such

as

parental

predicated

upon

interests. 19

permission
a

622,

four

Justices):

643-644,

(expressing

determination

See Bellotti

u.s.

or

647-648

id.,

approval

v.

of

Baird

(1979)

at 656-657
of

judicial
the

authorization
minor's

(Bellotti

II),

best
443

(plurality opinion for
(WHITE,

absolute

J.,

dissenting)

parental

consent

19 The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) , also require that the alternative to parental
consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue
"will
be
completed
with
anonymity
and
sufficient
expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an
abortion to be obtained."
Id., at 644.
Confidentiality
is assured by the statutoryrequirement that allows the
minor to use her initials on the petition. See Mo. Stat.
§188.028.2(1). As to expedition of appeals, §188.028.2(6)
provides in relevant part:

The notice of intent to appeal shall be
given within twenty-four hours from the date of
issuance of the order.
The record on appeal
shall be completed and the appeal shall be
perfected within five days from the filing of
not ice to appeal.
Because time may be of the
essence
regarding
the
performance
of
the
abortion, the supreme court of this state shall,
by court rule, provide for expedited appellate
review of cases appealed under this section.
I

We believe th ~section provides the framework for a
constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial
proceedings. Immediately after the effective date of this
statutory
enactment,
the
District
Court
enjoined
enforcement: No unemancipated pregnant minor has been
required to comply with this 5-tat~o~eory section before an
abortion is performed. Thus, to this point in time, there
has been no need for the state Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning appellate review.
There is no reason to
believe that Missouri will not expedite any appeal
consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.

2
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requirement) . 20
these

rules

The reasons for,

have

been

and arguments against,

thoroughly

explored

in

prior

2

opinions, see, e. g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 434454

u.s.,

(1981)

(MARSHALL,

at 633-651,

J.,

dissenting);

Bellotti II,

443

and we need not discuss them again in

detail.
The

issue

construction. 21

here

is

one

purely

j
The Missouri statute,

I

of

statutory

UK . . - oz3. 2
I\in

2

fii})

relevant part,

provides:
(4) In the decree, the court shall for good

°

2 Cf. H . L . v . Matheson , 4 5 0 U. S . 3 9 8 , 4 0 7 & n . 14 ,
411 (1981) (upholding a parental notification requirement
but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated
minors or to immature minors showing such notification
detrimental to their best interests).
The lower courts
, found
that
§188.028's
notice
requirement
was
unconstitutional.
See 655 F.2d, at 873; 483 F. Supp., at
679.
The State has not sought review of that judgment
here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before
this Court for review, § 188.028 contains no requirement
for parental notification.
21 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated"
women under the age of 18 both from the requirement of
parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a
judicial proceeding.
The word "emancipated" in this
context is not void for vagueness. Although the question
whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the ~ee\:il:i:er:
facts and circumstances of, each individual case, the
1ssouri cour s ave deolared general ~ rules to guide
that determination, and the term is one of general usage
and understanding in the Missouri common law.
See Black
v. Cole, 626 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting
67 C.J.S. Parent and Child §88, at 811 (1950 ed.)); In re
the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
It should also be noted that, before a person may
be successfully prosecuted for a violation of §188.028,
the State must show that I defendant "knowingly" violated
the section.
\~

r

cause:
(a) Grant the petition for majority rights
the purpose of consenting to the abortion;

for
or

(b) Find the abortion to be in the best
interests of the minor and give judicial consent
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for
so finding; or

2

(c) Deny the petition, setting forth
grounds on which the petition is denied[.]

2

On its face,
do
a

(a) ,

§188.028.2(4)

(b) , or (c) .

denial

of

the

the

authorizes juvenile courts to

The Court of Appeals concluded that

petition

permitted

in

subsection

2

(c)

"would initially require the court to find that the minor
was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her
own decision and
interests."

that

655 F.2d,

an

abortion was

at 858.

statute

y

fairly

possible,

in her

best

Plaintiffs contend that

this interpretation is unreasonable.
Where

not

2

We do not agree.

courts

should

construe

a

to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.
~

The Court of Appeals was gegRizaRt o£ the

£~ot

that if the

1\

statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor
for~

"good cause," it would violate the principles set

forth in Danforth and Bellotti II.
The court,

however,

See 655 F.2d, at 858.

reached the logical conclusion that

"findings and the ultimate denial of the petition must be

3

' 22.

supported by a

showing of

exercising

option,

evidence

any
on

"the

'good cause.'"

the

juvenile

emotional

court

rationally

petition,

found

Before

must

receive

development,

intellect and understanding of the minor."
Appeals

Ibid.

that a

3

maturity,

The Court of

court could

not deny a

"for good cause," unless it first found--after

3

having received the required evidence--that the minor was
not mature enough to make her own decision. 22

s~

J-

pftQ" Bellotti II,. ..there wQuld be no legally

~

~,
sH:ffjci,e ~

reason to deny a. petiHon if eszidence demonstratgd
minor

wa..»-.._ sqffi~ien.tly

matlJ,te

tha ~

tQ make Qer own decision

W..e.~~
Thus.:,-

rc:r

~

interpreted

eel ietlQ
the

the

statute,

Court
and

of
as

Appeals

interprete.:l.

correctly
§188.028

2 2Missouri argues that, under state law, "for good
cause" is "'a cause or reason sufficient in law.'" State
v. Davis, 469 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1971) (quoting Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 978
(1976)).
The
Missouri
courts concede,
however,
in a variety of
contexts, that the commonly used legal phrase "for good
cause" "is not susceptible of precise definition," Vaughn
v. Ripley, 416 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967), and
that "'good cause' depends upon the circumstances of the
individual case," Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407
(Mo. 1963) .
A finding of its existence "lies largely in
the discretion of the .•• court to which the decision is
committed," ibid., and the phrase "connotes a remedial
purpose in a matter addressed primarily to the conscience
of the court," Corzine v. Scott, 505 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1974). ~This discretion, however, no doubt is
limited to choice that are "a cause or reason sufficient
in law." We are unwilling to assume that the discretion
given to the Missouri courts includes the privilege of
{ ignoring this Court's constitutional decision::J

) 3

' 2 3.

avoids

the

infirmities of

the state statute reviewed

in

Bellotti Ir. 23
3

The

judgment of the Court of Appeals,

invalidated

Missouri's

requirement

and

provision,

is

requirement of
the

second-trimester

upheld

affirmed.
a

the

State's

The

judgment

pathology report for

requirement

that

a

second

abortion of any viable fetus
judgment upholding

an

hours

plaintiffs'

expended

by

hospitalization

parental

consent

in validating

the

all abortions and

physician

is reversed.

award of

insofar as it

the

We vacate the

attorneys'
attorneys

attend

3

fees

and

for

all

remand

for

proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart,

u.s.

23Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ~
ambiguity of §188.028.2(4), as evidenced by the differing
interpretations placed upon it ) &y b9asonahle j~dicial ~
·
_,~ the
appropriate
course
of
judicial
restraint is abstention.
This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398,
407 (1981); Bellotti I, 428 u.s., at 146-147. Plaintiffs
did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the
court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification
procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state
statutory construction to the state supreme court, see 655
F.2d, at 861 n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure §4248, at 525 n. 29 (Supp.
1982), which procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis
in Bellotti I, 428 u.s., at 151.
Moreover, where, as
here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that
obviates the need to have the state courts render the
saving construction, L~e ±-s--- 'l'le--....zHHsd for ~ federal
courts to abstain.
----------_
~~

~bJ·~~
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It is so ordered.

CHAMBERS DRAFT: Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft,
Nos. 81-1255, 81-1623
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
This case, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., ante, p. ___ , and Simopoulos v. Virginia, post, p. ___ ,
presents questions as to the validity of state regulations governing
the performance of abortions.
I

On June 30, 1979, the day after Missouri's abortion regulations
went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.,
two doctors who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional,
several sections of the new bill.

The sections relevant here

include Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that
abortions after twelve weeks of pregnancy be performed in a
hospitall; §188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed 2 ; §188.030, requiring the presence of a second physician

1 Mo.

Rev. Stat. §188.025 provides: "Every abortion
performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy shall be performed in a hospital."
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.047 provides:

"A representative sample of tissue removed at
time of abortion shall be submitted to a board
eligible or certified pathologist, who shall
file a copy of the tissue report with the state
division of health, and who shall provide a copy
of the report to the abortion facility or
hospital in which the abortion was performed or
induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."

the

during abortions performed after viability 3 ; and §188.028, requiring
minors to secure parental or judicial consent.4

3Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall
performed or induced only where there is in
attendance a physician other than the physician
performing or adducing the abortion who shall
take control of and provide immediate medical
care for a child born as a result of the
abortion.
During
the
performance
of
the
abortion,
the physician performing it,
and
subsequent
to
the
abortion,
the physician
required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with
good medical practice,
consistent with the
procedure used, to perserve the life and health
of the viable unborn child; provided that it
does not pose an increased risk to the life or
health of the woman."
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028 provides:
"1.
No person shall knowingly perform an
abortion upon a pregnant woman under the age of
eighteen years unless:

"(1) The attending physician has secured
the informed written consent of the minor and
one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated
attending physician has received the
written consent of the minor; or

and the
informed

"(3) The minor has been granted the right
to self-consent to the abortion by court order
pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and
the
attending
physician
has
received
the
informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to
the abortion by court order, and the court has
given its informed written consent in accordance
with subsection 2 of this section, and the minor
is having the abortion willingly, in compliance
with subsection 3 of this section.
"2.
The right of a minor to self-consent
Footnote continued on next page.

be

After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the

to an
abortion under
subdivision
(3)
of
subsection 1 of this section or court consent
under subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this
section may be granted by a court pursuant to
the following procedures:
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an
application to the juvenile court which shall
assist the minor or next friend in preparing the
petition and notices required pursuant to this
section.
The minor or the next friend of the
minor shall thereafter file a petition setting
forth the initials of the minor; the age of the
minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or,
if the minor's parents are
deceased and no guardian has been appointed, any
other person standing in loco parentis of the
minor; that the minor has been fully informed of
the risks and consequences of the abortion; that
the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient
intellectual
capacity
to
consent
to
the
abortion; that, if the court does not grant the
minor majority rights for the purpose of consent
to the abortion, the court should find that the
abortion is in the best interest of the minor
and give judicial consent to the abortion; that
the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have
private counsel, that the court should appoint
counsel.
The petition shall be signed by the
minor or the next friend;

"(3) A hearing on the merits of the
petition, to be held on the record, shall be
held as soon as possible, within five days of
the filing of the petition • . . . At the hearing,
the court shall hear evidence relating to the
emotional development, rna tur i ty, intellect and
understanding of the minor; the nature, possible
consequences, and alternatives to the abortion;
and any other evidence that the court may find
useful in determining whether the minor should
be granted majority rights for the purpose of
consenting to the abortion or whether the
abortion is in the best interests of the minor;
" ( 4) In the decree, the court
Footnote continued on next page.

"·

shall

for

4.
District Court invalidated each of these sections, except the
pathology requirement.

483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701 (1980) • 5

The

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the District
Court's judgment with respect to §188.028, thereby upholding the
requirement that a minor secure parental or judicial consent to an
abortion.

It also held that the District Court erred in sustaining

§188.047, the pathology requirement.

The District Court's judgment

with respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, and
the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating

good cause:
for
or

"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights
the purpose of consenting to the abortion;

"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best
interests of the minor and give judicial consent
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for
so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth
grounds on which the petition is denied;

the

"3.
If a minor desires an abortion, then
she
shall
be or ally
informed of and,
if
possible, sign the written consent required by
section 188.039 in the same manner as an adult
person.
No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion
may be performed against the will of a minor
pursuant
to
a
court
order
described
in
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section
that the abortion is necessary to perserve the
life of the minor."
5The District Court also awarded attorney's
for all hours claimed by the plaintiffs' attorneys.
655 F.2d 848, 872 (CAS 1981).

fees
See

to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement.
872-873 (1981).

655 F.2d 848,

On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding

that the second-trimester hospitalization requirement was
unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment.

664

F.2d 687, 691 (1981).
We granted certiorari.

u.s.

(1982).

We now affirm the

Court of Appeals' judgment invalidating the Missouri hospitalization
requirement and upholding the parental consent requirement, but
reverse the judgment holding the pathology report and the secondphysician requirements unconstitutional.6
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12,

has stated

fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes
regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated here.

With

these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes at issue.
II
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or
special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic
Association.

Ante, at 13.

Missouri's hospitalization requirements

are similar to those enacted by Akron, as all second-trimester
abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities. 7

For

6 The petition also raises the issue whether an
award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 u.s.c.
§ 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to
which plaintiffs prevailed.
See n. 5, supra. As to this
issue, the judgment is vacated and remanded in light of
our decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart,
U.S.
(1983).
Footnote(s) 7 will appear on following pages.

the reasons stated at some length in City of Akron, we held that
such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's
constitutional right to obtain an abortion."

Ante, at 20-21.

For

the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that
§188.025 is unconstitutional.

We turn now to the State's second-

physician requirement.
III
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized as

7 Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in
its
statutory
prov1s1ons
regulating
abortions.
We
therefore must assume, as did the courts below, see 483 F.
Supp., at 686 n. 10; 664 F.2d, at 689-690 & nn. 3, 5 & 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acutecare facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.015(2)
(Supp.
1982)
(defining
"abortion
facility"
as
"a
clinic,
physician's office, or any other place or facility in
which abortions are performed other than a hospital").
Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of Missouri's hospital
licensing laws, reads:
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to
the maintenance and operation of facilities for
the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less
than twenty-four hours in any week of three or
more
nonrelated
individuals
suffering
from
illness, disease, injury, deformity or other
abnormal physical conditions; or a place devoted
primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical
care for
three or more nonrelated individuals •••. "
Cf.
Mo.
Rev.
Stat.
§197.200(1)
(1978)
(defining
"ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with
an organized medical staff of physicians" and "with
continuous physician services and registered professional
nursing services whenever a patient is in the facility");
13 Mo. Admin Code 50-30.010 (1) (A)
(1977)
(same).
The
regulations
for
the
Department
of
Social
Services
establish
standards
for
the
construction,
physical
facilities, and administration of hospitals.
See id.,
§§50-20.010 to -20.030 (1977). These are not unlike those
set by the JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13 & n. 16.

~·

compelling the interest of a State in the life of a viable fetus:
"[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
165.

Id., at 164-

Several of the Missouri statutes undertake such regulation.

Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to
preserve the life or the health of the mother.
§188.030.1 (Supp. 1982}.

Mo. Rev. Stat.

The State also forbids the use of abortion

procedures fatal to the viable fetus unless alternative procedures
pose a greater risk to the health of the mother.

See §188.030.2.

The statute at issue in this case requires the attendance of a
second physician at the abortion of a viable fetus.

See §188.030.3.

The lower courts held that this requirement is invalid.
The plaintiffs, respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance
on the grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and
costly.

They note that Missouri does not require two physicians in

attendance for any other medical or surgical procedure, including
childbirth or delivery of a premature infant.

These are not

insubstantial arguments, and we view the issue as a close one.
Our cases repeatedly have held that the State's interest in the
potential life of a viable fetus is compelling.
latitude in regulating after viability.
438, 445-446 (1977}: Roe, 410

u.s.,

The State has

See Beal v. Doe, 432

at 164-165.

u.s.

The fetus is

uniquely vulnerable at this stage and, as recognized in Roe, the

.

'
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abortion decision no longer is entrusted solely to the mother and
her physician.

See id., at 165-166.

Section 188.030.3 provides that the second physician "shall
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born
as a result of the abortion."

Moreover, the statute requires that

the physician "be in attendance" during the abortion and "take all
reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice •.. to
preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided
that it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health of the
woman."

Seen. 3, supra.

It is clear from these provisions that

Missouri has made a judgment that there are some physicians
primarily interested in performing abortions when desired by the
woman, and that there may be tension between this interest and the
state interest in protecting the potential life of an unborn child.
For example, the District Court found that the dilatation-andevacuation procedure (D&E) of abortion "carries no chance of fetal
survival."B

483 F. Supp., at 694.

The presence of a second

physician could be a safeguard against the improper and unnecessary
use of this procedure.
The tension between the State's interest and the primary
concern of the woman's physician also explains why a second
physician is required for third-trimester abortions but not for any

8At a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that
viability is possible, the fetus is sufficiently large
that it must be dismembered, and the skull must be
crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See
655 F.2d, at 865 & n. 29.

'9 .

other medical or surgical procedure, including childbirth or
delivery of a premature infant.9

In most situations, a patient's

primary interest is in preserving her own health.

Exceptions to

this, of course, are childbirth and where an infant must be
delivered prematurely.

In these situations, the mother ardently

desires that the child be born safely and is healthy, although she
naturally hopes to survive in good health.
The situation often is different with respect to the woman who
seeks an abortion.

Many pregnant women who otherwise would have an

abortion may determine not to do so if the fetus is viable.

But the

9 The courts below found the statutory provision
unconstitutional
because
there
is
no
possible
justification for
a second-physician requirement:
no
viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure.
See 483 E'.
Supp., at 694; 655 F.2d, at 865. As the Court of Appeals
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is
subject to the requirements of §188.030.2.
See id., at
865 & n. 28.
Thus, D&E is not to be used when the fetus
is viable and other methods are more likely to preserve
its life but not pose a greater risk to the woman's life
or health.
Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified
they would not use D&E in third-trimester); American
College
of
Obstetricians
and
Gynecologists
(ACOG)
Technical Bulletin No.
56,
Methods
of
Midtr imester
Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or
similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks).
There is nothing in the record to indicate that there is
an exact correspondence between the situations in which
there are compelling medical reasons for per forming any
abortion after viability and the method that presents the
least risk to the mother--r9 D&E.
Cf. 655 F.2d, at 865
(experts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after
viability).
We therefore cannot assume that all thirdtrimester abortions will be D&E abortions, thus precluding
all possibility of live birth. The possibility that does
exist, plus the constant threat that any D&E abortion
might have to be abandoned because of complications,
justifies the State in requiring a second physician at
every third-trimester abortion.

10.
viability of the fetus will not alter the decision of all women, and
the State's assumption that some physicians will accord primacy to
the wishes of these woman cannot be viewed as unreasonable.

The

State's interest is compelling, and this necessarily justifies
imposition of some burdens on the woman's choice following viability
of the fetus.
We believe the second-physician requirement furthers the
State's compelling interest in potential life, particluarly in those
cases where the abortion does result in a live birth. 10

It is true

that the medical literature indicates that preserving the potential
life of a viable fetus during a third trimester abortion often is
not possible. 11

But use of methods that are fatal to the fetus are

not always required to preserve the life and health of the mother.
The State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for these
few instances of live birth.

The second physician, in those

emergency situations under which Missouri permits any thirdtrimester abortion, 12 may be of assistance to the mother's physician
10 see ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 9, at
4 {as high as 7% live-birth rate for intrauterine
instillation of uterotonic agents): Grimes & Cates, The
Brief for Hypertonic Saline, 15 Contemporary Ob/Gyn 29,-:nr
{1980)
{increasing
number
of
live-born
fetuses
in
prostaglandin abortions): Stroh & Hinman, Reported Live
Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-Half Years'
Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet.
Gynecol. 83, 83-84 {1976) {26 live births following saline
induced-abortions: 9 following hysterotomy: 1 following
oxtyocin-induced abortion).
llsee Stoh & Himman, supra n. 10,
survival out of thirty-eight live births).

at

88

{one

12There is no clearly expressed exception on the
face of the statute for the performance of an abortion of
Footnote continued on next page.

11.

in preserving the health of the child.

We thus believe the second-

doctor requirement bears a reasonable relationship to the State
interest in protecting the lives of viable unborn children.

We

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that §188.030.3
is unconstitutional.
IV
The most suspect state regulations are those that apply to
mature women during the first trimester.

We have made clear that

even "minor regulations on the abortion procedure during the first
trimester may not interfere with physician-patient consultation or
with the woman's choice between abortions and childbirth."
Akron, ante, at 12.

City of

Nevertheless, even in the early weeks of

pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on
the woman's exercise of her right may be permissible where justified
by important state health objectives."

Ante, at 11.

Section

188.047 requires a pathology report for every abortion performed.
The question is whether this requirement unconstitutionally burdens
a woman's abortion decision.

We hold that it does not.

In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the exception

a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance.
There may be emergency situations where, for example, the
woman's health may be endangered by delay.
Section
§188.030.3 is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase
"provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the
life or health of the woman."
This clause reasonably
could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398, 407 n. 14 (1981) (rejecting
argument that Utah statute might apply to individuals with
emergency health care needs).

12.
of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces,
shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by
arrangement outside of the hospital."
20.030(3) (A)7 (1977).

13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-

Although Missouri apparently does not require

pathology reports in all procedures, "[t]his does not mean that a
State never may enact a regulation touching on the woman's abortion
right during the first weeks of pregnancy."
11.

City of Akron, ante, at

The specific issue here is whether §188.047, which on its face

and in effect is reasonably related to generally accepted medical
standards and maternal health, 1 3 "further[s] important health-

13 A pathological examination is designed to as~ist
in
the
detection
of
fatal
ectopic
pregnanc1es,
hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous growths, and a
variety of other problems that can only be discovered
through a pathological examination.
The District Court
noted
that
several
medical
experts
testified
that
pathology should be done in every case of abortion.
483
F. Supp., at 700 n. 49.
See The Abortion Profiteers,
Chicago Sun Times (1978) (special report), at 26, col. 3
(quoting Dr. Willard Cates, head of abortion surveillance
for the National Center for Disease Control, as saying
"pathological reports are so important that no clinic
should allow a patient to leave the premises without
one"). Moreover, the ACOG standards for abortion services
state that for all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be
subsmi tted to a pathologist for an examination.
In
the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, the
attending physician should record a description of the
gross products.
Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts
can be identified, the products of elective interruptions
of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross
and
microscopic
examination."
ACOG,
Standards
for
Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis
added) . The standards of the National Abortion Federation
(NAF), whose members include the institutional plaintiffs
in this case,
itself provides:
"All tissue must be
examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by
a phbsician or trained assistant and the results recorded
in t e chart.
In the absence of visible fetal parts or
placenta upon gross examination, obtained tissue may be
Footnote continued on next page.

13.
related State concerns," ante, at 12, without interfering with the
woman's decision to have an abortion.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are
"clearly" "useful and even necessary in some cases," because
"abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal
disorders."

655 F.2d, at 870.

Examining tissue removed during an

abortion provides a State with an unique opportunity to further its
interest in promoting the health of its citizens.

Additionally,

questions about the long-range complications of abortions and their
effect on subsequent pregnancies remain.

See App. 72-73 (testimony

of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.): Levin, et al., Association of Induced
Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499
(1980).

Recorded pathology reports, in concert with abortion

complication reports, provide a statistical basis to study those
complications. 14

Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.

examined under a low power microscope
If this
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to
the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic
examination." NAF, National Abortion Federation Standards
6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance with standards
obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good
standing).
See Brief of the American Public Health
Association as Amicus Curiae in Simopoulos and City of
Akron 29 n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for nonhospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum
standards").
Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan
Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation,
Maintenance and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient
Abortion Facilities 10
("Gross examination must be
performed on all specimens.
Microscopic tissue analysis
must be done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation
is inadequate or does not confirm a normal gestation.").
l4section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report
be sent to the State's division of health.

14.
Danforth, 428

u.s.

52, 81 (1976).

Plaintiffs contend, however, that the additional cost of a
tissue examination is a significant burden on a pregnant woman's
abortion decision. 1 5

The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff

Reproductive Health Services was $19.40 per abortion performed.
F. Supp., at 700 n. 48. 16

483

We think this minor burden is justified,

like the Missouri record-keeping requirements upheld in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, as "useful to the
State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens,
and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical
experience and judgment," 428

u.s.,

at 81. 17

In sum, "we see no

legally significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision
or on the physician-patient relationship."

See id., at 81.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this

15 Plaintiffs also note that
§188.047 does not
specify whether the pathologist must make a microscopic
examination.
State regulations, however, state:
"All
reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination.
If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an
accompanying microscopic tissue report must also be filed
with the Division of Health."
13 Mo. Admin. Code 50151.030 (1) (1981).
l6There was testimony in the District Court that the
additional cost of pathology would range from $10.00 to
$40.00. See 483 F. Supp., at 700 n. 48.
17 The Danforth Court also noted that "[t] he added
requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception
for public health officers, and for retention for seven
years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and
persuade us in our determination of the constitutional
limits." 428 u.s., at 81. Missouri extends the identical
safeguards found reassuring in Danforth to the pathology
reports at issue here.
See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§188.055.2,
188.060 (Supp. 1982).

15.
point.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards with
respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute.

A

State's interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a
requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial.
We have cautioned, however, that "the State must provide an
alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that
she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best
interests." 18

City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 19

The issue here is

18 The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (Bellotti II), also required that the alternative
to parental consent must "assure" that the resolution of
this
issue
"will
be
completed
with
anonymity
and
sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity
for
an
abortion
to
be
obtained."
Id.,
at
644.
Confidentiality
here
is
assured
by
the
statutory
requirement that allows the minor to use her initials on
the petition.
Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982).
As to expedition of appeals, §188.028.2(6) provides in
relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given
within twenty-four hours
from the date of
issuance of the order.
The record on appeal
shall be completed and the appeal shall be
perfected within five days from the filing of
notice to appeal.
Because time may be of the
essence
regarding
the
performance
of
the
abortion, the supreme court of this state shall,
by court rule, provide for expedited appellate
review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a
constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial
proceedings. Immediately after the effective date of this
statutory
enactment,
the
District
Court
enjoined
enforcement.
No unemancipated pregnant minor has been
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 19 will appear on following pages.

16.
one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a
judicial alternative that is consistent with these established legal
standards. 20
The Missouri statute, §188.028.2,2 1 in relevant part, provides:

required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point
in time, there has been no need for the state Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review.
There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not
expedite any appeal consistent with the mandate in our
prior opinions.
l9cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s., at 406-407 & n.l4,
411 (upholding a parental notification requirement but not
extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or
to immature minors showing such notification detrimental
to their best interests).
The lower courts found that
§188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional.
See
655 F.2d, at 873; 483 F. Supp., at 701. The State has not
sought review of that judgment here. Thus, in the posture
in which it appears before this Court for review, §188.028
contains no requirement for parental notification.
20 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated"
women under the age of 18 both from the requirement of
parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a
judicial proceeding.
Plaintiffs argue that the word
"emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but
we disagree.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using
word to describe a minor). Although the question whether
a
minor
is
emancipated
turns
upon
the
facts
and
circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts
have adopted general rules to guide that determination,
and the term is one of general usage and understanding in
the Missouri common law.
See Black v. Cole, 626 S.W.2d
397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C.J .S. Parent and
Child §86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy,
535 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v.
Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd
on other grounds, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959).
It should
also be noted that, before a person may be successfully
prosecuted for a violation of §188.028, the State must
show that the defendant "knowingly" violated the section.
21 see n. 4, supra.
This Court in Danforth held
unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requ1rement
for all unmarried minors under the age of 18.
428 u.s.,
at 75.
In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
Footnote continued on next page.
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the
purpose of consenting to the abortion: or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of
the minor and give judicial consent to the abortion,
setting forth the grounds for so finding: or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
On its face, §188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts to do (a),
(b), or (c).

The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the

petition permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the
court to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature
enough to make her own decision and that an abortion was not in her
best interests."

655 F.2d, at 858.

interpretation is unreasonable.

Plaintiffs contend that this

We do not agree.

Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.

The Court of Appeals was

aware that if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to
a minor

for~

"good cause," it would violate the principles that

this Court has set forth.

Ibid.

The court, however, reached the

logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate denial of the
petition must be supported by a showing of 'good cause.'"

Ibid.

Before exercising any option, the juvenile court must receive
evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and
understanding of the minor."
1982) •

Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028.2(3)

(Supp.

The Court of Appeals rationally found that a court could not

section challenged here.
This
new statute became
effective shortly before our decision in Bellotti II.

18.
deny a petition, "for good cause," unless it first found--after
having received the required evidence--that the minor was not mature
enough to make her own decision. 22
622, 643-644, 647-648 {1979)

See Bellotti v. Baird, 443

{plurality opinion).

u.s.

We conclude that

the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute, and as
interpreted §188.028 avoids constitutional infirmities. 23

22Missouri argues that, under state law, "for good
cause" is "'a cause or reason sufficient in law.'" State
v. Davis, 469 S.W.2d 1, 5 {Mo. 1971) {quoting Webster's
Third New International Dictionary). The Missouri courts
recognize, however, in a variety of contexts, that the
commonly used legal phrase "for good cause" "is not
susceptible of precise definition," Vaughn v. Ripley, 416
S • W. 2 d 2 2 6 , 2 2 8 {Mo • App • 19 6 7 ) , and that " ' [ g] ood cause '
depends upon the circumstances of the individual case,"
Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407 {Mo. 1963).
A
finding of 1ts existence "lies largely in the discretion
of the
court to which the decision is committed,"
ibid., and the phrase "connotes a remedial purpose in a
matter addressed primarily to the conscience of the
court," Corzine v. Stoff, 505 S.W.2d 162, 164 {Mo. App.
1973).
This discretion, however, no doubt is limited to
choices that are not
inconsistent with the federal
Constitution.
23 Plaintiffs also argue that,
in light of the
ambiguity of §188.028.2{4), as evidenced by the differing
interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate course of
judicial restraint is abstention.
This Court has found
such an approach appropriate.
See H.L. v. Matheson, 450
u.s., at 407: Bellotti v. Baird, 428 u.s. 132, 146-147
{1976) {Bellott1 I).
Plaintiffs did not, however, argue
in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and
Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court
can refer questions of state statutory construction to the
state supreme court.
See 655 F.2d, at 861 n. 20: 17 c.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure §4248, at 525 n. 29 {1978 & Supp. 1982). Such a
procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti
I. Supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute 1s
susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need
to have the state courts render the saving construction,
there is no reason for federal courts to abstain.
Cf.
City of Akron, ante, at 23-24.

··':.t.

19.
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invalidated
Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld
the State's parental consent provision, is affirmed.

The judgment

invalidating the requirement of a pathology report for all abortions
and the requirement that a second physician attend the abortion of
any viable fetus is reversed.

We vacate the judgment upholding an

award of attorneys' fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs'
attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v.
Eckerhart,

u.s.

(1983}.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 81-1255 AND 81-1623

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC.,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
81-1255
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MISSOURI, ET AL.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MISSOURI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
81-1623
v.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC.,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions.

I
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. , two
~~~:s who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic ("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the Western
District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, several
sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance

l
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of abortions. The sections relevant here include Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12
weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188.047,
requiring a pathology report for each abortion performed; 2
§ 188.030, requiring the presence of a second physician during
abortions performed after viability; 3 and § 188.028, requiring
minors to secure parental or judicial consent. 4
After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit1
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
2
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
• Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
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nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex- I
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699--701
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment with respect to
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition.
At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied;
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§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining § 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981). We granted certiorari. --U.S.-- (1982).
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
II
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life of the minor."
6
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. See 655 F . 2d 848, 872 (CA81981). The petition
for certiorari raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made
pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent
to which plaintiffs prevailed .

.
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all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is
unconstitutional.
III
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
6
Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
" 'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals .... "
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13,
and n. 16.

1
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the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U. S. 379, 386--387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.ff.rhe statute at
issue in this case requires the attendance of a second physi.
ea
·
a viable fetus. § 188.030.3.
~ Se£ti9H 1~. 936-. a provides that the secon p ysician "shall
for a child
"'t ake control of and provide immediate medi
born as a result of the abortion."
,The statu e eqmres that the physician "be in attendance" during the abortion and "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the viable
unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk
to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra.
1s
lear from t hese provisions tnat MisSOUri has rna e a judgent that there are some physicians who may choose a
method of abortion without fully considering the state interest in protecting the potential life of an unborn child. 7 For
>

I
I

~

'"""~

Some physicians perform the abortion with no consideration of alternative methods. The mode of one clinic was described in Danforth:
"The counseling ... occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that include
both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The physician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is typically
limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and
birth control techniques ....
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors. . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting of five patients . . . . After the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and others in the
7

--
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example, if a physician chooses th ilatation-and-evacuation
method (D&E) of abortion,
e this method "carries no
chance of fetal survival." 8 483 F. Supp., at 694. The presence of a second physician could be a safeguard against the
I
improper and unnecessary use of this procedure.
The lower courts invalidated this requirement. The plaintiffs, respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the
grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. These are not insubstantial arguments, and we view
the issue as a close one.
The tension -that may exist between the State's interest
and the primary concern of the woman's physician explains
why a second physician is required for third-trimester abortions but not for any other medical or surgical procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. 9 In
group in the recovery room . . . ."
428 U.S., at 91-92 n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti I, 0. T. 1975, pp.43-44).
8
At a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that viability is possible,
the fetus is sufficiently large that it must be dismembered, and the skull
crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See 655 F. 2d, at
865, and n. 29.
9
The courts below found the statutory provision unconstitutional because there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement
whenever D&E is used, since no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. As the Court of Appeals
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be
used when the fetus is viable and when other methods are more likely to
preserve its life bat do not pose a greater risk to the woman's life or health.
Cf. id., at 865 (so'me physicians testified they would not use D&E in thirdtrimester); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979)
(mortality rate for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation abortions
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most situations, a patient's primary interest is in preserving
her own health. Exceptions to this, of course, are childbirth
and where an infant must be delivered prematurely. In
these situations, the mother ardently desires that the child
be born safely and is healthy, although she naturally hopes to
survive in good health.
The woman's interest in an abortion often will be at odds
with the State's interest in preserving potential life. We
that t.Qe second phys · ian requirement may be necessary
to furthe~ interest. It may be that preserving the potentiallife of a v1ao e fetus during a third trimester abortion
often is not possible. 10 But the State legitimately may
choose to provide safeguards for the comparatively few instances of live birth. And of course, the State has a compelling interest in preserving the life of any child that survives
the abortion procedure. Viable fetuses will be in immediate
and grave danger because of their prematurity. The second
physician, in situations where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, 11 may be of assistance to the woman's physician
up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the record to indicate that D&E will
be the method that poses the least risk to the woman in every situation in
which there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion
after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (experts disagree whether D&E
should ever be used after viability). We therefore cannot assume that all
third-trimester abortions will be D&E abortions, or that there will be no
live births. Thus, the State's compelling interest in preserving the life of
the fetus when there is a live birth justifies the State in requiring a second
physician at every third-trimester abortion.
10
See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 10, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh &
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and OneHalf Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.
83, ~4 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out of 38 live births).)
"There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
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in preserving the health of the child. We thus believe the
second-physician requirement bears a reasonable relationship
to the State interest in protecting the lives of viable unborn
children. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
,......-,ttre-..patllo.!J~-i'efR:~Wemt~t.

IV
Section 188.047 requires a pathology report for every abortion performed. But even in the early weeks of pregnancy,
"[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the
woman's exercise of her rightfi,o decide to have an abortion]
may be permissible where justffied by important state health "
objectives." City of Akron, at 11. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 80-81 (1976).
The question is whether§ 188.047 unconstitutionally burdens
a woman's abortion decision. We hold that it does not.
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri
apparently does not require pathology reports in all procedures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right during the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards
and maternal health, 12 "further[s] important health-related
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).
12
A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of
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State concerns," ante, at 12, without interfering with the
woman's decision to have an abortion.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tissue removed during an abortion provides a State with an
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose members include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If this
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." NAF, National
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance
with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington,
D. C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does
not confirm a normal gestation.").
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opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M. A. 2495,
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for
studying those complications. 13 Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
81.
In light of these factors, we think the small additional cosV4
of a tissue examination 15 does not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision.
n Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest
in protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 16 We view the re13
Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's
division of health.
14
The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48.
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See 483 F. Supp., at 700,
n. 48.
15
Plaintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the pathologist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however, state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination.
If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13
Mo. Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981).
16
The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S.,
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
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quirement for a pathology report as comparable and as a
relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant
al standards
with respect to parental consent requirements
Bet in dispme. A State's interest in protecting immature minors will
sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental
or judicial. We have cautioned, however, that "the State
must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant
minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to
make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best interests." 17 City of
Akron, ante, at 21-22. 18 The issue here is one purely of stat§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).

The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II),
also required that the alternative to parental consent must "assure" that
the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be
obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality here is assured by the statutory
requirement that allows the minor to use her initials on the petition. Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). As to expedition of appeals,
§ 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the State Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.
18
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding
17
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utory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with these established legal
standards. 19
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2,w in relevant part,
provides:
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review,
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
19
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Although the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
20
See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II .

.

.

0~

81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION
14

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 21 to
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision and that an abortion
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not
agree.
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It
recognized, however, tha~before exercising any optiollt>the
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good
cause.'" 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reasonably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good
cause" unless it first found-after having received the required evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to
make her own decision. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
643--644, 647-648 (1979) (plurality opinion). We conclude
that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute
and that § 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional
infirmities. 22
21
We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (PowELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker.
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II , 443 U.S., at
643 n. 22.
22
Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invalidated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of
attorneys' fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart,- U.S.- (1983).
It is so ordered.

evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts
to abstain.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
This case, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. --,presents questions as to the validity
of state r-egulations governing e performance of abortions.
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On June 30, 1979, the day after Missouri's abortion :reg:Yla.. ~
~
y---4tn~iOeH-ml~ went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Kansas City,' ~
G.-:....._
,
Missouri, Inc., two doctors who perform abortions, and an
I ~ ·- - ~
abortion clinic ("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District
L--z.., ~
Court for the Western District of Missouri challenging, as un~
constitutional, several sections of the new bill. The sections
f?
relevant here include Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982),
( ~f ~\
requiring that abortions after twelve weeks of pregnancy be
-;

q . s- ·
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performed in a hospital 1; § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion performed 2 ; § 188.030, requiring the
presence of a second physician during abortions performed
after viability 3; and § 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial consent. •
1
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
2
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
·
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
where there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to perserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the District Court invalidated each of these sections,
except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679,
69~ 701 (1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible, within five days of the filing of the petition. . . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the
emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the
minor; the nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion;
and any other evidence that the court may find useful in determining
whether the minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of
consenting to the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests
of the minor;
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is

,•
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cuit reversed the District Court's judgment with respect to
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872--873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981).
We granted certiorari.-- U. S. - - (1982). We now
affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment invalidating the Missouri hospitalization requirement and upholding the parental
consent requirement, but reverse the judgment holding the
pathology report and the second-physician requirements
unconstitutional. 6
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8--12, has
stated fully the principles that govern judicial review of state
denied;
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to perserve the
life of the minor."
5
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. See 655 F . 2d 848, 872 (CAS 1981).
6
The petition also raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees,
made pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the
extent to which plaintiffs prevailed. See n. 5, supra. As to this issue,
the judgment is vacated and remanded in light of our decision in Hens ley v.
Eckerha:rt, U. S. (1983).

81-1255

AND 81-162~PINION

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN v. ASHCROFT

5

statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
II
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 7 For the reasons stated at some length
in City of Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain
7
Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, a\689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals .... "
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. See id., §§ 50-20.010 to -20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by the JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at
13, and n. 16.
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an abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that§ 188.025 is unconstitutional. We turn now to the State's second-physician
requirement.

III
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
as compelling the interest of a State in the life of a viable fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality
of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother." Id., at 164-165. Several of the Missouri statutes
undertake such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the
health of the mother. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp.
1982). The State also forbids the use of abortion procedures
fatal to the viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a
greater risk to the health of the mother. See § 188.030.2.
The statute at issue in this case requires the attendance of a
second physician at the abortion of a viable fetus. See
§ 188.030.3. The lower courts held that this requirement is
invalid.
The plaintiffs, respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the grounds that the second-physician requirement
distorts the traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is
both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does
not require two physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a
premature infant. These are not insubstantial arguments,
and we view the issue as a close one.
Our cases repeatedly have held that the State's interest in
the potential life of a viable fetus is compelling. The State
has latitude in regulating after viability. See Beal v. Doe,
432 U. S. 438, 44&-446 (1977); Roe, 410 U. S., at 164-165.
The fetus is uniquely vulnerable at this stage and, as recog-
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nized in Roe, the abortion decision no longer is entrusted
solely to the mother and her physician. See id., at 165-166.
Section 188.030.3 provides that the second physician "shall
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child
born as a result of the abortion." Moreover, the statute requires that the physician "be in attendance" during the abortion and "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the viable
unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk
to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It is
clear from these provisions that Missouri has made a judgment that there are some physicians primarily interested in
performing abortions when desired by the woman,ttand that
there may be tension between this interest and the state interest in protecting the potential life of an unborn child. For
example, the District Court found that the dilatation-andevacuation procedure (D&E) of abortion "carries no chance of
fetal survival." 8 483 F. Supp., at 694. The presence of a
second physician could be a safeguard against the improper
and unnecessary use of this procedure.
e tension between the State's interest and the primary
concern of the woman's physician also explains why a second
physician is required for third-trimester abortions but not for
any other medical or surgical procedure, including childbirth
or delivery of a premature infant. 9 In most situations, a pa8
At a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that viability is possible,
the fetus is sufficiently large that it must be dismembered, and the skull
must be crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See 655
F. 2d, at 865, and n. 29.
9
The courts below found the statutory provision unconstitutional because there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement:
no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. See 483 F. Supp., at 694;
655 F. 2d, at 865. As the Court of Appeals noted, however, the choice of
D&E after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id.,
at 865, and n. 28. · Thus, D&E is not to be used when the fetus is viable
and other methods are more likely to preserve its life but not pose a

'•.t
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tient's primary interest is in preserving her own health. Exceptions to this, of course, are childbirth and where an infant
must be delivered prematurely. In these situations, the
mother ardently desires that the child be born safely and is
healthy, although she naturally hopes to survive in good
health.
The situation often is different with respect to the woman
who seeks an abortion. Many pregnant women who otherwise would have an abortion may determine not to do so if
the fetus is viable. But the viability of the fetus will not alter the decision of all women, and the State's assumption that
some physicians will accord primacy to the wishes of these
woman cannot be viewed as unreasonable. The State's interest is compelling, and this necessarily justifies imposition
of some burdens on the woman's choice following viability of
the fetus.
We believe the second-physician requirement furthers the
State's compelling interest in potential life,
·
·
abo ·
GeS-.l:f.SU).t-iR-8-li~
t
greater risk to the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians
testified they would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or
similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing
in the record to indicate that there is an exact correspondence between the
situations in which there are compelling medical reasons for performing
any abortion after viability and the method that presents the least risk to
the mother is D&E. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (experts disagree whether D&E
should ever be used after viability). We therefore cannot assume that all
third-trimester abortions will be D&E abortions, thus precluding all pOS:.
sffiility orTiv~ The possibility that does exist, plus the constant
threat that any D&E abortion might have to be abandoned because of complications, justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every thirdtrimester abortion.
10
See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 9, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Grimes &
Cates, The Brief for Hypertonic Saline, 15 Contemporary Ob/Gyn 29, 38
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It is true that the medical literature indicates that preserving
the potential life of a viable fetus during a third trimester
abortion often is not possible. 11 But use of methods that are
fatal to the fetus are not always required to preserve the life
and health of the mother. The State legitimately may ~
choose to provide safeguards for ~fistances of live
,....~~...Lo .L. : .. /.
birth. The second physician, in those emerg8W!.y situations
~.._..,~
Missouri permits ar;y third-trimester abortio~ ..>;
- -- - ssistance to the motber's physician in preserving _
~ - 9
the health of the child. We thus believe the second-~ )
~-/h.#1
requirement bears a reasonable relationship to the State in~
terest in protecting the lives of viable unborn children. We
'r
\1
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that
~
§ 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
~~

-

~

IV
The most suspect state regulations are those that apply to
mature women during the first trimester. We have made
~ "minor regulations on the abortion procedure
during the first trimester may not interfere with physicianpatient consultation or with the woman's choice between
(1980) (increasing number of live-born fetuses in prostaglandin abortions);
Stroh & Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two
and One-Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet.
Gynecol. 83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions;
9 following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion). "
11
See Stoh & Himman, supra n. 10, at 88 (one survival out of thirty- )
eight live births).
12
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).

']......-{.
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abortions and childbirth." City of Akron, ante, at 12. Nevertheless, even in the early weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain
regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's
exercise of her right may be permissible where justified by
important state health objectives." Ante, at 11. Section
188.047 requires a pathology report for every abortion performed. The question is whether this requirement unconstitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold
that it does not.
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri
apparently does not require pathology reports in all procedures, "[t]his does not mean that a State never may enact a
regulation touching on the woman's abortion right during the
first weeks of pregnancy." City of Akron, ante, at 11. The
specific issue here is whether§ 188.047, which on its face and
in effect is reasonably related to generally accepted medical
standards and maternal health, 13 "further[s] important
health-related State concerns," ante, at 12, without interfer3
' A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered
through a pathological examination. The Districf'court noted that several
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. See The Abortion Profiteers, Chicago Sun Times (1978) (special report), at 26, col. 3 (quoting Dr. Willard
Cates, head of abortion surveillance for the National Center for Disease
Control, as saying "pathological reports are so important that no clinic
should allow a patient to leave the premises without one"). Moreover, the
ACOG standards for abortion services state that for all surgical services
performed on an ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be
subsmitted to a pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of
elective termination of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a
description of the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts
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ing with the woman's decision to have an abortion.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are "clearly" "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tissue removed during an abortion provides a State with an
unique opportunity to further its interest in promoting the
health of its citizens. Additionally, questions about the longrange complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of
Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced
Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A.
2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert
with abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis
to study those complications. 14 Cf. Planned Parenthood of
can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must
be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination."
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982)
(emphasis added). The standards of the National Abortion Federation
(NAF), whose members include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant and the results recorded
in the chart. In the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross
examination, obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If this examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent
to the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination."
NAF, National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to
remain in good standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Simopoulos and City of Akron 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan
Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and
Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross
examination must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does not confirm a normal gestation.").
"Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's
division of health.
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Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976).
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the additional cost of a
tissue examination is a significant burden on a pregnant
woman's abortion decision. 15 The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services was $1~1,0
per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48_.6 I We
1Iiink this minor burden is justified, like the Missouri recordkeeping requirements upheld in Planned Parenthood ofCentral Missouri v. Danforth, supra, as "useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a
resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience an? j~dgme~t," 428 U. S., at 81. J In sum, "we ~ee
-noiegally significant Impact or consequence on the abortion
decision or on the physician-patient relationship." See id.,
at 81. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals on this point.

v

As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. A State's interest in protecting immature minors will
sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental
or judicial. We have cautioned, however, that "the State
"Plaintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the pathologist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however, state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination.
If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13
Mo. Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981).
16
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See 483 F. Supp., at 700, n.
48.
"The Danforth Court also noted that "[t)he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., at
81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).

1~4
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must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant
minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to
make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best interests." 18 City of
Akron, ante, at 21-22. 19 The issue here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with these established legal
standards. 20
18
The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti I/),
also required that the alternative to parental consent must "assure" that
the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be
obtained." ld., at 644. Confidentiality here is assured by the statutory
requirement that allows the minor to use her initials on the petition. Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). As to expedition of appeals,
§ 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the state Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.
19
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. See 655 F. 2d, at
873; 483 F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for
review, § 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
20
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
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The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2,21 in relevant part,
provides:
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts to do (a),
(b), or (c). The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of
the petition permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court to find that the minor was not emancipated
and was not mature enough to make her own decision and
that an abortion was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at
858. Plaintiffs contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not agree.
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Although the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S.W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C.J.S. Parent
and Child §86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S.W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959). It should also be noted that, before a person may be successfully
prosecuted for a violation of § 188.028, the State must show that the defendant "knowingly" violated the section.
21
See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II.
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avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
~ if the statute provides discretion to deny perL/ mission to ~ minor for any "good cause," 1 would violate the
principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. The court,
however, reached the logical conclusion that "findings and
the ultimate denial of the petition must be supported by a
showing of 'good cause."' Ibid. Before exercising any option, the juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of
the minor." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982).
The Court of Appeals rationally found that a court could not
deny a petition, "for good cause," unless it first found-after
having received the required evidence-that the minor was
not mature enough to make her own decision. 22 See Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 643-644, 647-648 (1979) (plurality
opinion). We conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly
interpreted the statute, and as interpreted § 188.028 avoids
constitutional infirmities. 23
Missouri argues that, under state law, "for good cause" is '"a cause or
reason sufficient in law."' State v. Davis, 469 S.W. 2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1971)
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary). The Missouri
courts recognize, however, in a variety of contexts, that the commonly
used legal phrase "for good cause" "is not susceptible of precise definition,"
Vaughn v. Ripley, 416 S.W. 2d 226, 228 (Mo. App. 1967), and that '"[g)ood
cause' depends upon the circumstances of the individual case," Wilson v.
Morris, 369 S.W. 2d 402, 407 (Mo. 1963). A finding of its existence "lies
largely in the discretion of the ... court to which the decision is committed," ibid., and the phrase "connotes a remedial purpose in a matter addressed primarily to the conscience of the court," Corzine v. Stoff, 505
S.W. 2d 162, 164 (Mo. App. 1973). This discretion, however, no doubt is
limited to choices that are not inconsistent with the federal Constitution.
23
Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 407; Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147 (1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not,
however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and
Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer ques22

81-1255
16

AND

81-1623-0PINION

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN v. ASHCROFT

VI

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invalidated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of attorneys' fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v.
E ckerhart, U. S. (1983).

It is so ordered.

tions of state statutory construction to the state supreme court. See 655
F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 (1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I. Supra, at 151.
Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction
that obviates the need to have the state courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts to abstain. Cf. City of Akron,
ante, at 23-24.
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[Decided March - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions.

I
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional,
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance of abortions. The sections relevant here include
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial
consent. 4
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
' Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
' Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
1
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rephysician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
"(1) The rrunor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition.
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
[Footnote 5 is on p. 41
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981). We granted certiorari. U. S. - - (1982).
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
II
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied;
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life of the minor."
5
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of
fees. See 655 F . 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.
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In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is
unconstitutional.

III
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement.
Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals . ... "
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. !d., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13,
and n. 16.
6
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U. S. 379, 386--387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good
medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
The lower courts invalidated § 188. 030.3. 7 The plaintiffs,
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the
The courts below found that there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used since no viable fetus can
survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accordingly, they found the provision overbroad. As the Court of Appeals
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be
used when the fetus is viable; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to
the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified they
7
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. These are not insubstantial arguments, and we view
the issue as a close one.
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to preserve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreasonable for the State to assume that during the operation the
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to preserving the woman's condition, and not to protecting the actual life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure.
would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of
Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the
record to indicate that D&E will be the method that poses the least risk to
the woman in every situation in which there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (experts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after viability). We
therefore cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E
abortions, or that there will be no live births. Thus, the State's compelling interest in preserving the life of the fetus when there is a live birth
justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester
abortion.
8
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).
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Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because
of their premature birth. A second physician, in situations
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health
and life of the child.
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is delivered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's
interests are protected more fully than the first physician
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling interest that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those unusual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimester abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We believe the second-physician requirement furthers the State's
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses,
and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding
that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
IV
Section 188.047 requires a pathology report for every abortion performed. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy,
however, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an
abortion may be permissible where justified by important
state health objectives." City of Akron, at 11. See
9
See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh &
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and OneHalf Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.
83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out of 38 live births).)
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Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S.
52, 80--81 (1976). The question is whether§ 188.047 unconstitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold
that it does not.
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri
apparently does not require pathology reports in all procedures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right during the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards
and maternal health, 10 "further[s] important health-related
'"A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose members include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If this
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State concerns," City of Akron, ante, at 12, without interfering with the woman's decision to have an abortion.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tissue removed during an abortion provides a State with an
opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M. A. 2495,
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for
studying those complications. 11 Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
81.

In light of these factors, we think the small additional cost 12
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." NAF, National
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance
with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington,
D. C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does
not confirm a normal gestation.").
a Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's
division of health.
12
The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48.
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See ibid.
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of a tissue examination 13 does not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. In Danforth, this Court
unanimously upheld Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as
"useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its
female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S.,
at 81. 14 We view the requirement for a pathology report as
comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on
this point.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id.,
at 656-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). A State's interest in
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear,
however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
Plaintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the pathologist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however,
state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic
tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981).
14
The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S.,
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).
13
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best interests." 15 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 16 The issue
here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with
these established legal standards. 17
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 18 in relevant part,
provides:
6

The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to parental consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." I d., at 644. Confidentiality
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982).
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.
16
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review,
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
17
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al'
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 19 to
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision and that an abortion
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not
agree.
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
18
See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II.
19
We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (PowELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker.
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at
643, n. 22.

81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION
14

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reasonably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good
cause" unless it first found-after having received the required evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional
infirmities. 20
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali20
Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146--147
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts
to abstain.
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dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of
attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart,- U.S.- (1983).
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions.

I
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional,
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance of abortions. The sections relevant here include
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial
consent. 4
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
2
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rephysician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition.
At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
[Footnote 5 is on p. 4}
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981). We granted certiorari. - - U. S . - (1982).
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
II
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied;
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life of the minor."
5
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.
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In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is
unconstitutional.
III
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement.
6
Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 68~90, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals .... "
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. !d., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13,
and n. 16.

• ;t
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." ld., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good
medical practice . . . to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs,
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the
'The courts below found that there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used since no viable fetus can
survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accordingly, they found the provision overbroad. As the Court of Appeals
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be
used when the fetus is viable; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to
the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified they
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. These are not insubstantial arguments, and we view
the issue as a close one.
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to preserve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreasonable for the State to assume that during the operation the
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to preserving the woman's condition, and not to protecting the actual life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure.
would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of
Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the
record to indicate that D&E will be the method that poses the least risk to
the woman in every situation in which there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (experts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after viability). We
therefore cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E
abortions, or that there will be no live births. Thus, the State's compelling interest in preserving the life of the fetus when there is a live birth
justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester
abortion.
8
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).

•.

81-1255 & 81-1623--0PINION
8

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because
of their premature birth. A second physician, in situations
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health
and life of the child.
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is delivered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's
interests are protected more fully than the first physician
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling interest that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those unusual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimester abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We believe the second-physician requirement furthers the State's
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses,
and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding
that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
IV
Section 188.047 requires a pathology report for every abortion performed. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy,
however, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an
abortion may be permissible where justified by important
state health objectives." City of Akron, at 11. See
9
See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh &
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and OneHalf Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.
83, 83--84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out of 38 live births).)
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Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S.
52, 80-81 (1976). The question is whether § 188.047 unconstitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold
that it does not.
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri
apparently does not require pathology reports in all procedures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right during the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards
and maternal health, 10 "further[s] important health-related
10
A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose members include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If this
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State concerns," City of Akron, ante, at 12, without interfering with the woman's decision to have an abortion.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tissue removed during an abortion provides a State with an
opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M. A. 2495,
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for
studying those complications. 11 Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
81.

In light of these factors, we think the small additional cost 12
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." NAF, National
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance
with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington,
D. C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does
not confirm a normal gestation.").
"Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's
division of health.
12
The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48.
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See ibid.
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of a tissue examination 13 does not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. In Danforth, this Court
unanimously upheld Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as
"useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its
female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S.,
at 81. 14 We view the requirement for a pathology report as
comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on
this point.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id.,
at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). A State's interest in
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear,
however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
Plaintiffs also note that§ 188.047 does not specify whether the pathologist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however,
state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic
tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981).
"The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S.,
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).
13
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best interests." 15 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 16 The issue
here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with
these established legal standards. 17
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 18 in relevant part,
provides:
15
The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to parental consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982).
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.
16
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review,
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
17
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 19 to
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision and that an abortion
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not
agree.
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
18
See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II.
19
We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to
an "independent decisionmaker." H .L . v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (PowELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker.
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at
643, n. 22.
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Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reasonably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good
cause" unless it first found-after having received the required evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional
infirmities. 20
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali20

Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147
(1976) (Bellotti[). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving CQ!lstruction, there is no reason for federal courts
to abstain.
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dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of
attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart, U. S. (1983).
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-185

CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - ,
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, ante, p. - - . The principal issue here is whether
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional.
I
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge,
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant
sought any license for it.
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but
never advised her parents of her decision.
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course.
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began.
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet.
ld., at 200.
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home.
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.1
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d).
2
The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which
provides:
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - , and now affirm.
II
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization requirements. 3 He contends that they restrict the availability
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester,
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester,
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is
performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances,
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however,
rebut the other defenses.
3
Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient surgical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two additional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977).
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden
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of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-trimester
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-licensed clinic, do not further the State's interests.
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding principles, for we have set them out at length today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at
9-12, 14-16. For present purposes here, the critical point is
that we consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that
a State has an "important and legitimate interest in the
health of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113, 163 (1973), and is compelling throughout the remainder of the pregnancy. This interest, of course, embraces the facilities and circumstances in which abortions are
performed. ld., at 150.
A
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization requirement for abortions performed during the second trimester.
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, perof going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975).
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts
in fact caused the death of the fetus . In view of the undisputed facts
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221
Va. , at 106~1070 , 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201.
'A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing
surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, which defines "hospital" to include
"outpatient ... hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 5 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions
... which primarily provide facilities for the performance of
surgical procedures on outpatients" 6 and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 7
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id.,
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a
license before he performed the abortion at issue here. Thus, without
record evidence that appellant's facility qualifies as a surgical outpatient
clinic and that he was denied a hospital license, the issue of whether the
Falls Church facility would qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to our
determination in this case. Seen. 7, infra (noting State's interpretation of
the Virginia regulations).
5
The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15,
§ 1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although not relevant to our
determination here, we note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for
which he has been prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and
Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982).
• section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va.
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical clinics).
7
Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
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Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 8 provided that
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State.
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly different from those
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
ante, at 45. In those cases, the regulations required that "all
second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found that
such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation
and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure."
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws
invalid because they did not reasonably further the state interest in maternal health.
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be percal clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3,
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services.
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week amenorrhea).").
8
We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical
clinics."
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formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here.
B

Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious complications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in
the second trimester, still may cause complications. 10
The American Public Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast
• See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329,
331 (1981), Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980).
'"Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56,
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979).
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infectionnormally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. - . Thus the relative safety of the D&E
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent
infection.
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majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the
same standards of care as those recommended for other sur-gical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (AGOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter AGOG Standards).
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid.
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195.'' City of
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's licensing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics performing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health.
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c
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient
surgical clinics in Virginia. These regulations may be
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categories.
The first grouping relates to organization, management,
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3;
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures
manual, 11 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also
construction requirements that set forth standards for the
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 12 and general building. 13
The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used,
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4;
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and
infection control, § 41.2.5.
12
These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities.
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1.
13
The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa11
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The most important group of regulations for our purposes
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer,
such as anesthesia,t 4 laboratory,t5 and pathology. 16 Some of
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 17 and postoperative recovery.'8 Finally, the regulations mandate some
emergency services and evacuation planning. 19
tient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4.
14
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.1.1 (service must be
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for administration and recovery).
15
Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing,
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically indicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4.
16
Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See
Ashcroft, ante, at - - .
17
Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the
performing physician. !d., § 43.8.4.
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27-28.
18
Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one
[Footnote 19 is on p. 11}

\

....
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III
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. Instead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus
invalid.
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations on various grounds. He argues that even if he had applied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations;" that Part II of
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility
where second trimester abortions are performed, but seen.
8, supra; and that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43. 9.1, 43. 9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d.,
§§ 43. 9.3, 43. 9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical
organizations, seen. 32, infra.
19
See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation
plan); id., §43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus,
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides:
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory,
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all
times."

81-18~0PINION

12

SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals."
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. Only the last of these arguments is relevant to the validity of these statutes and regulations, and appellant points to no evidence that supports his
generalized claim of "safety." We have noted above that the
Virginia requirements are strikingly different from those we
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Compliance with
the state's requirements will entail costs, but this can be said
of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the
health and safety of people. Moreover, ethical physicians
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the standards set by their profession, and appellant has not identified
any significant differences between professional standards
and the Virginia requirements. We are convinced, at least
on the record before us, that the Virginia provisions are reasonably related to and further the State's compelling interest
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman during the
second trimester.
The requirements of the first 20 and second categories 21 of
regulations discussed in Part 11-C above have little relevance
to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant be20
ACOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assurance." See ACOG Standards 55 ("Each physician's office and outpatient
clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management of health
care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement,
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, ACOG's standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the
completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." ACOG
Standards 55-56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures and policies in each area of
care). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6. (supporting the
NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of

•"·
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yond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that second-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-second week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as appears from the recommendations of AGOG and the American
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin,
see nn. 22, 23, and 24, Virginia's requirements, although
more detailed with respect to specific facilities, 22 equipment,
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3, and that "[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and revised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (responsibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (hereinafter "Planned Parenthood Guidelines") (duties of administrator).
21
This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices provide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 56-58. Cf. Planned
Parenthood Guidelines, 1-3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for
first-trimester abortion clinics). ACOG's standards for an ambulatory
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting,
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evaluation, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia,
performance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instruments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG
Standards 61.
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas.
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter
"APHA Guide") (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other environmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57.
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the

81-185--0PINION
14

SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA

and personnel than the AGOG and APHA standards, are
compatible with generally accepted medical standard.
Our concern centers on whether the patient services requirements of the Virginia regulations further the State's interest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the
standards used by AGOG and APHA, and we are impressed
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regulations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 23 and record-keeping standards 24 are typical and not unreasonable in detail.
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, including positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen,
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have parenteral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen).
22
ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58,
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an
emergency. ld., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10.
23
Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure.
See nn. 11 and 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations
are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate
steps to control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate wastedisposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient
Hospitals) §§41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5,
52.2. 6, 52.2. 7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop
procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife
blades, and contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62.
APHA Guide 655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used
for each procedure .... ").
24
The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to those detailed
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The laboratory services 25 support-and often are essential
to-the direct medical services 25 performed by the physician 27 and nurse. 28 The post-operative recovery standards 29 also comport with accepted medical practice, 30 and the
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59--60, which require at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history,
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, allergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facilities, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient information to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent,
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and
discharge summary and instructions. ld., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval history, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record.").
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," impose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655-656 (recommended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13
(record-keeping and reporting requirements).
25
The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating
instillation. See ACOG Standards 59 ("The laboratory data should include
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients,
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes.").
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must include determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served;
may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea;
urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic
screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for
pregnancy tests,' urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin determination, and Rh typing).
26
See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be completed and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added).
[Footnotes 27 through J1 are on pp. 16 and 17}
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equipment requirements for emergency services are
minimal. 31
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify preexisting or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." !d., at 60 (emphasis
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8.
27
For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before anesthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes general, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthetist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10.
28
The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians'
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with administrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of procedures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Administrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load,
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines
7-8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient.").
29
See n. 19, supra.
30
Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the

.,,
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 16.
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply because it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the asserted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20.
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-trimester abortions are reasonably related to and further the
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature,
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or
injury."). Less serious complications can be monitored by the registered
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occurrence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complications. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. J . Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period
desirable).
81
The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unanticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7;
Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10 ("Each facility must
have a functioning arrangement for emergency transport to a local accredited hospital.").
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State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 32 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-accommodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-between the physician and the patient.
IV
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester
abortions be performed in, properly equipped outpatient
clinic is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court
of Virginia is
Affirmed.

32
Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires the same services and equipment as Part
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3,
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however,
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to the state's compelling interest.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. - - , present questions as to the validity of
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions.

I
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional,
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance of abortions. The sections relevant here include
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial
consent. 4
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
2
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
8
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
4
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
1

r

•
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rephysician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition.
At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
[Footnote 5 is on p. 4}
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981). We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1982).
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8--12, has stated
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
II
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied;
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life of the minor."
5
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees , made pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.
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In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is
unconstitutional.
III
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement.
6

Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
" 'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals .... "
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. !d., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13,
and n. 16.
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good
medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased
risk to the life or health of the woman." Seen. 3, supra. It
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs,
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the
7
he courts e ow ound that there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used since no viable fetus can
survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp. , at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accordingly, they found the provision overbroad. As the Court of Appeals
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is.subject to the reg;rirements of§ 188.030.2. See i d., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D& E IS not to be
usectw'lien the fetus1 s viable; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to
the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified the

f
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. ~hese tu•e RQt i~iUbiltaRtial aPgYFBeRts, oftHS we""'¥:iew
tfie is~tle as a elese eHe..
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to preserve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreasonable for the State to assume that during the operation the
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to preserving the woman'weH8itieE?, and not to protecting the actual life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure.
would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of
Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the
record to indicate that D&E will be the method that poses the least risk to
the woman in every situation in which there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (experts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after viability). We
therefore cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E
abortions, or that there will be no live births. Thus, the State's compelling interest in preserving the life of the fetus when there is a live birth
justifies the State in requirin a second h sician at every third-trimeste
bortion.
8
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).

..

~)
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Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because
of their premature birth. A second physician, in situations
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health
and life of the child.
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is delivered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's
interests are protected more fully than the first physician
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling interest that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those unusual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimester abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We believe the second-physician requiremen~furthers the State's
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses,
and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding
that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
IV
Section 188. 047 reqmres a pat o ogy report for every abortion performed. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy,
however, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an
abortion may be permissible where justified by important
state health ob ·ectives." City of Akron, at 11. See

d

• See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh &
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and OneHalf Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J . Obstet. Gynecol.
83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one s,urviva! out of 38 live birth~ 4 ~~ 'IJ 8 ( 5<J- (o
~~

r

1
:Z.%
~ ~:n(f~ ()_focwd. ~~ ~)) ~ •• ~ ~a\(~&-'\l%v~f\~
~ )ot.C{~ d--S ~ &'l -~))'Ill. 1 cJ: <i?ll7 '( 5o1?\
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Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S.
52, 80-81 (1976). The question is whether § 188.047 unconstitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold
that it does not.
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20. 030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri
apparently does not require pathology reports in all procedures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right during the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards
and maternal health, 10 "further[s] important health-related
A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose members include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If t ·
10
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State concerns," City of Akron, ante, at 12, without interfering with the woman's decision to have an abortion.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tissue removed during an abortion provides a State with an
opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A. M. A. 2495,
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for
studying those complications. 11 Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
81.

In light of these factors, we think the small additional cost 12
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." NAF, National
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance
with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington,
D. C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does
not confirm a normal gestation.").
11
Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's
division of health.
12
The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48.
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See ibid.
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of a tissue examination 13 does not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. In Danforth, this Court
unanimously upheld Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as
"useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its
female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S.,
at 81. 14 We view the requirement for a pathology report as
comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the jud ent of the Court of Appeals on
this point.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id.,
at 656-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 16 A State's interest in
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear,
however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
laintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the patholomust make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however,
state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic
tissue report must also be filed ·
Div' · of Health." 13 Mo.
Admin. Cod
-151.030 1 (1981
' The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S.,
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).
gJ.S

~
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best interests."~ City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 1.8' The issue
here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with
these established legal standards.-~'~"' I~ 1q
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2,.1!1 in relevant part,
provides:
J0 ...r'The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to paren-

tal consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." !d., at 644. Confidentiality
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982).
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.
1"1 J"Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review,
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
19 )"'The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). AI-
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
·2 0
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courtsJAf to
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision and that an abortion
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Pla.intiffs
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not
agree.
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
I ~ee n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II.
20 .;'we have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (PowELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker.
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at
643, n. 22.

r
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Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good
cause.'" 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reasonably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good
cause" unless it first found-after having received the required evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at
643--644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional
z.l infirmities.~
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali~~

? Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146--147
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction
to the state supreme court. See 655 F . 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I , supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts
to abstain.
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dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental{£onsent provision. is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of
attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart,- U.S.- (1983).
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions.
I

Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional,

•

81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION
2

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance of abortions. The sections relevant here include
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial
consent. 4
1
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
2
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
' Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly peiform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rephysician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
"(1) The mir10r or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition.
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting

[Footnote 5 is on p. 4]
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872--873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981). We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1982).
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8--12, has stated
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
II

In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied;
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life of the minor."
5
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.
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physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is
unconstitutional.
III
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement.
Missouri does not define the tenn "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the tenn has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are perfonned other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, defonnity or other abnonnal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals . .. ."
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13,
and n. 16.
6
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good
medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs,
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the
The courts below found, and JuSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion
agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used because no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accordingly, for them, § 188.030.3 is overbroad.J\Tfiepe is ag;pil!ffteRt tfiat a fet~
·
·
as the Court of Appeals
noted, the choice oft 1s proce ure er VIa 11 1s subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts
below, in conclusory language, found that D&E is the "method of choice fee
7
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature
infant.
£"1t. ..

4fi!r vi~~tb.1,·s.1

IS

f"'.3:S;Lic!.I . , ' (D55

f..t.l, a! 81..~.

r6 seme ;wemen who need post-viability :ilhartigniJt"" Po.,t,

a~ ~ No scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by those courts or by the dissent.
Reliance apparently is placed solely on the testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a
physician om ansa~ ~estimony, if nothing else, is remarkable in its
candor. He is a member of the National Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and people interested in the pro-choice
movement." 2 Record 415-416. He supported the use of D&E on 28week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In some circumstances,
he considered it a better procedure than other methods. See 2 Record
427-428. His disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only to be rid of the growth,
called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a dead fetus." I d., at 431.
He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to protect the
fetus, if it can be saved," id., and finally that "as a general principle"
"[t]here should not be a live fetus," id., at 435. Moreover, contrary to
every other view, he thought a fetus could survive a D&E abortion. Id.,
at 433-434. None of the other physicians who testified at the trial, those
called both by the plaintiffs and defendants, considered that any use of
D&E after viability was indicated. See 1 Record 21 (limiting use of D&E
to under 18 weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar)
(D&E up to 17 weeks; would never perform D&E after 26 weeks); 4 Record
787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E
safest up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20
weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to childbirth
at 24 weeks~ Record 33, 78-81~r. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E
performed) ~''A.pparently Dr. Crist practiced only in Kansas, 2 Record 334,
368, 428, a state having no statutes comparable to § 188.030.1 and
§ 188.030.2. It is not clear whether he was operating under or familiar
with the limitations imposed by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the circumstances when there were "contraindications" against the use of any of
the procedures that could preserve viability, or whether his conclusory
opinion was limited to emergency situations. Indeed, there is no record
evidence that D&E ever will be the method that poses the least risk to the
woman in those rare situations where there are compelling medical reasons

( Dr.C.r;.s'- ·~)

"
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The first physician's primary concern will be the life and
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to preserve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreasonfor performing an abortion after viability. If there were such instances,
they hardly would justify invalidating § 188.030.3.
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in,._l'footnote, the District Court citedwith no elaboration-Dr. Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agreement with Dr. Crist is enlightening.
/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~----------------------~~~
, "Q. Is there any reason that you can give us for the attendance of a sec\
ond physician for an abortion on a viable fetus by method of D&E.
"A. No.
"Q. There is no possibility of survival, is there?
"A. No. Mr. Susman, can I add to that just a moment?
"Q. Certainly.
"A. To get that in focus, to me this is not a practical point. I simply do
not believe that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an elected
method of abortion. Because, again, we are talking about well along in
second trimester, not early trimester.
"Q. Doctor, there has been prior testimony of D&E being performed at
those stages when contraindication exists for the other alternatives.
"A. Well, okay. There very well may be, but I personally cannot con·
ceive that as a significant practical point. It may be important legally,
""'
but from a medical standpoint, that doesn't bother me.
4 Record 83&-837 (emphasis added). Given that Dr. Crist's discordant
testimony IS wholly unsupportea, tne State's compelling interest in protecting a viable fetus justifies the second-physician requirement even
though there may be the rare case when a physician may think honestly
that D&E is required for the mother's health. Legislation need not accommodate every conceivable contingency.
8
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).

'

.

81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

9

able for the State to assume that during the operation the
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to preserving the woman's health, and not to protecting the actual
life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because of
their premature birth. A second physician, in situations
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health
and life of the child.
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is delivered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's
interests are protected more fully than the first physician
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling interest that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those unusual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimester abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We believe the second-physician requirement rationally furthers
the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
IV
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
9

See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh &
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and OneHalf Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J . Obstet. Gynecol.
83, 83--84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out
of 38live births); 4 Record 728 (50-62% mortality rate for fetuses 26 and 27
weeks); id., at 729 (2&--92% mortality rate for fetuses 28 and 29 weeks); id. ,
at 837 (50% mortality rate at 34 weeks).

I
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requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). With respect to abortions, whether performed in hospitals or in some other facility, § 188.047 requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the
tissue report with the State Division of Health. . . ." See n.
2, supra. The pathologist also is required to "provide a copy
of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced." Thus, Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well as
from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological
examination by the performing doctor. The narrow question
before us is whether the State lawfully also may require the
tissue removed following an abortion performed in clinics as
well as in hospitals to be submitted to a pathologist. We believe that it can.
On its face and in effect, § 188.047 is reasonably related to
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at
12. As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. 10 As a rule, it is
10

A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can be discovered only
through a pathological examination. The general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear. See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing); Brief of the
American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185,

.....
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good medical practice to submit all tissue to the examination
of a pathologist. 11 This is particularly important following
abortion, because questions remain as to the long-range complications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies. See
App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et
al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for studying those
complications. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976).
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion
is as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination.
This argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a
pathologist-not the performing physician-to examine tissue after almost every type of surgery. Although this requirement is in a provision relating to surgical procedures in
hospitals, many of the same procedures included within the
81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
11
ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee" should examine "all
tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic operations." ACOG, Standards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG
standards also state as a general rule that, for all surgical services performed on an ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 1982). The
dissent, however, relies on the recent modification of these standards as
they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change
in policy was controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800.
ACOG found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it recognized-on
the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a
microscopic examination is performed in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980).
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Missouri statute customarily are performed also in outpatient
clinics. No reason has been suggested why the prudence required in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in such
a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to impose
stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing abortions than on hospitals. 12 As the testimony in the District
Court indicates, medical opinion is not YMniffiOtis. on this
question. See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800,
845-847; n. 2, supra. ~.there is substantial support for
Missouri's requirement. In t his case, for example, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner,
testified that he requires a pathologist examination after each
of the 60,000 abortions performed under his direction at the
New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. He
considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or for that matter from any other surgical procedure
which involved the removal of tissue from the human body."
12

The professional views that the plaintiffs find to support their position
do not disclose whether consideration was given to the fact that not all
abortion clinics, particularly inadequately regulated clinics, conform to ethical or generally accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U. S. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to "incompetent
or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). The SunTimes of Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to
obtain proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, that a
State reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is necessary
in abortion clinics as well as in general hospitals.
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests that we disregard the interests
of the "woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But
these women may be those most likely to seek the least expensive clinic
available. As the standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be
the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's examination of tissue is particularly importan~
~ ~ ,_~~~.:::..._h_Jt...-'\
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App. 143-144. See also App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr.
Keitges); 5 Record 798--799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt). 13
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's
health and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to minimize to this extent the cost of abortions. Even in the early
weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide
to have an abortion may be permissible where justified by important state health objectives." City of Akron, ante, at 11.
See Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80-81. In light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination can have, we
think the cost of a tissue examination does not significantly
burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp.,
at 700, n. 48. In Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld
Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the
State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens,
and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving
medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 14 We
The dissent appears to suggest that § 188.047 is constitutionally infirm
because it does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that
misses the point of the regulation. The need is for someone other than the
performing clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue.
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is
reasonable for the State to assume that an independent pathologist is more
likely to perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor.
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the
pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy.") (emphasis added).
14
The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S.,
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in
13
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view the requirement for a pathology report as comparable
and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id.,
at 656-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 15 A State's interest in
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear,
however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
best interests." 16 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 17 The issue

\

t·.· ',

-

Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).
16
The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an open one,
and adhere to the viewsjftti they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at 10-11.
But those views have never been adopted by a majority of this Court,
while a majority have expressed quite differing views. See H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (plurality
opinion).
16
The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to parental
consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed
with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." I d., at 644. Confidentiality here is
assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). As to
expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
[Footnote 17 is on p. 15}

I
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here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with
these established legal standards. 18
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 19 in relevant part,
provides:
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
17
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at406-407, and n. 14,411 (upholding
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review,
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
18
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Although the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
19
See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 20 to
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision and that an abortion
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not
agree.
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II.
'IJ) We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (PowELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker.
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at
643, n. 22.

1
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denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reasonably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good
cause" unless it first found-after having received the required evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional
infirmities. 21
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invalidated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental and juducial consent
provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a second physician attend the abortion of any
viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding
an award of attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with
Hensley v. Eckerhart, - - U. S. - - (1983).

It is so ordered.
21
Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts
to abstain.

RIDER A

Although he conceded that the attendance of a second physician for a
D&E abortion on a viable fetus was not necessary, he thought the
point mostly was theoretical, because he "simply [did] not believe
that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an elected
method of abortion."

4 Record 836.

When reminded of Dr. Crist's

earlier testimony, he conceded the remote possibility of thirdtrimester D&E abortions, but stated: "I personally cannot conceive
that as a significant practical point.
but [not] from a medical standpoint •••• "

It may be important legally,
Id.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. - -, present questions as to the validity of
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions.

Rfii

I
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional,
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance of abortions. The sections relevant here include
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial
consent. 4
1
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
2
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rephysician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the
following procedures:
"(1) The mirwr or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition.
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
[Footnote 5 is on p. 41
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981). We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1982).
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
II

In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied;
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life of the minor."
5
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.
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physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is
unconstitutional.
III
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement.
Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
" 'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals . .. ."
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13,
and n. 16.
6
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." !d., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good
medical practice . . . to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased
risk to the life or health of the woman." Seen. 3, supra. It
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
The lower courts invalidated § 188. 030.3. 7 The plaintiffs,
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the
7

The courts below found, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion
agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used because no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accordingly, for them, § 188.030.3 is overbroad. This reasoning rests on two
assumptions. First, a fetus cannot survive a D&E abortion, and second,
D&E is the method of choice in the third trimester. There is general
agreement as to the first proposition, but not as to the second. Indeed,
almost all of the authorities disagree with JuSTICE BLACKMUN's critical as-
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature
infant.
sumption, and as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this procedure
after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See i d., at
865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts below, in conclusory language,
found that D&E is the "method of choice even after viability is possible."
655 F. 2d, at 865. No scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by
those courts or by the dissent. Reliance apparently is placed solely on the
testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas, to whom the District Court referred in a footnote. 483 F. Supp. , at 694, n. 25. This testimony provides slim support for this holding. Dr. Crist's testimony, if
nothing else, is remarkable in its candor. He is a member of the National
Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and people interested in the pro-choice movement." 2 Record 415-416. He supported
the use of D&E on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In
some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure than other methods. See 2 Record 427-428. His disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only to
be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a
dead fetus." Id., at 431. He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to protect the fetus, if it can be saved," id., and finally that
"as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a live fetus, " id. , at 435.
Moreover, contrary to every other view, he thought a fetus could survive a
D&E abortion. I d ., at 433-434. None of the other physicians who testified at the trial, those called both by the plaintiffs and defendants, considered that any use of D&E after viability was indicated. See 1 Record 21
(limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 weeks; would never perform D&E after
26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20 weeks); i d. , at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E
equivalent to childbirth at 24 weeks). See also 8 Record 33, 78-81 (deposition of Dr. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E performed). Apparently
Dr. Crist practiced only in Kansas, 2 Record 334, 368, 428, a state having
no statutes comparable to § 188.030.1 and § 188.030.2. It is not clear
whether he was operating under or familiar with the limitations imposed
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The first physician's primary concern will be the life and
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to preserve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreasonable for the State to assume that during the operation the
by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the circumstances when there were
"contraindications" against the use of any of the procedures that could preserve viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited to emergency situations. Indeed, there is no record evidence that D&E ever will
be the method that poses the least risk to the woman in those rare situations where there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after viability. If there were such instances, they hardly would justify invalidating § 188.030.3.
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in its footnote, the District Court citedwith no elaboration-Dr. Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agreement with Dr. Crist, is enlightening.
Although he conceded that the attendance of a second physician for a D&E
abortion on a viable fetus was not necessary, he thought the point mostly
was theoretical, because he "simply [did] not believe that the question of
viability comes up when D&E is an elected method of abortion." . 4 Record
836. When reminded of Dr. Crist's earlier testimony, he conceded theremote possibility of third-trimester D&E abortions, but stated: "I personally cannot conceive that as a significant practical point. It may be important legally, but [not] from a medical standpoint .... " Ibid. Given that
Dr. Crist's discordant testimony is wholly u!\supported, the State's compelling interest in protecting a viable fetus justifies the second-physician requirement even though there may be the rare case when a physician may
think honestly that D&E is required for the mother's health. Legislation
need not accommodate every conceivable contingency.
8
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).
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first physician's attention and skills will be directed to preserving the woman's health, and not to protecting the actual
life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because of
their premature birth. A second physician, in situations
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health
and life of the child.
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is delivered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's
interests are protected more fully than the first physician
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling interest that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those unusual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimester abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible/ but the
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We believe the second-physician requirement rationally furthers
the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
IV
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the excep9
See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh &
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and OneHalf Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J . Obstet. Gynecol.
83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out
of 38 live births); 4 Record 728 (50-62% mortality rate for fetuses 26 and 27
weeks); i d., at 729 (25-92% mortality rate for fetuses 28 and 29 weeks); id.,
at 837 (50% mortality rate at 34 weeks).
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tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). With respect to abortions, whether performed in hospitals or in some other facility, § 188.047 requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the
tissue report with the State Division of Health .... " See n.
2, supra. The pathologist also is required to "provide a copy
of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced." Thus, Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well as
from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological
examination by the performing doctor. The narrow question
before us is whether the State lawfully also may require the
tissue removed following an abortion performed in clinics as
well as in hospitals to be submitted to a pathologist. We believe that it can.
On its face and in effect, § 188.047 is reasonably related to
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at
12. As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. 10 As a rule, it is
A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can be discovered only
through a pathological examination. The general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear. See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing); Brief of the
American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185,
81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-hospi10

,v
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good medical practice to submit all tissue to the examination
of a pathologist. 11 This is particularly important following
abortion, because questions remain as to the long-range complications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies. See
App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et
al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for studying those
complications. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976).
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion
is as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination.
This argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a
pathologist-not the performing physician-to examine tissue after almost every type of surgery. Although this requirement is in a provision relating to surgical procedures in
hospitals, many of the same procedures included within the
Missouri statute customarily are performed also in outpatient
tal abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
"AGOG's standards at the time of the District Court's trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee" should examine "all
tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic operations." ACOG, Standards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG
standards also state as a general rule that, for all surgical services performed on an ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 1982). The
dissent, however, relies on the recent modification of these standards as
they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change
in policy was controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799--800.
ACOG found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it recognized--on
the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a
microscopic examination is performed in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980).
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clinics. No reason has been suggested why the prudence required in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in such
a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to impose
stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing abortions than on hospitals. 12 As the testimony in the District
Court indicates, medical opinion differs widely on this question. See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847;
n. 2, supra. There is substantial support for Missouri's requirement.
In this case, for example, Dr. Bernard
Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner, testified that he requires a pathologist examination after each of
the 60,000 abortions performed under his direction at the
New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. He
considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or for that matter from any other surgical procedure
which involved the removal of tissue from the human body."
App. 143-144. See also App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr.
The professional views that the plaintiffs find to support their position
do not disclose whether consideration was given to the fact that not all
abortion clinics, particularly inadequately regulated clinics, conform to ethical or generally accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U. S. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to "incompetent
or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). The SunTimes of Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to
obtain proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, that a
State reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is necessary
in abortion clinics as well as in general hospitals.
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests that we disregard the interests
of the "woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But
these women may be those most likely to seek the least expensive clinic
available. As the standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be
the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's examination of tissue is particularly important for their protection.
12
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Keitges); 5 Record 798--799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt). 13
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's
health and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to minimize to this extent the cost of abortions. Even in the early
weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide
to have an abortion may be permissible where justified by important state health objectives." City of Akron, ante, at 11.
See Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80-81. In light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination can have, we
think the cost of a tissue examination does not significantly
burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp.,
at 700, n. 48. In Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld
Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the
State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens,
and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving
medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 14 We
The dissent appears to suggest that § 188.047 is constitutionally infirm
because it does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that
misses the point of the regulation. The need is for someone other than the
performing clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue.
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is
reasonable for the State to assume that an independent pathologist is more
likely to perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor.
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the
pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy.") (emphasis added).
14
The Danforth Court also noted that "(t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S.,
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
18
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view the requirement for a pathology report as comparable
and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, wereverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
640-642, 64~4 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id.,
at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting)Y A State's interest in
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear,
however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
best interests." 16 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 17 The issue
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).
15
The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an open one,
and adhere to the views they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at 10-11.
But those views have never been adopted by a majority of this Court,
while a majority have expressed quite differing views. See H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (plurality
opinion).
16
The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to parental
consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed
with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." I d., at 644. Confidentiality here is
assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). As to
expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
[Footnote 17 is on p. 15]
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here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with
these established legal standards. 18
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 19 in relevant part,
provides:
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
17
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 406--407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review,
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
18
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Although the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J . S. Parent
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
19
See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II.
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 20 to
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision and that an abortion
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not
agree.
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason00
We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (PowELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker.
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at
643, n. 22.

,-
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ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good
cause" unless it first found-after having received the required evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at
643-644, 647--648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional
infirmities. 21
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invalidated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental and juducial consent
provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a second physician attend the abortion of any
viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding
an award of attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with
Hensley v. Eckerhart, - - U. S. - - (1983).

It is so ordered.

21

Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts
to abstain.
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II, and VI, and an opinioin with respect to
Parts III, IV, and V, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins.
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions.
I
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic
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("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional,
several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance of abortions. The sections relevant here include
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial
consent. 4
1
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
' Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
4
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the following procedures:
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed , any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights ,for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition.
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;
[Footnote 5 is on p. 4]
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981). We granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 988 (1982).
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at ~12, has stated
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied;
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life of the minor."
5
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of
fees. See 655 F . 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.
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II

In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is
unconstitutional.
Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-{)90, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals ... ."
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13,
and n. 16.
6
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III
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." !d., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U. S. 379, 386--387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good
medical practice . . . to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of,
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs,
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the
The courts below found, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion
agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used because no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accordingly, for them, § 188.030.3 is overbroad. This reasoning rests on two
assumptions. First, a fetus cannot survive a D&E abortion, and second,
7

(

'
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature
infant.
D&E is the method of choice in the third trimester. There is general
agreement as to the first proposition, but not as to the second. Indeed,
almost all of the authorities disagree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN's critical assumption, and as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this procedure
after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at
865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts below, in conclusory language,
found that D&E is the "method of choice even after viability is possible."
655 F. 2d, at 865. No scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by
those courts or by the dissent. Reliance apparently is placed solely on the
testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas, to whom the District Court referred in a footnote . 483 F. Supp., at 694, n. 25. This testimony provides slim support for this holding. Dr. Crist's testimony, if
nothing else, is remarkable in its candor. He is a member of the National
Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and people interested in the pro-choice movement." 2 Record 415-416. He supported
the use of D&E on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In
some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure than other methods. See 2 Record 427-428. His disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only to
be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a
dead fetus." !d., at 431. He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to protect the fetus , if it can be saved," id., and finally that
"as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a live fetus," id., at 435.
Moreover, contrary to every other view, he thought a fetus could survive a
D&E abortion. I d. , at 433-434. None of the other physicians who testified at the trial, those called both by the plaintiffs and defendants, considered that any use of D&E after viability was indicated. See 1 Record 21
(limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 weeks; would never perform D&E after
26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20 weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E
equivalent to childbirth at 24 weeks). See also 8 Record 33, 78--81 (deposition of Dr. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E performed). Apparently
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The first physician's primary concern will be the life and
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State permits
these late abortions only when they are necessary to preserve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreasonDr. Crist practiced only in Kansas, 2 Record 334, 368, 428, a state having
no statutes comparable to § 188.030.1 and § 188.030.2. It is not clear
whether he was operating under or familiar with the limitations imposed
by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the circumstances when there were
"contraindications" against the use of any of the procedures that could preserve viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited to emergency situations. Indeed, there is no record evidence that D&E ever will
be the method that poses the least risk to the woman in those rare situations where there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after viability. If there were such instances, they hardly would justify invalidating § 188.030.3.
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in its footnote , the District Court citedwith no elaboration-Dr. Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agreement with Dr. Crist, is enlightening. Although he conceded that the attendance of a second physician for a D&E abortion on a viable fetus was not
necessary, he considered the point mostly theoretical, because he "simply
[did] not believe that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an
elected method of abortion." 4 Record 836. When reminded of Dr.
Crist's earlier testimony, he conceded the remote possibility of third-trimester D&E abortions, but stated: "I personally cannot conceive that as a
significant practical point. It may be important legally, but [not] from a
medical standpoint.... " Ibid. Given that Dr. Crist's discordant testimony is wholly unsupported, the State's compelling interest in protecting a
viable fetus justifies the second-physician requirement even though there
may be the rare case when a physician may think honestly that D&E is
required for the mother's health. Legislation need not accommodate
every conceivable contingency.
8
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L . v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).
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able for the State to assume that during the operation the
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to preserving the woman's health, and not to protecting the actual
life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because of
their premature birth. A second physician, in situations
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health
and life of the child.
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is delivered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's
interests are protected more fully than the first physician
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling interest that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those unusual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimester abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We believe the second-physician requirement reasonably furthers
the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
IV
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh &
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and OneHalf Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.
83, 83--84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out
of 38 live births); 4 Record 728 (50-62% mortality rate for fetuses 26 and 27
weeks); id., at 729 (2&-:92% mortality rate for fetuses 28 and 29 weeks); id.,
at 837 (50% mortality rate at 34 weeks).
9
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requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). With respect to abortions, whether performed in hospitals or in some other facility, § 188.047 requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the
tissue report with the State Division of Health .... " Seen.
2, supra. The pathologist also is required to "provide a copy
of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced." Thus, Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well as
from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be
submitted to a pathologist, not merely examined by the performing doctor. The narrow question before us is whether
the Stat~ lawfully also may require the tissue removed following abortions performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to
be submitted to a pathologist.
·
On its face and in effect, § 188.047 is reasonably related to
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at
12. As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. 10 As a rule, it is
A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can be discovered only
through a pathological examination. The general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear. See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing); Brief of the
American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185,
81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-hospi10

'

81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

11

accepted medical practice to submit all tissue to the examination of a pathologist. 11 This is particularly important following abortion, because questions remain as to the long-range
complications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies.
See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin,
et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent
Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded
pathology reports, in concert with abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for studying those complications. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth,
428 u. s. 52, 81 (1976).
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion
is as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination.
This argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a
pathologist-not the performing physician-to examine tissue after almost every type of surgery. Although this requirement is in a provision relating to surgical procedures in
hospitals, many of the same procedures included within the
Missouri statute customarily are performed also in outpatient
tal abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
11
ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee" should examine "all
tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic operations. " ACOG, Standards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG
standards also state as a general rule that, for all surgical services performed on an ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 1982). The
dissent, however, relies on the recent modification of these standards as
they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change
in policy was controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800.
ACOG found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it recognized-on
the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a
microscopic examination is performed in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980).
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clinics. No reason has been suggested why the prudence required in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in such
a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to impose
stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing abortions than on hospitals. 12 As the testimony in the District
Court indicates, medical opinion differs widely on this question. See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847;
n. 2, supra. There is substantial support for Missouri's requirement.
In this case, for example, Dr. Bernard
Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner, testified that he requires a pathologist examination after each of
the 60,000 abortions performed under his direction at the
New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. He
considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or for that matter from any other surgical procedure
which involved the removal of tissue from the human body."
App. 143-144. See also App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr.
12
The professional views that the plaintiffs find to support their position
do not disclose whether consideration was given to the fact that not all
abortion clinics, particularly inadequately regulated clinics, conform to ethical or generally accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U. S. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti![) (minors may resort to "incompetent
or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). The SunTimes of Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to
obtain proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, that a
State reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is necessary
in abortion clinics as well as in general hospitals.
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests that we disregard the interests
of the "woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But
these women may be those most likely to seek the least expensive clinic
available. As the standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be
the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's examination of tissue is particularly important for their protection.
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Keitges); 5 Record 79~799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt). 13
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's
health and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to minimize to this extent the cost of abortions. Even in the early
weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide
to have an abortion may be permissible where justified by important state health objectives." City of Akron, ante, at 11.
See Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80--81. We think the cost of a
tissue examination does not significantly burden a pregnant
woman's abortion decision. The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services was $19.40
per abortion performed, 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48, and in
light of the substantial benefit's that a pathologist's examination can have, this small cost clearly is justified. In Danforth,
this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest
in protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 14 We view the re13
The dissent appears to suggest that § 188.047 is constitutionally infirm
because it does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that
misses the point of the regulation. The need is for someone other than the
performing clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue.
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is
reasonable for the State to assume that an independent pathologist is more
likely to perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor.
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the
pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy.") (emphasis added).
"The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S.,
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in
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quirement for a pathology report as comparable and as a
relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id.,
at 65&-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting).'" A State's interest in
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear,
however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
best interests." 16 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 17 The issue
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).
~ The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an open one,
and adhere to the views they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at 10-11.
But those views have never been adopted by a majority of this Court,
while a majority have expressed quite differing views. See H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (plurality opinion); id., at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
16
The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to parental consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982).
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
1
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here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with
these established legal standards. 18
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 19 in relevant part,
provides:
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.
11
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review,
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
18
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Although the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
19
See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
18. 428 U. S. , at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the

~
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
·
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 20 to
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature eno~gh to make her own decision and that an abortion
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not
agree.
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II.
20
We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (PowELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker.
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at
643, n. 22.
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denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good
cause.'" 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reasonably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good
cause" unless it first found-after having received the required evidence--that the minor was not mature enough to
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional
infirmities. 21
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invalidated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental and juducial consent
provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a second physician attend the abortion of any
viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding
an award of attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with
Hensley v. Eckerhart, --U.S.-- (1983).

It is so ordered.
21
Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts
to abstain.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II, and VI, and an opinioin with respect to
Parts III, IV, and V, in which THE CHIEF JusTICE joins.
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - - , and Simopoulos v.
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions.

I
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic
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("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional,
several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance of abortions. The sections relevant here include
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial
consent. 4
1
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a
hospital."
2
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides:
"A representative sample of tissuli removed at the time of abortion shall
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be
made a part of the patient's permanent record."
3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides:
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance,
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life
or health of the woman."
4
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides:
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant
woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received
the informed written consent of the minor; or
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699--701
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order,
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly,
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section.
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the following procedures:
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent,
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the
next friend;
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record,
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition.
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;

[Footnote

5

is on p. 4]
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F. 2d 848, 872--873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691
(1981). We granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 988 (1982).
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes
at issue.
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied;
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life of the minor."
• The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.
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II
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general,
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is
unconstitutional.
Missouri does not define the tenn "hospital" in its statutory provisions
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below,
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6,
that the tenn has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility.
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions
are perfonned other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads:
" 'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, defonnity or other abnonnal physical
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twentyfour hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated individuals .... "
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities,
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977).
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13,
and n. 16.
6
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III
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good
medical practice . . . to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs,
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the
The courts below found, and JusTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion
agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used because no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accordingly, for them, § 188.030.3 is overbroad. This reasoning rests on two
assumptions. First, a fetus cannot survive a D&E abortion, and second,
7

·~,;

·...
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature
infant.
D&E is the method of choice in the third trimester. There is general
agreement as to the first proposition, but not as to the second. Indeed,
almost all of the authorities disagree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN's critical assumption, and as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this procedure
after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at
865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts below, in conclusory language,
found that D&E is the "method of choice even after viability is possible."
655 F . 2d, at 865. No scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by
those courts or by the dissent. Reliance apparently is placed solely on the
testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas, to whom the District Court referred in a footnote. 483 F. Supp., at 694, n. 25. This testimony provides slim support for this holding. Dr. Crist's testimony, if
nothing else, is remarkable in its candor. He is a member of the National
Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and people interested in the pro-choice movement." 2 Record 415-416. He supported
the use of D&E on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In
some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure than other methods. See 2 Record 427-428. His disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only to
be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a
dead fetus." !d., at 431. He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to protect the fetus, if it can be saved," id., and finally that
"as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a live fetus," id., at 435.
Moreover, contrary to every other view, he thought a fetus could survive a
D&E abortion. I d., at 433-434. None of the other physicians who testified at the trial, those called both by the plaintiffs and defendants, considered that any use of D&E after viability was indicated. See 1 Record 21
(limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 weeks; would never perform D&E after
26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20 weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E
equivalent to childbirth at 24 weeks). See also 8 Record 33, 78-81 (deposition of Dr. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E performed). Apparently
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The first physician's primary concern will be the life and
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State permits
these late abortions only when they are necessary to preserve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreasonDr. Crist performed abortions only in Kansas, 2 Record 334, 368, 428, a
state having no statutes comparable to § 188.030.1 and § 188.030.2. It is
not clear whether he was operating under or familiar with the limitations
imposed by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the circumstances when
there were "contraindications" against the use of any of the procedures
that could preserve viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited
to emergency situations. Indeed, there is no record evidence that D&E
ever will be the method that poses the least risk to the woman in those rare
situations where there are compelling medical reasons for performing an
abortion after viability. If there were such instances, they hardly would
justify invalidating § 188.030.3.
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in its footnote, the District Court citedwith no elaboration-Dr. Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agreement with Dr. Crist, is enlightening. Although he conceded that the attendance of a second physician for a D&E abortion on a viable fetus was not
necessary, he considered the point mostly theoretical, because he "simply
[did] not believe that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an
elected method of abortion." 4 Record 836. When reminded of Dr.
Crist's earlier testimony, he conceded the remote possibility of third-trimester D&E abortions, but stated: "I personally cannot conceive that as a
significant practical point. It may be important legally, but [not] from a
medical standpoint.... " Ibid. Given that Dr. Crist's discordant testimony is wholly unsupported, the State's compelling interest in protecting a
viable fetus justifies the second-physician requirement even though there
may be the rare case when a physician may think honestly that D&E is
required for the mother's health. Legislation need not accommodate
every conceivable contingency.
8
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H .L . v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).
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able for the State to assume that during the operation the
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to preserving the woman's health, and not to protecting the actual
life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because of
their premature birth. A second physician, in situations
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health
and life of the child.
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is delivered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's
interests are protected more fully than the first physician
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling interest that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those unusual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimester abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible/ but the
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We believe the second-physician requirement reasonably furthers
the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
IV
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri
9
See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7%
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh &
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and OneHalf Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.
83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out
of 38live births); 4 Record 728 (50-62% mortality rate for fetuses 26 and 27
weeks); id., at 729 (2&-92% mortality rate for fetuses 28 and 29 weeks); id.,
at 837 (50% mortality rate at 34 weeks).
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requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). With respect to abortions, whether performed in hospitals or in some other facility, § 188.047 requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the
tissue report with the State Division of Health .... " Seen.
2, supra. The pathologist also is required to "provide a copy
of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the
abortion was performed or induced." Thus, Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well as
from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be
submitted to a pathologist, not merely examined by the performing doctor. The narrow question before us is whether
the State lawfully also may require the tissue removed following abortions performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to
be submitted to a pathologist.
On its face and in effect, § 188.047 is reasonably related to
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at
12. As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases,"
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. 10 As a rule, itis
A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous
growths, and a variety of other problems that can be discovered only
through a pathological examination. The general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear. See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards obligatory for N AF member facilities to remain in good standing); Brief of the
American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185,
81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-hospi10

.
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accepted medical practice to submit all tissue to the examination of a pathologist. 11 This is particularly important following abortion, because questions remain as to the long-range
complications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies.
See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin,
et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent
Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded
pathology reports, in concert with abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for studying those complications. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth,
428 u. s. 52, 81 (1976).
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion
is as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination.
This argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a
pathologist-not the performing physician-to examine tissue after almost every type of surgery. Although this requirement is in a provision relating to surgical procedures in
hospitals, many of the same procedures included within the
Missouri statute customarily are performed also in outpatient
tal abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
11
ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee" should examine "all
tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic operations." ACOG, Standards
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG
standards also state as a general rule that, for all surgical services performed on an ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 1982). The
dissent, however, relies on the recent modification of these standards as
they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change
in policy was controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800.
ACOG found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it recognized-on
the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a
microscopic examination is performed in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980) .

..
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clinics. No reason has been suggested why the prudence required in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in such
a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to impose
stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing abortions than on hospitals. 12 As the testimony in the District
Court indicates, medical opinion differs widely on this question. See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847;
n. 2, supra. There is substantial support for Missouri's requirement.
In this case, for example, Dr. Bernard
Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner, testified that he requires a pathologist examination after each of
the 60,000 abortions performed under his direction at the
New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. He
considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or for that matter from any other surgical procedure
which involved the removal of tissue from the human body."
App. 143--144. See also App. 146--147 (testimony of Dr.
The professional views that the plaintiffs find to support their position
do not disclose whether consideration was given to the fact that not all
abortion clinics, particularly inadequately regulated clinics, conform to ethical or generally accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U. S. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to "incompetent
or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). The SunTimes of Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to
obtain proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, that a
State reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is necessary
in abortion clinics as well as in general hospitals.
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests that we disregard the interests
of the "woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But
these women may be those most likely to seek the least expensive clinic
available. As the standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be
the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's examination of tissue is particularly important for their protection.
12
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Keitges); 5 Record 79~799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt). 13
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's
health and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to minimize to this extent the cost of abortions. Even in the early
weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide
to have an abortion may be permissible where justified by important state health objectives." City of Akron, ante, at 11.
See Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80-81. We think the cost of a
tissue examination does not significantly burden a pregnant
woman's abortion decision. The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services was $19.40
per abortion performed, 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48, and in
light of the substantial benefit's that a pathologist's examination can have, this small cost clearly is justified. In Danforth,
this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest
in protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 14 We view the re3

The dissent appears to suggest that § 188.047 is constitutionally infirm
because it does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that
misses the point of the regulation. The need is for someone other than the
performing clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue.
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is
reasonable for the State to assume that an independent pathologist is more
likely to perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor.
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the
pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy.") (emphasis added).
•• The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S.,
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in
'

81-1255 &
14

81-162~0PINION

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

quirement for a pathology report as comparable and as a
relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.

v
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id.,
at 65EK>57 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 15 A State's interest in
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear,
however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her
best interests." 16 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 17 The issue
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982).
'~The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an open one,
and adhere to the views they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at 10-11.
But those views have never been adopted by a majority of this Court,
while a majority have expressed quite differing views. See H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (plurality opinion); id., at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
16
The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to parental consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982).
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part:
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide
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here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with
these established legal standards. 18
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 19 in relevant part,
provides:
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.
17
Cf. H .L . v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here.
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review,
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
18
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree.
Cf. H.L . v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Although the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo.
1959).
19
See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting
forth the grounds for so finding; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied[.]"
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 20 to
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision and that an abortion
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not
agree.
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor."
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before
our decision in Bellotti II.
00
We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (PowELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker.
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at
643, n. 22.
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denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good
cause.'" 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reasonably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good
cause" unless it first found-after having received the required evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional
infirmities. 21
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invalidated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental and juducial consent
provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a second physician attend the abortion of any
viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding
an award of attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with
Hensley v. Eckerhart, --U.S.-- (1983).

It is so ordered.
21

Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts
to abstain.
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Akron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provisions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy
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the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the
Court's prior decisions.
I

Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is performed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligible or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy.
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abortions during the first trimester must be left "'free of interference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissible. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see
ante, at 8.
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justified by important health objectives. Although pathology
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the
examination be performed and the report prepared by a
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the attending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante,
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The
routine and accepted medical practice is for the attending
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tissue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician detects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) does not recommend an examination
by a pathologist in every case:
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy,
the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal
parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for
gross and microscopic examination.
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be
sent for further pathologic examination.... " AGOG,
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54
(1982). 1
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such
an examination is necessary:
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination,
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981)
(emphasis deleted).
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice
1
See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66
(1982):
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination . . .. An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified.
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination."
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of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Missouri's requirement that this examination be performed by a
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was
expert testimony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as
capable of performing an adequate gross examination as is a
pathologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of concern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848,
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135. 2 While a pathologist
may be better able to perform a microscopic examination,
Missouri law does not require a microscopic examination unless "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the initial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of
the attending physician and which will often make the pathologist's services unnecessary.
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist requirement] further[s] important health-related State concerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician.
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pathologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8,
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is undisputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10,
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspective, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put
2
The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done"
for every abortion. 483 F. Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980).
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the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966) ($1.50 poll
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S.
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to
appellate review for indigents).
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor recordkeeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps approach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions."
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri has not shown that
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits
have been exceeded.
II

In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 188.030.3
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at
3

A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abortion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim,
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981)
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure,
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 18-19
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester
abortion).
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164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may justify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abortions , except those necessary to preserve the life and health
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." I d., at 165;
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake").
A
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving
the life of a fetus born alive, this type of aid is possible only
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physician performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction
does not apply when this method "would present a greater
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.030.2 (1983).
The District Court found that the dilatation and evacuation
(D&E) method of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival,
and that it will nevertheless be the method of choice for some
women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in
other words , maternal health considerations will preclude the
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F.
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the
' The Court of Appeals upheld this factual finding. 665 F . 2d, at 865.
As a general rule , we do not review a District Court's factual findings in

..
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second physician can do nothing to further the State's compelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where
the burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865--866.
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester abortion" because "[w]e ...
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7,
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot justify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of
method presumably will be made in advance, 5 and any need
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would
hold it invalid. •
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S.
507, 512, n. 6 (1980).
5
In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the available method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one.
' The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more frequently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus,
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetusdestroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-
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B
In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to provide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it unconstitutional. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute appears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a
post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only when
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take
control of' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this section to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (emphasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second physician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict."
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979).
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to
"take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and health
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions without a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physicians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with.
ton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the physician's right to practice."
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissibly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether he may
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the woman's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay.
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability
abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to
make a 'trade-off between the woman's health and additional
percentage points offetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magnitude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible
criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician requirement invalid on this ground as well. 9
7

"Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation.'" Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971).
8
A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician requirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983).
9
Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds,
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician requirement impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second physician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a normal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the woman's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The individual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty").
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-
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III
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983). A minor who has
not obtained parental consent may petition the juvenile court
for court consent or the right to self-consent. The statute
then provides that
"the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion . . . ; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on
which the petition is denied .... " § 188.028.2(4).
The Court recognizes that this statute "[o]n its face ... authorizes juvenile courts to choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section." Ante, at 13 (footnote omitted). The District Court took a similar view, noting that
"each of the three [alternatives] is clearly independent of the
others, connected in the statute with the disjunctive 'or."'
The District Court also concluded that "[a]lternative (c) permits the court to 'deny the petition,' guided only by the general standard that such action be 'for good cause.'" 483
F. Supp., at 689. The District Court thus found it "clear
... that alternative (c) authorizes the juvenile court to deny
the minor's petition for good cause, but does not require a
prior finding that the minor is not sufficiently mature and not
competent to make a decision regarding abortion independently." Ibid.
If the statute is construed in accordance with its plain Ianwork are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a patient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician.
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detriment of both woman and child.

' '
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guage, it would be unconstitutional under the standards set
forth by the plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
643-644, 647-648 (1979) (Bellotti 11), and applied by the
Court today. To avoid the necessity of invalidating the statute, the Court applies the maxim that, "[w ]here fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality." Ante, at 14. The Court thus approves
the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, concluding
that a Missouri juvenile court may not "deny a [minor's] petition 'for good cause' unless it first [finds] ... that the minor
was not mature enough to make her own decision." Ante, at
14.
The Court's maxim of statutory construction may be a wise
one for federal courts to follow in discerning the meaning of
federal statutes, but it is not one we can impose on state
courts interpreting their own law. The interpretation of
Missouri law is a matter for the courts of Missouri, and "[t]he
majority's construction of state law is, of course, not binding on the Missouri courts." Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 101, n. 4 (opinion of
WHITE, J.). A Missouri juvenile court considering a petition
brought by a mature minor may therefore conclude, despite
this Court's optimistic assertion to the contrary, that Missouri's judicial consent statute means exactly what it says: the
court may "for good cause . . . [d]eny the petition." 10
'" This statute was enacted in 1979, after the Court's decision in Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), but very shortly before its 1979
decision in Bellotti II. The Massachusetts statute held invalid in Bellotti
II, like the Missouri statute before us today, permitted a court to grant or
deny a minor's petition "for good cause shown." See Bellotti II, 443 U. S.,
at 625. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this language to authorize the withholding of consent " 'in circumstances where
[the court] determines that the best interests of the minor will not be
served by an abortion,'" even if the minor "'is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion."' ld., at
630, quoting Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N. E. 2d

81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT
12

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

It is certainly possible that the courts of Missouri will
agree with this Court and construe Missouri law as the Court
does today. But this is a task that must be left to the state
courts. We cannot perform it for them. In Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), the Court held that
the District Court should have abstained where "an unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the
state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem."' Id., at 147,
quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177 (1959); see
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). I
feel that the District Court should have abstained here as
well. 11 Although Missouri does not have a certification procedure comparable to the one employed in Bellotti I, its rules
of procedure provide for expedited review of questions of
"general interest or importance." Mo. S. Ct. Rules 83.02,
83.06 (1983). In Bellotti I, moreover, we did not "mean to
intimate that abstention would be improper . . . were certification not possible." 428 U. S., at 151. 12 In cases where
288, 293 (1977). The Court does not explain why it expects the Missouri
courts to reach a different result.
11
The Court's interpretation of Missouri law is directly contrary to the
interpretation given by the United States District Judge, who has been on
the Missouri bench, state or federal, for over 30 years. The District Judge
declined to abstain on the basis that "[i]t is clear to this Court that section
188.028 is not susceptible to a reasonable construction which would
avoid the federal constitutional question controlling in Bellotti II." 483
F. Supp., at 690 (emphasis added). This District Judge's interpretation of
the statute should indicate that it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to necessitate abstention. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345--347 (1976).
12
While "speed in resolution" of this constitutional challenge remains important, Bellotti I, 428 U.S., at 151, it is worthy of note that enforcement
of these statutes has been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation.
The District Court would have been free to keep its stay in effect, in exercising its power to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional issue. See
England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964).
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constitutional rights of this magnitude are at stake, we
should refrain from speculating on the meaning of Missouri
law when an authoritative interpretation may be obtained by
other means. 13

'" Because I believe abstention is appropriate , I do not reach the question whether Missouri's parental-judicial consent statute as construed by
the Court is constitutional.
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Akron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provisions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy
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the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the
Court's prior decisions.
I
Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is performed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligible or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy.
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abortions during the first trimester must be left "'free of interference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissible. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see
ante, at 8.
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justified by important health objectives. Although pathology
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the
examination be performed and the report prepared by a
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the attending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante,
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The
routine and accepted medical practice is for the attending
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tissue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician detects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (AGOG) does not recommend an examination
by a pathologist in every case:
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy,
the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal
parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for
gross and microscopic examination.
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be
sent for further pathologic examination.... " ACOG,
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54
(1982). 1
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such
an examination is necessary:
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination,
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981)
(emphasis deleted).
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice
See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66
(1982):
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination .. . . An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified.
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination."
1
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of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Missouri's requirement that this examination be performed by a
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was
expert testimony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as
capable of performing an adequate gross examination as is a
pathologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of concern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848,
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135. 2 While a pathologist
may be better able to perform a microscopic examination,
Missouri law does not require a microscopic examination unless "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the initial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of
the attending physician and which will often make the pathologist's services unnecessary.
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist requirement] further[s] important health-related State concerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician.
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pathologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8,
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is undisputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10,
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspective, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put
The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done"
for every abortion. 483 F. Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980).
2
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the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966) ($1.50 poll
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S.
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to
appellate review for indigents).
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo . v. Danforth, 428
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor recordkeeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps approach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions."
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri has not shown that
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits
have been exceeded.
II
In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at
3

A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abortion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim,
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981)
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure,
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 18-19
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester
abortion).

~··
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164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may justify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abortions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." !d., at 165;
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake").
A
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving
the life of a fetus born alive, this type of aid is possible only
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physician performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction
does not apply when this method "would present a greater
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.030.2 (1983).
The District Court found that the dilatation and evacuation
(D&E) method of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival,
and that it will nevertheless be the method of choice for some
women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in
other words, maternal health considerations will preclude the
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F.
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the
' The Court of Appeals upheld this factual finding. 665 F. 2d, at 865.
As a general rule, we do not review a District Court's factual findings in

.,
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second physician can do nothing to further the State's compelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where
the burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865-866.
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester abortion" because "[w]e ...
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7,
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot justify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of
method presumably will be made in advance ,S and any need
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would
hold it invalid. 6
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S.
507, 512, n. 6 (1980).
5
In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the available method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the
method or technique employed. " Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one.
6
The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more frequently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus,
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetusdestroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-

.'
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In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to provide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it unconstitutional. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute appears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a
post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only when
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take
control of'' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this section to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (emphasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second physician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict."
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979).
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to
"take all reasonable steps ... to preserve the life and health
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions without a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physicians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with.
ton, 4iO U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the physician's right to practice."
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissibly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether he may
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the woman's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay.
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability
abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to
make a 'trade-off between the woman's health and additional
percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magnitude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible
criminal sanctions." ld., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician requirement invalid on this ground as well. 9
"Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation.'" Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971).
8
A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician requirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983).
9
Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds,
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician requirement impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second physician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a normal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the woman's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The individual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty").
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team7

f
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III
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983).

A
Until today, the Court has never upheld "a requirement of
a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," ante, at 11.
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U. S., at 74, the Court invalidated a parental consent requirement on the ground that "the State does not have the
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and
his patient, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent." In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II),
eight Justices agreed that as a ute perm1ttmg a JU 1c1a ve o
of a mature minor's decision to have an abortion was unconstitutional. See id., at 649-650 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id.,
at 654-656 (opinion of STEVENS J. . Althou h four Justices
stated in Bellotti II that appropriately structured judicia
consent requirement would be constitutional, id., at 647-648
(opinion of POWELL, J.), this statement was not necessary to
the result of the case and did not command a majority. Four
other Justices concluded that any judicial-consent statute
would suffer from the same flaw the Court identified in Danforth: it would give a third party an absolute veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient. I d., at 655-656
(opinion of STEVENS, J.).
I continue to adhere to the views expressed by JUSTICE
STEVENS in Bellotti II:
work are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a patient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician.
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detriment of both woman and child.

81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

11

"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny
and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign
or other third parties .... As a practical matter, I would
suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings
in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden
at least as great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent of the parent. Moreover, once this burden is met,
the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the
best interest of the minor. That standard provides little
real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores
whose enforcement upon the minor-particularly whe~·--<
contrary to her own informed and reasonable decisionis fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protection afforded to her decision." 443 U. S., at 65~56 (footnote omitted).
Because Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 permits a parental or judicial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion, I would
hold it unconstitutional.

B
Even if I believed that a State could require parental or judicial consent, I could not accept the Court's conclusion that
the Missouri consent statute should be upheld. Under Missouri law, a minor who has not obtained parental consent may
petition the juvenile court for court consent or the right to
self-consent. Section 188.028.2(4) then provides that:
"the court shall for good cause:
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion ... ; or
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on

..

1
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which the petition is denied .... "

The Court recognizes that this statute "[o]n its face ... authorizes juvenile courts to choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section." Ante, at 13 (footnote omitted). The District Court took a similar view, noting that
"each of the three [alternatives] is clearly independent of the
others, connected in the statute with the disjunctive 'or."'
The District Court also concluded that "[a]lternative (c) permits the court to 'deny the petition,' guided only by the general standard that such action be 'for good cause.'" 483
F. Supp., at 689. The District Court thus found it "clear
... that alternative (c) authorizes the juvenile court to deny
the minor's petition for good cause, but does not require a
prior finding that the minor is not sufficiently mature and not
competent to make a decision regarding abortion independently." Ibid.
If the statute is construed in accordance with its plain language, it would be unconstitutional under the standards set (
forth in either the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL or the opinion
of JUSTICE STEVENS in Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 643-644,
647-648, 652-656. To avoid the necessity of invalidating the
statute, the Court applies the maxim that, "[ w ]here fairly
possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of
unconstitutionality." Ante, at 14. The Court thus approves
the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, concluding
that a Missouri juvenile court may not "deny a [minor's] petition 'for good cause' unless it first [finds] ... that the minor
was not mature enough to make her own decision." Ante, at
14.
The Court's maxim of statutory construction may be a wise
one for federal courts to follow in discerning the meaning of
federal statutes, but it is not one we can impose on state
courts interpreting their own law. The interpretation of
Missouri law is a matter for the courts of Missouri, and "[t]he
majority's construction of state law is, of course, not bind-

)
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ing on the Missouri courts." Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 101, n. 4 (opinion of
WHITE, J. ). A Missouri juvenile court considering a petition
brought by a mature minor may therefore conclude, despite
this Court's optimistic assertion to the contrary, that Missouri's judicial consent statute means exactly what it says: the
court may "for good cause ... [d]eny the petition." 10
It is certainly possible that the courts of Missouri will
agree with this Court and construe Missouri law as the Court
does today. But this is a task that must be left to the state
courts. We cannot perform it for them. In Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti!), the Court held that
the District Court should have abstained where "an unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the
state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem."' Id., at 147,
quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177 (1959); see
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). I
feel that the District Court should have abstained here as
well. 11 Although Missouri does not have a certification pro10

This statute was enacted in 1979, after the Court's decision in Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti 1), but very shortly before its 1979
decision in Bellotti II. The Massachusetts statute held invalid in Bellotti
II, like the Missouri statute before us today, permitted a court to grant or
deny a minor's petition "for good cause shown." See Bellotti II, 443 U. S.,
at 625. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this language to authorize the withholding of consent " 'in circumstances where
[the court] determines that the best interests of the minor will not be
served by an abortion,'" even if the minor" 'is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion."' !d., at
630, quoting Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N. E. 2d
288, 293 (1977). The Court does not explain why it expects the Missouri
courts to reach a different result.
11
The Court's interpretation of Missouri law is directly contrary to the
interpretation given by the United States District Judge, who has been on
the Missouri bench, state or federal, for over 30 years. The District Judge
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cedure comparable to the one employed in Bellotti I, its rules
of procedure provide for expedited review of questions of
"general interest or importance." Mo. S. Ct. Rules 83.02,
83.06 (1983). In Bellotti I, moreover, we did not "mean to
intimate that abstention would be improper . . . were certification not possible." 428 U. S., at 151. 12 In cases where
constitutional rights of this magnitude are at stake, we
should refrain from speculating on the meaning of Missouri
law when an authoritative interpretation may be obtained by
other means.

declined to abstain on the basis that "[i]t is clear to this Court that section
188.028 is not susceptible to a reasonable construction which would
avoid the federal constitutional question controlling in Bellotti II." 483
F. Supp., at 690 (emphasis added). This District Judge's interpretation of
the statute should indicate that it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to necessitate abstention. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 34ih347 (1976).
12
While "speed in resolution" of this constitutional challenge remains important, Bellotti I, 428 U. S., at 151, it is worthy of note that enforcement
of these statutes has been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation.
The District Court would have been free to keep its stay in effect, in exercising its power to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional issue. See
England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964) .
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Akron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provisions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy
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the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the
Court's prior decisions.
I

Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is performed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligible or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy.
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abortions during the first trimester must be left "'free of interference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissible. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see
ante, at 8.
. Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justified by important health objectives. Although pathology
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the
examination be performed and the report prepared by a
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the attending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante,
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The
routine and accepted medical practice is for the attending
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tissue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician detects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) does not recommend an examination
by a pathologist in every case:

t
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy,
the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal
parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for
gross and microscopic examination.
". . .. Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be
sent for further pathologic examination.... " ACOG,
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54
(1982). 1
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such
an examination is necessary:
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination,
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981)
(emphasis deleted).
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice
' See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66
(1982):
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination .. .. An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified.
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination."
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of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Missouri's requirement that this examination be performed by a
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was
expert testimony at ~that a nonpath.Qlogist physician is as .....,
capable
e~n an ade uate oss examin . as is
pa ologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of concern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848,
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135. 2 While a pathologist
may be better able to perform a microscopic examination,
Missouri law does not require a microscopic examination unless "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo.
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the initial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of
the attending physician and which will often make the pathologist's services unnecessary.
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist requirement] further[s] important health-related State concerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician.
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pathologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8,
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is undisputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10,
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspective, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put

or

I

2
The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done"
for every abortion. 483 F. Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980).
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the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 668 (1966) ($1.50 poll
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S.
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to
appellate review for indigents).
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor recordkeeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps approach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions."
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri ha'S not shown that
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits
have been exceeded.
II
In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at
3
A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abortion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim,
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981)
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure,
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 1~19
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester
abortion).
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164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may justify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abortions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." I d., at 165;
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake").

A
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving
the life of a fetus born alive, this type of aid is possible only
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physician performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction
does not apply when this method "would present a greater
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.030.2 (1983).
The District Court foun that the dilatation and evacuation
(D&E) me o o a ortion entails no c~n~ of fetal survival,
and that it will nevertheless be the me MOI"Cli"oice for some
women who need post-viab1h y abortions. n some cases, in
otlier words, maternal health considerations will preclude the
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F.
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the
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As a general rule, w e do nOT revfew a DTstrict Court's factual findings in

(~~-~
~M
~~

~

,t~ ...

~·~

~
/-'4(._ 1¥ 7) s

~

·'·

81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT

7

second physician can do nothing to further the State's compelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where
tfie burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865--866.
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester abortion" because "[w]e ...
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7,
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot justify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of
method presumably will be made in advance, 5 and any need
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would
hold it invalid. 6
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S.
507, 512, n. 6 (1980).
' In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the available method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the
method or technique employed. " Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one.
• The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more frequently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a ·dead fetus,
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetusdestroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-
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B
In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to provide a clear exception for emergency situatio,ns renders it unconstitutional. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute appears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a
post-viability abortion "shall be performed . . . only when
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take
control of' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this section to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (emphasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second physician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict."
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979).
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to
"take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and health
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions without a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physicians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with.
ton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the physician's right to practice."
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissibly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether he may
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the woman's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay.
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability
abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to
make a 'trade-off between the woman's health and additional
percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magnitude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible
criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician requirement invalid on this ground as well. 9
7
"Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation."' Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971).
8
A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician requirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983).
9
Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds,
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician requirement impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second physician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There
· was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a-normal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the woman's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The individual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty").
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-

'I
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III
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983).
Until today, the Court has never upheld "a requirement of
a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," ante, at 11.
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U. S., at 74, the Court invalidated a parental consent requirement on the ground that "the State does not have the
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and
his patient, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent." In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II),
eight Justices agreed that a Massachusetts statute permitting a judicial veto of a mature minor's decision to have an
abortion was unconstitutional. See id., at 649-650 (opinion
ofPOWELL, J.); id., at 654-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Although four Justices stated in Bellotti II that an appropriately structured judicial consent requirement would be constitutional, id., at 647-648 (opinion of PoWELL, J.), this
statement was not necessary to the result of the case and did
not command a majority. Four other Justices concluded
that any judicial-consent statute would suffer from the same
flaw the Court identified in Danforth: it would give a third
party an absolute veto over the decision of the physician and
his patient. I d., at 655-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
I continue to adhere to the views expressed by JUSTICE
STEVENS in Bellotti II:
"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny
work are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a patient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician.
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detriment of both woman and child.
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and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign
or other third parties .... As a practical matter, I would
suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings
in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden
at least as great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent of the parent. Moreover, once this burden is met,
the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the
best interest of the minor. That standard provides little
real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores
whose enforcement upon the minor-particularly when
contrary to her own informed and reasonable decisionis fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protection afforded to her decision." 443 U. S., at 655-656 (footnote omitted).
Because Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 permits a parental or judicial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion, I would
hold it unconstitutional.
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, Jus- \
TICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Akron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provisions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy through abortion. I agree that Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the Akron analysis,
and I join Parts I and II of JusTICE PowELL's opinion in the j
present cases. I do not agree, however, that the remaining
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Missouri statutes challenged in these cases _satisfy the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the Court's prior
decisions.
I

Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is performed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligible or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy.
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abortions during the first trimester must be left "'free of interference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissible. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see
ante, at 13.
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justified by important health objectives. Although pathology
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the
examination be performed and the report prepared by a
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the attending physician. Contrary to JuSTICE POWELL'S assertion, ante, at 10, this requirement of a report by a pathologist
is not in accord with "generally accepted medical standards."
The routine and accepted medical practice is for the attending physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any
tissue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician detects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and

.'
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Gynecologists (ACOG) does not recommend an examination
by a pathologist in every case:
"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy,
the attending physician should record a description of
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal
parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for
gross and microscopic examination.
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be
sent for further pathologic examination. . . ." ACOG,
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54
(1982). 1

Nor does the National Abortion Federation b~lieve that such
an examination is necessary:
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination,
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examina'See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66
(1982):
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination .... An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified.
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination."
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tion." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981)
(emphasis deleted).
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was expert testimony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as capable of
performing an adequate gross examination as is a pathologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of concern" are
readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848, 871, n. 37
(CA8 1981); see App. 135. 2 While a pathologist may be better able to perform a microscopic examination, Missouri law
does not require a microscopic examination unless "fetal
parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo. Admin. Code
§ 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the initial gross
examination, which is normally the responsibility of the attending physician and which will often make the pathologist's
services unnecessary.
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist requirement] further[s] important health-related State concerns." Akron, ante, at 12. 3 There has been no showing
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician.
Missouri does not require pathologists' reports for any other
surgical procedures performed in clinics, or for minor surgery performed in hospitals. 13 Mo. Admin. Code §5020.030(3)(A)(7) (1977). Moreover, I cannot agree with JusTICE POWELL that Missouri's pathologist requirement has
"no significant impact" ante, at 13, on a woman's exercise of
2

The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done"
for every abortion. 483 F . Supp: 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980).
3
JUSTICE POWELL appears to draw support from the facts that "questionable practices" occur at some abortion clinics, while at others "the
standards of medical practice . .. may not be the highest." Ante, at 12, n.
12. There is no evidence, however, that such questionable practices occur
in Missouri.
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her right to an abortion. It is undisputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a first-trimester abortion by as
much as $40. See 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this
increase may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable
perspective, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to
every woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may
well put the price of an abortion beyond reach. 4 Cf. Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 668 (1966)
($1.50 poll tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v.
Ohio, 360 U. S. 252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to appellate review for indigents).
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor recordkeeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps approach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions."
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri has not shown that
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits
have been exceeded.
II

In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman.
'A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abortion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim,
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981)
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure,
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 18-19
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester
abortion).
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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at
164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may justify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abortions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." !d., at 165;
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake").
A
The second physician requirement is upheld in t ·s.-case-~
the basis that it "reasonably furthers
the State's
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses."
Ante, at 9. While I agree that a second physician indeed
may aid in preserving the life of a fetus born alive, this type
of aid is possible only when the abortion method used is one
that may result in a live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily
requires a physician performing a post-viability abortion to
use the abortion method most likely to preserve fetal life, this
restriction
oes no apply when this method "would present a greater
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 188.030.2 (1983).
The District Court found that the dilatation and evacuation
(D&E) method of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival,
and that it will nevertheless be the method of choice for some

I
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women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in
other words, maternal health considerations will preclude the
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F.
Supp., at 694. 5 When a D&E abortion is performed, the
second physician can do nothing to further the State's compelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where
the burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865-866.
JusTICE POWELL apparently believes that the State's interest in preserving potential life justifies the State in requiring a second physician at all post-viability abortions because
some methods other than D&E may result in live births.
But this fact cannot justify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of method presumably will be made in ad5
The District Court relied on the testimony of Doctors Robert Crist and
Richard Schmidt. Doctor Crist testified that in some instances abortion
methods other than D&E would be "absolutely contraindicated" by the
woman's health condition, 2 Record 438-439, giving the example of a recent
patient with hemolytic anemia that would have been aggravated by the use
of prostaglandins or other labor-inducing abortion methods, id., at 428.
Doctor Schmidt testified that "[t]here very well may be" situations in
which D&E would be used because other methods were contraindicated.
4 Record 836. Although Doctor Schmidt previously had testified that a
post-viability D&E abortion was "almost inconceivable," this was in response to a question by the State's attorney regarding whether D&E
would be used "[a]bsent the possibility that there is extreme contraindication for the use of prostaglandins or saline, or of hysterotomy." I d., at
787. Any inconsistencies in Doctor Schmidt's testimony apparently were
resolved by the District Court in the plaintiffs' favor.
The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's factual finding that
health reasons sometimes would require the use of D&E for post-viability
abortions. 665 F. 2d, at 865. Absent the most exceptional circum-

stances, ~

cweaonDt review a District Court's factual findings in which the Court of
Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507, 512, n. 6 (1980).
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vance, 6 and any need for a second physician disappears when
the woman's health requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would hold it invalid. 7
B
In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to provide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it unconstitutional. As JUSTICE POWELL recognizes, ante, at 8,
n. 8, an emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to the life or health of the woman. A second physician
may not always be available in such a situation; yet the statute appears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms,
that a post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only
when there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall
take control of' any child born as a result of the abortion, and
it imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this
In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the available method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one.
7
The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more frequently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus,
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetusdestroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State,
he is recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical
judgment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his
license are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners
has no rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on
the physician's right to practice."
6

..
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section to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3
(emphasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second
physician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to
the health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly
fails to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979).
JUSTICE POWELL attempts to cure this defect by asserting
that the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to "take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and
health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not
pose an increased risk to the life or health of the woman,"
could be construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions without a second physician. Ante, at 8, n. 8. This
construction is contrary to the plain language of the statute; }
the clause upon which JusTICE PowELL relies refers to the
duties of both physicians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way suggests that the second physician may
be dispensed with.
Moreover, since JUSTICE POWELL's proposed construction
is not binding on the courts of Missouri, 8 a physician performing an emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on
it with any degree of confidence. The statute thus remains
impermissibly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether
he may proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or whether he must wait for a second physician even if
the woman's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay. This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect
on the physician who perceives the patient's need for a postviability abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a
statute that failed to specify whether it "require[d) the physi8
"Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation.'" Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971).
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cian to make a 'trade-off' between the woman's health and additional percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at
400. The Court held there that "where conflicting duties of
this magnitude are involved, the State, at the least, must
proceed with greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 9 I
would apply that reasoning here, and hold Missouri's secondphysician requirement invalid on this ground as well. 10

III
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983).
Until today, the Court has never upheld "a requirement of
a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," ante, at 14.
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U. S., at 74, the Court invalidated a parental consent requirement on the ground that "the State does not have the
9
A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician requirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983).
10
Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds,
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician requirement impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second physician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a normal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the woman's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The individual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty").
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and teamwork are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a patient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician.
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detriment of both woman and child.
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constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and
his patient, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent." In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II),
eight Justices agreed that a Massachusetts statute permitting a judicial veto of a mature minor's decision to have an
abortion was unconstitutional. See id., at 649-650 (opinion
of POWELL, J. ); id., at 654-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J. ). Although four Justices stated in Bellotti II that an appropriately structured judicial consent requirement would be constitutional, id., at 647-648 (opinion of POWELL, J.), this
statement was not necessary to the result of the case and did
not command a majority. Four other Justices concluded
that any judicial-consent statute would suffer from the same
flaw the Court identified in Danforth: it would give a third
party an absolute veto over the decision of the physician and
his patient. Id., at 655--656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
I continue to adhere to the views expressed by JUSTICE
STEVENS in Bellotti II:
"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny
and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign
or other third parties .... As a practical matter, I would
suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings
in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden
at least as great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent of the parent. Moreover, once this burden is met,
the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the
best interest of the minor. That standard provides little
real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores
whose enforcement upon the minor-particularly when
contrary to her own informed and reasonable decisionis fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underly-
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ing the constitutional protection afforded to her decision." 443 U. S., at 655-656 (footnote omitted).
Because Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 permits a parental or judicial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion, I would
hold it unconstitutional.

